Investigating the effects of co-witness influence on blame attribution. by Mojtahedi, Dara
 INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTS OF CO-WITNESS 
INFLUENCE ON BLAME ATTRIBUTION 
DARA MOJTAHEDI 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Huddersfield in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
The University of Huddersfield 
 
May 2018 
 
2 
 
Copyright statement 
i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or 
schedules to this thesis) owns any copyright in it (the “Copyright”) 
and s/he has given The University of Huddersfield the right to use 
such copyright for any administrative, promotional, educational 
and/or teaching purposes. 
ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, may be made only 
in accordance with the regulations of the University Library. Details 
of these regulations may be obtained from the Librarian. This page 
must form part of any such copies made. 
iii. The ownership of any patents, designs, trademarks and any and all 
other intellectual property rights except for the Copyright (the 
“Intellectual Property Rights”) and any reproductions of copyright 
works, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may 
be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and 
may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property Rights 
and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use 
without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant 
Intellectual Property Rights and/or Reproductions 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
Through the use of misinformation paradigms, research has demonstrated that 
eyewitnesses can be influenced by their co-witnesses when attempting to attribute blame to 
the correct person in incidents where there are multiple potential suspects at blame (such 
as a fight or car accident). The act of blame conformity could directly contribute to the false 
conviction of innocent bystanders and should therefore be a central focus for research. Yet 
very little research has attempted to investigate the moderating factors associated with 
blame conformity. The present thesis investigated the effects of co-witness influence on 
eyewitness blame attribution. More specifically, the thesis sought to identify the external 
and internal predictors of blame conformity. A similar experimental paradigm to Thorley 
(2015) was created to observe blame conformity. In the present studies, confederates were 
used to expose participants to misleading post-event information about the witnessed crime 
footage (suggesting that the wrong person had initiated the assault). Participants were then 
interviewed and asked if they could determine which person from the incident was to blame 
for initiating the assault. A series of internal and external variables were measured and 
manipulated to identify the most accurate predictors of blame conformity. In total, four 
studies were carried out: The studies investigated the effects of age and gender (study 1a); 
unanimity and group size of misinformation (study 1b; using same data as 1a); personality 
characteristics (FIRO-B assessment)(study 2); co-witness familiarity (study 3); and the 
perceived intelligence and authority of the misinformation source (study 4), on co-witness 
influence. 
The results found no significant age or gender-related differences in blame 
conformity. In relation to personality; the results suggested eyewitnesses who scored highly 
on the wanted control dimension were more likely to accept misinformation from co-
witnesses, and were more likely to lose confidence in their own judgements after a group 
discussion. Results also indicated that participants were more vulnerable to co-witness 
influence when exposed to misinformation from a majority of co-witnesses. Misinformation 
presented by an individual confederate did not have a significant influence on participants’ 
responses. It was found that the level of statement similarity with regard to blame 
attribution was higher when the co-witnesses had a pre-existing relationship. Results 
indicated that participants were also more likely to conform to the confederate if she was 
presented as having high intelligence, in comparison to a confederate whose personal 
characteristics were undisclosed. After controlling for perceived intelligence, the perceived 
authority of the confederate did not have a significant effect on their influence over the 
participants. The implications and practical applications of the findings — as well as 
directions for future research— are discussed within the thesis.
4 
 
Table of Contents  
Contents 
Abstract ......................................................................................................... 3 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................ 4 
List of Tables ................................................................................................ 12 
List of Figures ............................................................................................... 14 
Dedications and Acknowledgements ................................................................. 15 
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................. 16 
1.1. The issue with co-witness influence ........................................................ 16 
1.2. The current work .................................................................................. 20 
Chapter 2: The Effects of Post-Event Information on Eyewitness Memory ............. 21 
2.1. Introduction to post-event information and the misinformation effect ......... 21 
2.2. Sources of misinformation ..................................................................... 22 
2.2.1. Misinformation from co-witnesses ..................................................... 22 
2.2.2. Misinformation from interviewers ...................................................... 23 
2.2.3. Misinformation from media reports ................................................... 24 
2.2.3. Comparing the different sources of post-event information .................. 24 
2.3. Causes of misinformation acceptance ..................................................... 26 
2.3.1. Demand characteristics ................................................................... 26 
2.3.2. Source monitoring errors ................................................................. 29 
2.3.3. Comparing the causes of misinformation acceptance. .......................... 33 
Chapter 3: Co-witness Influence ...................................................................... 35 
3.1. Co-witness discussions.......................................................................... 35 
3.2. A theoretical model of co-witness influence ............................................. 39 
3.2.1. History of social conformity research ................................................. 39 
3.2.2. Normative VS informational influence. ............................................... 40 
3.3. Measuring co-witness influence in a laboratory setting .............................. 43 
3.3.1. Collaborative recall paradigm ........................................................... 43 
3.3.2. Social contagion of memory paradigm ............................................... 44 
5 
 
3.3.3. Memory conformity paradigm ........................................................... 45 
3.4. Empirical research findings .................................................................... 46 
3.4.1. Memory conformity ......................................................................... 47 
3.4.2. Interpreting the event and blame conformity ..................................... 50 
3.4.3. Eyewitness confidence ..................................................................... 53 
3.4.4. The effects of group discussion on memory recall ............................... 54 
Chapter 4:  Factors Influencing Memory Conformity ........................................... 57 
4.1. General introduction to the chapter ........................................................ 57 
4.2. Gender-related differences in co-witness suggestibility. ............................ 58 
4.2.1. Informational influence .................................................................... 58 
4.2.2. Source monitoring .......................................................................... 62 
4.2.3. Interpersonal behaviour and normative influence ................................ 62 
4.2.4. Research on gender and memory conformity ..................................... 63 
4.2.5. Limitations of previous research ....................................................... 64 
4.3. Age-related differences in co-witness suggestibility .................................. 65 
4.3.1. Informational influence .................................................................... 66 
4.3.2. Source monitoring .......................................................................... 69 
4.3.3. Research on age and memory conformity .......................................... 69 
4.3.4. Limitations of previous research: Age as a nominal variable ................. 70 
4.4. Personality and Co-witness suggestibility ................................................ 71 
4.4.1. Personality and misinformation acceptance ........................................ 71 
4.4.2. Interpersonal characteristics and co-witness suggestibility ................... 74 
4.4.3. Predicting co-witness suggestibility ................................................... 75 
4.4.4. Limitations of previous research ....................................................... 77 
4.5. Group size and co-witness suggestibility ................................................. 78 
4.5.1. Prevalence of pair studies within the existing literature........................ 79 
4.5.2. Misinformation size ......................................................................... 80 
4.5.3. Unanimity of misinformation ............................................................ 87 
4.6. Co-witness familiarity ........................................................................... 89 
6 
 
4.7. Co-witness characteristics ..................................................................... 92 
4.7.1. Perceived competence ..................................................................... 94 
4.7.2. Perceived status and authority ......................................................... 95 
4.7.3. Informational and Normative pressures ............................................. 96 
Chapter 5: Introduction to the Experimental Chapters ........................................ 98 
5 .............................................................................................................. 98 
.1. The empirical studies .............................................................................. 98 
5.1.1. Study 1a: Gender & age effects on co-witness suggestibility ................ 98 
5.1.2. Study 1b: Group size and co-witness influence ................................... 99 
5.1.3. Study 2: Personality and co-witness suggestibility .............................. 99 
5.1.4. Study 3: Co-witness familiarity and co-witness influence ..................... 99 
5.1.5. Study 4: The impacts of perceived competence on co-witness influence100 
5.1.6. Multiple comparisons of data for studies one (a & b) and two .............. 100 
5.2. Methodological Considerations .............................................................. 101 
5.2.1. Sampling ...................................................................................... 101 
5.2.2. Stimulus materials ......................................................................... 103 
5.2.3. General design and procedure ......................................................... 106 
5.3. Ethical considerations .......................................................................... 108 
Chapter 6 Study 1a: Gender & Age Effects on Co-Witness Suggestibility .............. 110 
6.1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 110 
6.1.1. Gender-related differences in co-witness suggestibility ....................... 110 
6.1.2. Age-related differences in co-witness suggestibility ............................ 111 
6.2. Present study ..................................................................................... 111 
6.3. Methodology ....................................................................................... 113 
6.3.1. Participants ................................................................................... 113 
6.3.2. Design ......................................................................................... 113 
6.3.3. Materials ...................................................................................... 115 
6.3.4. Procedure ..................................................................................... 115 
6.4. Results .............................................................................................. 116 
7 
 
6.4.1. Control group ................................................................................ 119 
6.4.2. Blame attribution ........................................................................... 122 
6.4.3. Eyewitness confidence in blame attribution ....................................... 124 
6.5. Discussion .......................................................................................... 126 
6.5.1. Gender and co-witness suggestibility in blame attribution ................... 127 
6.5.2. Age and co-witness suggestibility in blame attribution ........................ 129 
6.5.3. Misinformation and overconfidence .................................................. 130 
6.5.4. Limitations and directions for future research .................................... 131 
6.5.5. Summary ..................................................................................... 132 
Chapter 7: Study 1b: Group Size and Co-Witness Influence. .............................. 133 
7.1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 133 
7.1.1. Misinformation size ........................................................................ 133 
7.1.2. Unanimity of misinformation ........................................................... 134 
7.2. Present study ..................................................................................... 135 
7.3. Methodology ....................................................................................... 136 
7.3.1. Participants ................................................................................... 136 
7.3.2. Design & procedure ....................................................................... 136 
7.3.3. Materials ...................................................................................... 137 
7.4. Results .............................................................................................. 137 
7.4.1. General descriptive data ................................................................. 137 
7.4.2. The effects of confederate size and unanimity on blame conformity ..... 139 
7.4.3. The effects of confederate size and unanimity on confidence ............... 142 
7.5. Discussion .......................................................................................... 142 
7.5.1. Misinformation size and blame conformity ........................................ 143 
7.5.2. Unanimity of misinformation and blame conformity ............................ 145 
7.5.3. Misinformation size, unanimity and confidence .................................. 146 
7.5.4. Implications .................................................................................. 146 
7.5.5. Limitations and directions for future research .................................... 147 
7.5.6. Summary ..................................................................................... 148 
8 
 
Chapter 8: Study 2: Personality and Co-witness Suggestibility ........................... 149 
8.1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 149 
8.1.1. Personality correlates of eyewitness suggestibility.............................. 149 
8.2. Present study ..................................................................................... 150 
8.3. Methodology ....................................................................................... 151 
8.3.1. Participants ................................................................................... 151 
8.3.2. Measures and Materials .................................................................. 152 
8.3.3. Design ......................................................................................... 153 
8.3.4. Procedure ..................................................................................... 154 
8.4. Results .............................................................................................. 155 
8.4.1. Predicting eyewitness suggestibility through response accuracy. .......... 157 
8.4.2. Predicting eyewitness suggestibility, through eyewitness confidence .... 162 
8.5. Discussion .......................................................................................... 166 
8.5.1. FIRO-B and blame conformity ......................................................... 167 
8.5.2. FIRO-B and eyewitness confidence................................................... 171 
8.5.3. Group size .................................................................................... 172 
8.5.4. Implications of results .................................................................... 172 
8.5.5. Limitations and directions for future research. ................................... 174 
8.5.6. Conclusion .................................................................................... 175 
Chapter 9:  Study 3: The Effects of Co-Witness Familiarity on Blame Conformity .. 176 
9.1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 176 
9.1.2. Building on the existing research on co-witness familiarity .................. 177 
9.2. Present study ..................................................................................... 178 
9.3. Methodology ....................................................................................... 179 
9.3.1. Participants ................................................................................... 179 
9.3.2. Design & procedure ....................................................................... 180 
9.3.3. Materials ...................................................................................... 180 
9.3.4. Coding ......................................................................................... 181 
9.4. Results .............................................................................................. 181 
9 
 
9.4.1. Descriptive data ............................................................................ 181 
9.4.2. Unanimity of group statements ....................................................... 182 
9.4.3. Eyewitness blame attribution accuracy ............................................. 183 
9.5. Discussion .......................................................................................... 184 
9.5.1. Co-witness influence between strangers ........................................... 184 
9.5.2. Co-witness influence between familiar eyewitnesses. ......................... 186 
9.5.3. Post-event discussion and eyewitness accuracy ................................. 187 
9.5.4. Limitations and directions for future research .................................... 188 
9.5.5. Conclusion .................................................................................... 189 
Chapter 10:  Study 4: Perceived Competence and Co-witness Influence .............. 190 
10.1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 190 
10.1.1. Perceived competence .................................................................. 190 
10.1.2. Perceived status and authority....................................................... 191 
10.2. Present study .................................................................................... 191 
10.3. Methodology ..................................................................................... 193 
10.3.1. Participants ................................................................................. 193 
10.3.2. Design ........................................................................................ 194 
10.3.3. Confederates ............................................................................... 195 
10.3.4. Materials ..................................................................................... 195 
10.3.5. Procedure ................................................................................... 196 
10.4. Results ............................................................................................. 196 
10.4.1. Blame conformity ......................................................................... 198 
10.4.2. Confidence .................................................................................. 200 
10.5. Discussion ........................................................................................ 203 
10.5.1. Intelligence and co-witness influence.............................................. 204 
10.5.2. Authority versus intelligence ......................................................... 205 
10.5.3. Co-witness influence on confidence ................................................ 207 
10.5.4. Limitations and directions for future research .................................. 208 
10.5.5. Conclusion .................................................................................. 209 
10 
 
Chapter 11:  General Discussion ..................................................................... 210 
11.1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 210 
11.2. Summary of main findings .................................................................. 211 
11.3. Discussion of main findings ................................................................. 215 
11.3.1. Are the effects of co-witness discussions necessarily negative? .......... 217 
11.3.2. Gender and age-related differences ................................................ 218 
11.3.3. Personality correlates of co-witness suggestibility ............................ 219 
11.3.4. Co-witness familiarity ................................................................... 220 
11.3.5. Perceptions of the information source ............................................. 221 
11.3.6. Misinformation size and unanimity ................................................. 222 
11.3.7. Confidence as a measure of co-witness influence ............................. 224 
11.4. Real life applicability of findings ........................................................... 225 
11.5. Limitations and directions for future research ........................................ 228 
11.5.1. No filler tasks administrated .......................................................... 228 
11.5.2. Singular measure for blame conformity .......................................... 229 
11.5.3. The time interval between witnessing an incident and giving evidence 230 
11.5.4. Controlling for speaking order during the group discussion ................ 230 
11.5.5. Skewed sample size ..................................................................... 231 
11.5.6. Interviewing techniques ................................................................ 231 
11.5.7. Recording the responses of participants before the group discussion .. 232 
11.5.8. Controlling for the participants' ethnicity and education .................... 232 
11.5.9. Peripheral errors during the blame attribution task........................... 233 
11.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................ 234 
References .................................................................................................. 236 
Appendices .................................................................................................. 284 
Appendix 1. Pre-experiment instruction sheets. ........................................... 284 
A. True participant sheet ..................................................................... 284 
B. Confederate sheet .......................................................................... 285 
Appendix 2. Information sheet, consent form and debrief sheet..................... 286 
11 
 
A. Information sheet. ......................................................................... 286 
B. Consent form................................................................................. 290 
C. Debrief sheet ................................................................................. 291 
Appendix 3. Evidence of SREP approval ........................................................ 292 
Appendix 4. Interview script ........................................................................ 292 
Appendix 5. Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behaviour Scale . 293 
 
  
12 
 
 
List of Tables  
 
Table 5.1 Percentage of participant’s blame attribution accuracy within pilot ........ 105 
Table 6.1 Frequencies for experimental conditions (N=608) ............................... 114 
Table 6.2. Distribution of responses within all conditions. .................................. 117 
Table 6.3 Means and standard deviations of age for all conditions and responses. 118 
Table 6.4. Means and standard deviations of confidence. ................................... 119 
Table 6.5. Multinomial logistic regression predicting blame attribution. ................ 121 
Table 6.6. Linear Regression Model of eyewitness confidence. ............................ 121 
Table 6.7. Multinomial logistic regression predicting blame attribution. ................ 123 
Table 6.8. Multinomial logistic regression predicting blame attribution. ................ 124 
Table 6.9. Descriptive statistics, reliability, and correlations ............................... 125 
Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics for participant responses  ................................. 138 
Table 7.2. Descriptive statistics for conditions in relation to confederate size. ...... 138 
Table 7.3. Descriptive statistics and correlations for all continuous variables  ....... 138 
Table 7.4. Multinomial logistic regression predicting response accuracy. .............. 140 
Table 8.1. Participant information for each experimental condition. ..................... 154 
Table 8.2. Means and standard deviations of FIRO-B scales for all conditions ....... 156 
Table 8.3. Descriptive statistics, and correlations for all continuous variables ....... 157 
Table 8.4. Multinomial logistic regression predicting response accuracy. .............. 160 
Table 8.5. Multinomial logistic regression predicting response accuracy. .............. 161 
Table 8.6. Hierarchical Regression Model of confidence for correct responses. ...... 163 
Table 8.7. Hierarchical Regression Model of confidence for correct responses. ...... 164 
Table 8.8. Hierarchical Regression Model of confidence for incorrect responses. ... 165 
Table 8.9. Hierarchical Regression Model of confidence for incorrect responses. ... 166 
13 
 
Table 9.1. Percentage of blame attribution accuracy between conditions. ............ 182 
Table 9.2. Descriptive data for average statement similarity within groups. ......... 182 
Figure 9.1 Mean percentage of group statement similarity. ................................ 183 
Table 10.1. Distribution of eyewitness responses between conditions (N=193). .... 197 
Table 10.2. Mean confidence scores in blame attributions (N=164). .................... 197 
Table 10.3. Multinomial logistic regression predicting blame attribution ............... 200 
Table 10.4. Hierarchical Regression Model of confidence in correct statements. .... 202 
Table 10.5. Hierarchical Regression Model of confidence in incorrect statements. . 203 
 
 
14 
 
List of Figures  
 
Figure 5.1: Experimental stimulus, initial discussion between both men………………….104 
Figure 5.2: Experimental stimulus, the man in the dark green t shirt attacking……..104 
Figure 5.3: Experimental stimulus, both men being separated after their fight………105 
Figure 7.1: Percentage count of participant responses between confederate sizes…141 
Figure 9.1: Mean percentage of group statement similarity………………………………………183 
Figure 10.1: Distribution of eyewitness responses between the conditions……………….198 
 
15 
 
Dedications and Acknowledgements  
 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Mitra Asad-Akhtari and Ebrahim Mojtahedi. 
Was it not for them, this PhD would not have been possible. Their love and support 
motivated me to push myself and work through those late nights in the office. I would also 
like to thank my girlfriend Rebecca, for supporting me and providing me with endless cups 
of tea to get me through those long nights of data analysis.  
My supervisors also deserve substantial acknowledgement. Not only did Dr Maria 
Ioannou and Dr Laura Hammond provide fantastic supervision, but they also helped create 
an environment for me to excel in. Thank you for guiding me through this journey and more 
importantly, thank you for helping me gain confidence in myself as an academic member of 
staff. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge my friend, John Groarke. He did not provide any 
support or contribution to this PhD and was at times, detrimental to my progression. 
However, he has been pestering me for the last 3 years to put his name in my 
acknowledgements, for being “a top mate”. 
16 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
‘What a court wants is the independent recollection of the individual witness. It does 
not want a number of observers to get together and agree among themselves upon a 
common version’ (Heaton-Armstrong, 1987, p.472). 
 
1.1. The issue with co-witness influence 
 
Eyewitnesses play an important role in many police investigations and courtroom 
decisions (Brewer & Wells, 2011). There are different ways in which eyewitnesses can be 
used to help drive investigations forward, and ultimately help to identify and convict 
offenders. Witnesses to crimes can be asked to make an identification, which requires the 
witness to view a police line-up to see if they can identify the culprit (Brewer & Wells, 2011; 
Bruer, Harvey, & Adams, 2017; Gronlund, Wixted, & Mickes, 2014). Additionally, many 
witnesses can be asked to provide an eyewitness statement and subsequent testimony, 
which requires the eyewitness to recall the event and describe both the peripheral (e.g. 
colour of the offenders clothing) and central (e.g. the offender’s actions) details from the 
incident (Lindholm, 2008).  
The tasks of witness identification and recollection can be seen as dissimilar 
processes which can be explained through different cognitive models (Kintsch, 1970; 
Robinson & Johnson, 1996; Pozzulo, Dempsey, Crescini, & Lemieux, 2009; Robinson & 
Johnson, 1996). During the process of eyewitness identification, witnesses will rely on their 
recognition memory system to determine whether they can identify the offender within a 
line-up. Recognition is the process in which the contents of new information (in this case, 
individuals within the line-up) are compared against the contents of the existing memory to 
determine whether the new information had previously been encountered (Radvansky, 
2017). If there is a clear match, recognition occurs and the individual is likely to make an 
identification (see Anderson, 2000; Murdock, 1974). However, during the task of eyewitness 
identification, not only must the witness find the suspect familiar, but the source of the 
familiarity must be correctly attributed to the criminal event for an identification to be 
confidently made (Radvansky, 2017).  
Whilst eyewitness identification centres heavily on the witness’s abilities in facial 
recognition (Goldsttein, Johnson, & Chance, 1979), the process of providing a statement 
requires witnesses to recall many more aspects of an event (Wright, Gabbert, Memon, & 
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London, 2006). When given a statement, witnesses will be more reliant on their recollection 
memory. The generate-recognize model of recall (see Anderson & Bower, 1972; Bahrick, 
1970; Kintsch, 1970; Radvansky, 2017) posits that — whereas the process of recognition 
involves simply discriminating new information against old memories — memory recollection 
is a two-stage process involving the retrieval and recognition of memories: Memory is first 
recalled through a retrieval process where an individual will use retrieval cues to identify 
fragments of information for a particular event, from their episodic memory.  Then, at the 
second stage, the individual will use a recognition process to cross-reference the 
information, identify the correct memories and generate an accurate recollection of the 
event.  
A common assumption made within the criminal justice system is that the 
identifications and statements given by eyewitnesses will be reliable and independent from 
those of other witnesses (Brigham & WolfsKeil, 1983; Deffenbacher & Loftus, 1982). 
Moreover, eyewitnesses are advised that any assertions made should be based on their own 
experiences and not on information encountered through other sources (Forbes, 2003). 
However, if an eyewitness discusses the event with other co-witnesses, the issue arises as 
to whether their own recollection will remain untainted and uninfluenced by the new 
information.  
It must be noted that eyewitnesses do not always witness crimes in groups 
(Valentin, Pickering & Darling, 2003). However, multiple studies on real eyewitness cases 
reported that in approximately 83-86% of criminal events multiple eyewitnesses are present 
(Skagerberg & Wright, 2008a; Wright & McDaid, 1996). Furthermore, Paterson and Kemp’s 
(2006a) survey on real eyewitnesses found that 86% of the respondents admitted to 
discussing the event with other co-witnesses prior to giving their statements. With such a 
high proportion of eyewitnesses choosing to discuss the event with their co-witnesses, 
researchers have been prompted to determine whether such actions can pose a serious risk 
to the validity of eyewitness testimonies as a reliable and independent form of evidence. 
The consequences of co-witness influence have been demonstrated in many publicized 
cases where false eyewitness testimonies were used. The assassination of Swedish foreign 
minister, Anna Lindh, in 2003 can be used as a prime example of how collective 
interviewing can lead to inaccurate eyewitness statements. After the incident, police officers 
chose to interview several witnesses collectively, to produce a more detailed description of 
the offender. However, by exposing the witnesses to the reports of their co-witnesses, false 
information from some of the witnesses had contaminated the statements of others. 
Consequently, many of the witnesses were influenced into producing false information which 
lead the investigators into producing an erroneous description of the offender — many 
18 
 
witnesses had later admitted to recalling information that they had heard their co-witnesses 
report (Granhag, Stromwall & Hartwig, 2005). Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978) explained 
that when individuals attempt to report the visual details from a previous experience, verbal 
information about the event (learned post-event) from their semantic memory could be 
erroneously integrated as a visual memory and thus, wrongfully reported as witnessed 
information. This could explain why many witnesses from the Lindh investigation were 
reporting false information that they had encountered from their co-witnesses within their 
statements. 
Notable cases have also demonstrated the negative impact of co-witness discussions 
on the process of line-up identification. With regards to the British criminal justice system, 
one of the biggest miscarriages of justice facilitated by co-witness influence was the Jill 
Dando murder enquiry in 2001. Initially, most of the eyewitnesses were unable to identify 
the suspect from an identification parade, apart from one eyewitness who falsely believed 
that an innocent suspect (Barry George) was the offender. However, after discussing the 
case with each other during a taxi journey home from the police station, more witnesses 
became confident that George was the offender they had seen during the event; one 
eyewitness went from being uncertain to ‘95% sure’ that George was the correct suspect 
(Gabbert, 2004). The change in their judgements consequently contributed to the wrongful 
conviction of Barry George. As discussed previously, misleading information from an 
individual’s semantic memory could have an impact on their visual memory about the event 
(Loftus et al., 1978). With regard to eyewitness identification, Searcy, Bartlett, and Memon 
(2000) explained that such information could provide witnesses with misleading cues for 
memory recognition — in that witnesses could misattribute misleading information from 
their semantic memory as visual memory and as such, identify a suspect based on 
unwitnessed information about the event.  
It is not uncommon for multiple eyewitnesses to identify an innocent person as the 
offender. The Innocence Project, a non-profit legal organisation devoted to exonerating 
falsely convicted individuals, found that within a sample of 234 previous cases of eyewitness 
misidentification within the United States, 38% involved multiple eyewitnesses making the 
same erroneous judgements (Cardozo, 2009). How can multiple eyewitnesses make the 
exact same errors when attempting to recall a witnessed event? As with the Jill Dando 
murder enquiry, it may be that the confidence of one witness may unintentionally influence 
the memories of other witnesses, leading them to produce a similar account of the event 
(Goodwin, Kukucka & Hawks, 2012). 
Although real-life cases of eyewitness misidentification can offer some indication of 
the potential dangers of co-witness discussions, more controlled observations on eyewitness 
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behaviour are needed to determine the true risks of co-witness influence when eyewitnesses 
engage in post-event discussions. A large body of the current research (discussed in chapter 
3) has demonstrated that eyewitnesses are vulnerable to being misled by co-witnesses into 
reporting false information about an event through giving false statements and also making 
false identifications (Wright & Gabbert et al., 2006), a phenomenon known as memory 
conformity (Williamson, Weber, & Robertson, 2013; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). More 
worryingly, research has also demonstrated that eyewitnesses can be influenced by co-
witnesses when attempting to attribute blame. Thorley (2015) found that participants could 
be influenced by their co-witnesses into blaming an innocent bystander for committing a 
crime; a process which the author referred to as blame conformity. Such findings provide an 
explanation for how 38% of misidentification cases reported by the Innocence Project (see 
Cardozo, 2009), involved multiple eyewitnesses producing the same false testimonies.  
Despite evidence suggesting that co-witness influence can significantly impact the 
reliability of eyewitness evidence, survey reports indicate that practitioners within the 
criminal justice system still deem it to be a reliable form of evidence for investigating and 
prosecuting crimes (Coupe & Griffiths, 1996; Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1999; Wells & Olson, 
2003). In their survey of 159 police officers, Kebbell and Milne (1998) found that 51% of 
respondents reported that eyewitness evidence usually provided the major lead in their 
investigations; a further 33.1% said that it was almost always the major lead, and 2.5% 
stated that it was always the major lead. Further research suggests that this level of 
reliance is even greater when investigators are dealing with serious interpersonal crimes, 
such as stranger rape, serious assault and abduction (Philips & Brown, 1998). As well as 
police officers, jurors also seem to misjudge the reliability of eyewitness evidence, with 
reports estimating that 37% of jurors consider the testimony of one eyewitness to be 
sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction (Simons & Chabris, 2011). Additionally, 
Schmechel and colleagues found that many jurors failed to understand how external factors 
could have an impact on the accuracy of eyewitness accounts (Schmechel, O’Toole, 
Easterly, & Loftus, 2006). 
 Survey reports indicate that the criminal justice system will continue to place a 
strong level of reliance on eyewitness evidence, despite research exposing the malleability 
of human memory to external influence. This is because many crime scenes will often lack 
DNA-rich biological traces, leaving investigators heavily reliant on any available witnesses to 
help identify and convict the correct offender (Kebbell & Milne, 1998; Wells & Olson, 2003). 
Therefore, there is a need for researchers to identify the fundamental causes of co-witness 
influence, in order to aid investigators in reducing the risks of co-witness contamination. 
Despite a large body of pre-existing research investigating the effects of co-witness 
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influence, there seems to be a surprising lack of research attempting to identify the 
mediating variables that can determine an individual’s vulnerability to co-witness influence 
(otherwise referred to as co-witness suggestibility). Research indicates that individual 
differences in co-witness suggestibility exist, with some eyewitnesses seemingly showing a 
greater level of susceptibility to co-witness influence than others (Liebman et al., 2002; 
Patterson, Kemp & Forgas, 2009), yet very little research has attempted to identify what 
these individual differences are. Why are some individuals more vulnerable to being 
influenced by their co-witnesses than others? What makes some co-witnesses more 
influential than others? These fundamental questions form the basis of the present thesis.  
 
1.2. The current work 
 
The current thesis focuses on the effects of co-witness influence on blame attribution 
(blame conformity), a process of memory recall and decision making which can be severely 
damaging to an investigation. The studies within the thesis attempt to identify the external 
and internal predictors of co-witness suggestibility in relation to blame conformity and 
eyewitness confidence. An experimental memory recall paradigm was designed where 
participants would witness a criminal event and would later encounter misleading 
information about the event from their co-witnesses, before giving an individual statement. 
The paradigm allowed the study to manipulate various environmental factors as well as 
measuring the individual differences of participants to determine the significant correlates of 
co-witness suggestibility. 
First, to equip the reader with an appropriate understanding of the underlying 
processes behind co-witness influence, the thesis presents three introductory chapters on 
post-event information, co-witness discussions, and the mediating variables associated with 
co-witness suggestibility (memory conformity) – owing to the present studies focussing on 
the effects of co-witness influence on witness statements, the literature discussed in the 
subsequent chapters primarily centre around the effects of misinformation on memory recall 
rather than recognition. The introductory chapters are then succeeded by a series of 
empirical chapters (introduced in Chapter 5) which discuss the experimental studies that 
were carried out to fulfil the project’s main aim. The final chapter summarises the key 
findings throughout the studies and discusses some of the main implications that can be 
drawn from the results. 
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Chapter 2: The Effects of Post-Event Information on 
Eyewitness Memory 
 
2.1. Introduction to post-event information and the misinformation 
effect 
 
After witnessing an incident, an eyewitness may encounter additional information 
about the event from an external source. This form of information is referred to as post-
event information (Gabbert, Hope, Fisher, & Jamieson, 2012). Post-event information may 
contradict the witness’s personal recollection of the event, or can provide them with 
additional details about the event that they may have previously been unaware of (French, 
Sutherland, & Garry, 2006; Gabbert, 2004; Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2006). Interviewers 
will usually encourage the witnesses to only recall the information that they remember 
seeing; however, research suggests that many eyewitnesses who encounter misleading 
post-event information will then incorporate the misinformation into their personal 
statements (Gabbert, Memon, Allan, 2003; Paterson & Kemp, 2006b). This behaviour is 
more commonly referred to as the misinformation effect (Belli, 1989; Gerrie, Garry, & 
Loftus, 2005; Loftus, 2005; Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). 
Researchers have typically been able to observe the effects of post-event information 
on eyewitness memory by using the misinformation paradigm, an experimental procedure 
consisting of three stages (see Ayers & Reder, 1998 for review). Participants first witness an 
incident on a screen (usually a video or collection of images). Sometime after witnessing the 
event, they are then exposed to misleading information about the event, in the form of 
misleading questions, a false written narrative of the event, or an erroneous account from 
another witness. Finally, participants are individually questioned by the interviewer about 
the witnessed event. Responses are then compared to a control group of participants who 
have not been exposed to the misinformation, in order to determine whether exposure to 
misinformation has had a negative effect on the accuracy of the eyewitness’s memory 
report. Studies adopting this paradigm have typically found that participants who were 
exposed to misinformation were more likely to produce less accurate recollections about the 
event (Ayers & Reder, 1998; Carlucci, Kieckhaefer, Schwartz, Villalba, & Wright, 2010; 
Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004; Garry, French, Kinzett, & 
Mori, 2008; Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Paterson & Kemp, 2006b; Payne, Toglia, & 
Anastasi, 1994). More specifically, studies suggest that exposure to misinformation can lead 
to distortions in an eyewitness’s memory for items that were genuinely experienced (i.e. 
correctly remembering that the offender was wearing a hat, but mistaking it for blue when it 
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was red); as well as causing eyewitnesses to recall seeing items that were not present 
during the actual event (i.e. the presence of a weapon or second accomplice) (Nourkova, 
Bernstein, & Loftus, 2004). Findings from the misinformation effect paradigm demonstrate 
how easily eyewitnesses can incorporate misinformation from external sources into their 
own memory reports. 
 
2.2. Sources of misinformation 
2.2.1. Misinformation from co-witnesses 
 
The most frequent way that eyewitnesses encounter misinformation is through 
discussions with other co-witnesses (co-witness discussions) (Gabbert, 2004; Paterson & 
Kemp, 2006a). Research suggests that individuals who are present during the same event 
are likely to hold different recollections of the event afterwards (French, Sutherland, & 
Garry, 2006; Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2006). If co-witnesses hold differing recollections 
of the event, a group discussion could cause the individual statements of the eyewitnesses 
to become more similar (Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004; Mori, 2003; Wright, Self, 
& Justice, 2000). 
The previous real-life examples of co-witness influence discussed in chapter one 
demonstrated how post-event discussions could have an influence on eyewitness 
identification, as well as their recollection of the offender’s characteristics (statement). 
However, when giving a statement, eyewitnesses are asked to give more information than 
just the offender’s characteristics. Another way that post-event discussions could influence 
eyewitness statements is through contaminating their recollection about the incident itself 
and how it unfolded. A notable case in relation to co-witness misinformation and false 
testimonies is the 1995 Oklahoma bombing incident. Timothy McVeigh was responsible for 
detonating a bomb outside a federal building which subsequently killed 168 victims and 
injured many more. Upon searching for the suspect, the investigators were able to locate 
the shop that the suspect had used to rent a truck from (which was later used in the 
attack). Three eyewitnesses had reported having seen McVeigh come into the store they 
worked at to rent the vehicle. Initially, two of the witnesses had reported only seeing 
McVeigh get inside the truck, but the third witness (Tom Kessinger) mistakenly believed 
that a second accomplice was present. However, after discussing the event with each other, 
all three witnesses suddenly became convinced that a second accomplice was present 
during the event (Memon & Wright, 1999; Schacter, 2001). This collaborative error caused 
police officers to exhaust their time and resources looking for a non-existent second 
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suspect, in what is considered to be one of the most expensive manhunts in U.S. history 
(Skagerberg & Wright, 2008a). 
The effects of co-witness discussions are explored more extensively in chapter three. 
But first, it is worth discussing how other sources of post-event information can influence 
eyewitnesses into reporting misinformation. Eyewitnesses can also be exposed to post-
event information about the event from interviewers and media reports (Paterson & Kemp, 
2006b; Ridley & Clifford, 2004).  
 
2.2.2. Misinformation from interviewers 
 
When interviewing eyewitnesses, police officers and lawyers must be cautious as to 
what information they reveal to the witness and how they present their questions. This is 
because the witness’s memory can be easily influenced by any information that is presented 
or even suggested by the interviewer (Zaragoza, Payment, Ackil, Drivdahl, & Beck, 2001). 
One way in which interviewers can expose witnesses to post-event information is through 
the intentional or unintentional mention of additional details about the event (Jack, 
Zydervelt, & Zajac, 2013). Jack et al. (2013) found that participants who were presented 
with misinformation by the interviewer were susceptible to incorporating the misinformation 
into their statements later on. Another way in which interviewers can expose witnesses to 
post-event information is through misleading questions (Beckerian & Bowers, 1983; Loftus, 
1979; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). This effect was notably demonstrated by Loftus and 
Palmer (1974; study 2), who showed participants (N=150) a film depicting a car accident. 
After watching the footage, participants were then questioned about the event, at which 
point they were asked about the speed that the cars were traveling at prior to the accident. 
The wording of this question was altered so that participants from one condition were asked 
to report how fast the cars were travelling before they ‘hit’ each other, whilst participants 
from another condition were asked to report how fast the cars were travelling before they 
‘smashed’ into each other (with the latter implying that the cars were travelling at a faster 
speed). It was found that participants who were told that the cars had ‘smashed’ into each 
other erroneously predicted much higher speeds than those who were told that the cars had 
‘hit’ each other. Additionally, the study found that participants who were told that the cars 
had ‘smashed’ into each other were more likely to falsely report seeing broken glass during 
the accident. The latter observation suggests that misinformation can have a snowballing 
effect in contaminating an eyewitness’s account of an event, by also influencing the way 
that they interpret the incident. 
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2.2.3. Misinformation from media reports 
 
During more high-profile criminal investigations, witnesses may later encounter 
media coverage about the witnessed incident (Gabbert et al., 2012; Paterson & Kemp, 
2006b). Exposure to such outlets may provide the witness with additional information about 
the event, unknown to the individual prior to this exposure. Despite news outlets sometimes 
being inaccurate in their claims, reports show that the majority of the general public 
perceive the media to be a credible source for news (Kiousis, 2001). As a result, many 
witnesses could be susceptible to accepting inaccurate post-event information from news 
sources and incorporating them into their personal statements. Such an effect of media 
influence on memory recall was believed to have been present during the McMartin 
preschool trial (1983-1990), where a preschool run by members of the McMartin family had 
been charged with numerous acts of sexual abuse of children in their care (Talbot, 2001). 
Due to the media’s skewed portrayal of the event, favouring the viewpoint of the 
prosecution, it is believed that many victims may have been influenced by media reports 
when giving their testimonies (Eberle & Eberle, 1993). This led to one of the longest and 
most expensive criminal trials in American history, which subsequently resulted in all 
charges being dropped (Reinhold, 1990). Similar effects of media influence and 
misinformation acceptance have been observed within laboratory settings. Paterson and 
Kemp (2006b), for example, investigated the effects of encountering post-event information 
through media outlets, finding that participants who were exposed to inaccurate news 
reports after viewing a crime were more confident in their incorrect recollections than 
participants that had not encountered the post-event information. 
 
2.2.3. Comparing the different sources of post-event information 
 
Paterson and Kemp (2006b) compared the effects of misinformation from different 
sources of post-event information on memory recall. Participants (N=105) were shown 
footage of a crime. One week later, they were called back in and each participant was 
presented with misinformation about the event from one of four different sources. 
Participants encountered the misinformation through either a false news article; a 
misleading questionnaire; indirect co-witness information (participants were presented with 
the written statement from a previous participant); or direct co-witness information, 
through a post-event discussion with an experimental confederate (introduced as a fellow 
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participant). In addition to the four experimental conditions, there was also a control group 
where participants were not exposed to any form of post-event information. The 
researchers then interviewed the participants privately to determine how influential each 
source of post-event information was in relation to misinformation acceptance. The results 
indicated that post-event information was most influential when encountered from another 
co-witness (both directly and indirectly). Participants were more likely to incorporate the 
misinformation into their statements when it was encountered through a co-witness 
discussion or through indirect information about a previous witness’s statement, in 
comparison to the other sources of misinformation. Findings also suggested that co-witness 
information which was encountered indirectly was as influential as co-witness information 
encountered directly through post-event discussion. However, other research has produced 
evidence suggesting co-witness information encountered through a discussion is 
significantly more influential than co-witness information encountered indirectly (Gabbert et 
al., 2004). It must be noted that whilst the nature of the post-event information in Paterson 
and Kemp’s (2006b) experiments were not analysed or controlled for, it appears that three 
out of the four pieces of misinformation were peripheral details (such as The woman in the 
store was wearing a large brooch) and not information central to the event; thus, further 
research would be required to determine whether similar observations would exist if the 
misinformation provided was more central and significant to the criminal event (see 2.3.1. 
for discussion about central and peripheral information).  
Contrary to Paterson and Kemp’s findings, other research has suggested that post-
event information from interviewers can be as influential as co-witness information on 
memory recall, if presented through direct social interaction (Jack et al., 2013). It can be 
argued that in the Paterson and Kemp (2006b) study, co-witness information was only 
found to be the most influential source because the other sources of misinformation were 
presented indirectly through non-social methods (i.e. the misleading questions were 
presented in the form of a questionnaire). Jack et al. (2013) recreated a similar experiment, 
but unlike Paterson and Kemp (2006b), who used written questionnaires to present the 
participants with misleading questions, Jack et al. (2013) used an interviewer to directly 
present the misleading questions. The increased level of social interaction resulted in a 
similar level of misinformation acceptance between participants who were exposed to co-
witness misinformation and those who were exposed to misleading questions from an 
interviewer. Regardless of the observations made by Jack et al. (2013), co-witnesses are 
still more likely to cause misinformation acceptance during real incidents due to the 
likelihood of encountering misinformation from co-witnesses being significantly more 
prevalent than the likelihood of encountering misinformation from a misleading police 
officer. This is because it is common practice for police officers to avoid using leading 
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questions when interviewing witnesses (Adler, 2013; Ainsworth, 2012; Howitt, 2015). More 
specifically, the implementation of the PEACE (Planning and preparation, Engage and 
explain, Account, Closure, and Evaluation) interview framework by UK police officers allows 
investigators to reduce the risks of exposing eyewitnesses with post-event information 
during an interview (ACPO, 2001; Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009). In contrast, reports 
suggest that the vast majority of eyewitnesses are likely to be exposed to post-event 
information from co-witnesses, of which many may be false (Paterson & Kemp, 2006a; 
Skagerberg & Wright, 2008a). 
 
2.3. Causes of misinformation acceptance 
 
It is generally accepted that the misinformation effect can operate outside of a 
witness’s awareness (Morgan, Southwick, Steffian, Hazelett, & Loftus, 2013), such that 
when an individual reports misinformation that was encountered post-event, they will 
genuinely believe that they had witnessed the misinformation (Loftus & Palmer, 1974; 
Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Kirsch, 2006). This unintentional acceptance of misinformation can be 
a result of memory distortions affecting the witness’s reconstructions of the event (Cann & 
Katz, 2005; Schacter, Guerin, & Jacques, 2011; Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986).  
However, McClosky and Zaragoza (1985) suggested that some eyewitnesses may 
also intentionally choose to recall the misinformation because of response biases and task 
demands. Eyewitnesses could be motivated to produce the correct answer and, in wanting 
to do so, they may purposely choose to recall misinformation that they did not witness 
personally if they perceive the source as being reliable (Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert et al., 
2004).  Both underlying processes behind misinformation acceptance are explained in more 
detail below. 
 
2.3.1. Demand characteristics 
 
Many eyewitnesses may intentionally choose to conform to their co-witnesses 
through informational social influence (Blank, 2009; Wright et al., 2009), the process of 
conforming to others to obtain the correct answer (Wright, London, & Waechter, 2009). This 
is because eyewitnesses will be aware of the implications that their statements will have on 
an investigation (Williamson, Weber, & Robertson, 2013). As a result, most witnesses will 
often try to be as cooperative as possible, by providing any information about the event 
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that they think might be beneficial for the investigation. However, their increased concern 
for providing police officers with accurate information can cause them to provide information 
that may have been learnt post-event. Williamson et al. (2013) asserted that when an 
eyewitness is motivated to provide an accurate report, they may be persuaded to report 
newly learned misinformation, if they perceive its source as being reliable.  
The likelihood of a witness purposely including post-event information into their 
personal statement is moderated by the quality of their memory about the event (Gabbert, 
Memon, & Wright, 2007). An eyewitness would be more susceptible to accepting 
misinformation if their recollection of the event is limited or distorted (Walther, Bless, 
Strack, Rackstraw, & Wagner, 2002). Unfortunately for investigators, the memory report of 
eyewitnesses can often be heavily distorted (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 
2004). This is because, when witnessing an incident, individuals will only encode a small 
proportion of the information that is present within their visual field at the time (Eysenck, 
2012). Simons and Chabris (1999) demonstrated this within their observations on selective 
attention. Participants were asked to view a video of a group of children passing a ball 
around. At the same time, the footage also showed a man in a gorilla suit walking across 
the screen. However, when questioning the participants, the researchers found that many 
participants did not recall seeing the gorilla in the video. This was because when the 
participants’ attention was fixated on the ball, their minds had failed to encode other details 
that were present (i.e. the man in the gorilla suit). During a criminal incident, similar issues 
with memory encoding can cause witnesses to miss out important details about the event 
(Kramer, Buckhout, Eugenio, 1990). In addition, the emotional distress exhibited by some 
witnesses could inhibit their cognitive abilities further, which would consequently result in 
an even smaller proportion of the information being encoded (Deffenbacher et al., 2004). 
Such effects of emotional distress and attention fixation can be used to explain the weapon 
focus effect, an inhibitory effect where eyewitnesses from crimes involving weapons (usually 
a firearm) tend to produce less accurate recollections of the event due to fixating their 
attention on the weapon (Steblay, 1992). As a result of poor memory encoding, many 
witnesses will encode less information and will be more likely to become reliant on post-
event information to fill in the gaps within their memory, so that they can produce an 
accurate report for the investigator. 
When individuals are asked to provide a statement about an incident, they will recall 
and report information that is both peripheral and central to the event (Dalton & Daneman, 
2006; Daneman, Thannikkotu & Chen, 2013; Mahe, Corson, Verrier & Payoux, 2015). 
Central details about an event refer to critical information that play a major role in 
explaining how an event unfolded (Mahe et al., 2015). Such information is considered 
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indispensable to the course of the given incident (Candel, Merckelbach, Jelicic, Limpens, & 
Widdershoven, 2004). An example of central information to a criminal incident – as used in 
previous experimental paradigms – can be details about how a thief gained access to 
someone's property (see Heath & Erickson, 1998). On the other hand, peripheral details 
about an event refer to information relating to the characteristics of items and individuals 
that were present during the event – which in turn, are less relevant to explaining how the 
event unfolded (Christianson, 1992; Mahe et al., 2015). Referring back to the experimental 
paradigm of Heath and Erickson (1998), examples of peripheral information to a criminal 
incident include the brand of a soft drink can that was present during a robbery but not 
directly related the event. Both information that is peripheral and central to a criminal 
incident can be valuable to a criminal investigation. Central information that is reported can 
assist investigators in determining how a crime was carried out, which in turn could also 
help attribute blame to the correct suspect (Dalton & Daneman, 2006; Heath & Erickson, 
1998). Peripheral details about an event can also be beneficial by allowing investigators to 
obtain identifiable characteristics of individuals associated with the incident (Wells & Leippe, 
1981). 
In relation to co-witness influence,  there have been conflicting findings when 
comparing eyewitness suggestibility to central and peripheral misinformation. Some 
research has produced evidence suggesting that individuals are more susceptible to 
accepting misinformation that is peripheral in comparison to misinformation that is central 
to the event (see Dalton & Daneman, 2006). Researchers have attributed this to 
eyewitnesses being more attentive to the central details during an event and later being 
more confident in their own recollections of the such details in comparison to peripheral 
details (Luna & Migueles, 2009; Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 1999). However, Mahe et al. 
(2015) produced results that suggested misinformation acceptance was only present when 
the misleading information was central to the event. An explanation for this discrepancy 
could be that in Mahe et al. (2015), the misinformation was presented by the interviewer as 
misleading questions whereas Dalton and Daneman (2006) presented the misinformation 
through confederates. Therefore, participants may have been more willing to accept the 
misleading central information from the investigator than from a confederate, due to the 
misinformation source being perceived as being more credible. 
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2.3.2. Source monitoring errors 
 
However, not all eyewitnesses who include post-event information within their 
statements do it intentionally. Research indicates that many individuals will continue to 
include misleading post-event information in their statements, despite receiving instructions 
from investigators to not do so (Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; 
Morgan et al., 2013). Jacoby and Kelley (1992) demonstrated this behaviour through a 
modified misinformation paradigm. Participants witnessed an event and were later 
presented with a misleading narrative about the incident. Later, when being interviewed by 
the investigator, participants were informed that the narrative provided to them earlier was 
incorrect and were encouraged to only recall details that they remembered seeing from the 
footage. Despite these precautions, many participants still reported the misinformation that 
they had learned from the narrative. Findings suggested that exposure to misleading post-
event information could cause some eyewitnesses to genuinely believe that they had 
witnessed the misinformation. 
To understand how false information can be embedded within a person’s memory, 
the limitations of human memory, or — more precisely — the processes behind memory 
recall need to be considered. An individual’s memory about an event does not exist in 
isolation, but rather in a world of other memories that can interfere with one another 
(Schacter, 2000). Memory retrieval is a reconstructive process rather than a retrieval 
process (Hasher & Griffin, 1978). That is, an individual will attempt to reconstruct the past 
by weaving together fragments of stored memories, with the aid of present knowledge 
about the event (Bartlett, 1933). Therefore, an eyewitness who is asked to produce a 
statement will first have to piece together as much information as they can from their 
memories to determine how the event unfolded. It is during this reconstructive process that 
eyewitnesses are at risk of unintentionally misattributing misinformation as witnessed 
information. 
To avoid making such errors, the witness must be able to differentiate between the 
information that was witnessed during the event and additional information learnt after the 
event has occurred. To do this, the witness would have to evaluate each memory to 
determine its source, a decision-making process referred to as source monitoring (Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Source monitoring distinguishes different memories from one 
another to determine the sources from which the memories come from. When the attributes 
of memory representations differ significantly, fewer errors are made during source 
monitoring. However, if the memory representations share greater similarities, it can 
become more difficult to correctly attribute each memory to its correct source (Landau & 
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Marsh, 1997). The discrepancy detection principle (Tousignant et al., 1986) states that 
misinformation is more likely to be integrated within an individual’s memory if it is not 
immediately rejected as being a false memory. Thus, the more plausible and similar the 
misinformation is to the individual’s existing memory of the event, the more likely it is to be 
misattributed as witnessed information. Source monitoring judgements will predominantly 
focus on the quality of the memory fragment (Gabbert, 2004). The quality of memory 
representations can differ in relation to many different details of the event. These include 
the level of sensory detail, such as the colours and sounds that an individual will remember 
during the witnessed event (Porter & Birt, 2001); the contextual detail, remembering the 
time and location of witnessing the event (Friedman, 1993); the affective detail, 
remembering the emotional state the individual was in during the event (Buchanan & 
Lovallo, 2001); and the cognitive processes present during the event (i.e. what the 
individual was thinking at the time) (Johnson et al., 1993; Yonelinas, 2002). Memories of 
witnessed events will often be far more vivid and detailed than memories of imagined 
events that are based on post-event information (Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, & Leding, 2005; 
Wright & Stroud, 1998). It is therefore possible for an individual to differentiate between 
witnessed and imagined events based on the quality and detail of the memories (Johnson, 
Raye, Foley, & Kim, 1982). 
However, in some cases, the witness may claim to have a very detailed and vivid 
memory about witnessing the misinformation. Loftus, Feldman, and Dashiell (1995) 
demonstrated how easily individuals could produce detailed memories about false events. 
With the aid of the participants’ relatives, the researchers informed each participant about 
an imaginary event that had supposedly taken place during their childhood. Typically, 
participants were told that they had lost their parent in a supermarket and had been crying 
throughout the market for a considerable amount of time before being found. Most 
participants (75%) correctly stated that they could not remember the event; however, the 
remaining 25% had erroneously claimed to have remembered the false event. Many of 
these individuals went further and claimed to have remembered vivid details of the event, 
which had not been suggested to them. To explain this phenomenon, researchers have 
proposed that individuals can sometimes produce vivid memories about an imagined event 
by borrowing details from a similar legitimate memory to corroborate the false memory 
(Dewhurst, 2001; Lampinen, Faries, Neuschatz, & Toglia, 2000; Odegard & Lampinen, 
2004), a psychological process referred to as content borrowing (Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, & 
Leding, 2005). Relating content borrowing back to eyewitness suggestibility, the theory 
suggests that eyewitnesses who are exposed to misinformation may become more 
convinced about witnessing the false details if the false memory is corroborated by real 
memories from the event. 
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2.3.2.1. Fate of the original memory 
 
Eyewitnesses are more likely to incorporate misinformation during memory recall, if 
there are no existing memories that would contradict it. This is because it is easier to create 
a new memory from the misinformation than it would be to alter an existing one (Gabbert 
et al., 2006; Wright, Mathews, & Skagerberg, 2005). This process of creating 'new' 
memories from misinformation is more common when the memory is regarding the 
peripheral details of an event due to eyewitnesses being less likely to remember peripheral 
information from an even in comparison to central information. This was evidenced in 
Dalton and Daneman (2006) who found that participants were significantly less likely to 
remember peripheral details of an event than the central details. Consequently, the 
participants were also found to be more susceptible to accepting peripheral misinformation 
that they were unware of than misinformation that was central to the event. However, even 
if there is an existing memory that would contradict with the misinformation, source 
monitoring errors can still cause the witness to internalise the misinformation into their 
memory. A fundamental question arising from this process is one of the fate of the original 
memory.  
The fate of a witness’s original memory after the misattribution of misinformation 
has been the subject of repeated debate amongst researchers. Loftus and Loftus (1980) 
originally suggested misinformation could alter the original memory trace and resultantly 
erase any recollection the individual may have of certain details from the original event. 
Other researchers argued that rather than erasing the original memory completely, 
misinformation would merely make the original memory harder to retrieve (Belli, Windschitl, 
McCarthy, & Winfrey, 1992; Chandler, 1991). The retrieval-strategy disruption (RSD) 
hypothesis suggests that exposure to conflicting information during memory recall can 
disrupt the memory retrieval process and consequently result in poorer memory recall 
(Basden & Basden, 1995; Basden, Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997; Dahlström, 
Danielsson, Emilsson, & Andersson, 2010). Thus, eyewitnesses who encounter 
misinformation when trying to remember the original event will be less likely to retrieve the 
original memory and will consequently become more vulnerable to accepting the newly 
encountered misinformation. 
 However, the notion of memory alteration has been largely contested by many 
researchers who argue that misinformation cannot cause any form of impairment to an 
eyewitness’s original memory (McCloskey and Zaragoza 1985; Zaragoza, Dahlgren, & 
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Muench, 1992; Zaragoza, McCloskey, & Jamis, 1987). These researchers argue that 
misinformation has no effect on pre-existing memory. Instead, it has been suggested that 
misinformation simply influences the recollections of witnesses who are not able to 
accurately encode the original event or are unable to recall it. With the absence of any 
memories to contradict the misinformation, the witnesses are susceptible to attributing the 
misinformation as witnessed information (Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). Alternatively, 
researchers suggest that some eyewitnesses may remember both sources of information 
but, after deliberation, may choose to accept the misleading source if they decide that it is 
correct (Loftus, Feldman, & Dashiell, 1995). 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) supported this argument through a modified 
misinformation paradigm that tested participants abilities in memory recognition. Within the 
typical misinformation paradigm, participants would view a crime where a salient item is 
seen during the incident, such as a screwdriver. After witnessing the crime, some 
participants would be exposed to misinformation which would suggest that a different item 
was present instead, such as a hammer. Later, during the eyewitness interview, the 
participants would be asked to determine whether they saw a screwdriver or a hammer. 
Most participants exposed to the misinformation would erroneously believe they had seen a 
hammer, whereas participants who were not presented with any misinformation (control) 
would correctly identify the screwdriver as having been present during the event. Within 
McCloskey and Zargoza’s (1985) ‘modified test’, the misinformation option would be 
excluded as a possible response. Instead, the participant would be asked to choose between 
the correct item (screwdriver) and a new unrelated item (i.e. a pencil). If the 
misinformation would have truly impaired the participant’s original memory of the event, 
the participants should have not been able to correctly recall seeing a screwdriver. 
However, the study found that participants who were exposed to the misinformation could 
still correctly identify the original item, suggesting that the misinformation had not impaired 
their original memory. Whilst the study of McCloskey and Zargoza (1985) observed the 
effects of misinformation on memory recognition rather than memory recall – and thus not 
representative of the task of giving a witness statement – the findings can still be used to 
suggest that a witnesses' original memories for events cannot be altered or impaired by 
post-event information. 
The true process of memory impairment during the misinformation effect remains a 
topic of debate. However, rather than assuming that one theory triumphs over the others, it 
can be accepted that eyewitnesses can incorporate misinformation into their personal 
memories differently (Loftus, 2005). Some witnesses may incorporate misinformation into 
their memories due to not having an existing memory for the event; some may incorporate 
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the misinformation into their memories after deliberation between the different sources of 
information; and some witnesses may incorporate misinformation into their memories from 
having their original memories of the event impaired by misinformation. Regardless of the 
way in which misinformation is internalized, all the theories come to an agreement on a 
more pressing issue: that eyewitnesses are vulnerable to incorporating misinformation into 
their personal memories of an event. 
 
2.3.3. Comparing the causes of misinformation acceptance. 
 
When considering the different causes for misinformation acceptance during memory 
recall, a subsequent question to consider is which contributing cause predominates? 
Determining the exact cause for misinformation acceptance between different individuals 
can bear difficulties. Participants would have to first comprehend that their memory report 
was confabulated and this can be an issue if the participant has incorporated the 
misinformation into their memory through source misattribution. Participants who 
incorporate the misinformation purposely as a result of demand characteristics may be 
reluctant to admit that this is due to the negative connotations of being perceived as a 
suggestible individual. Of course, one of the most straightforward ways of determining the 
most prevalent cause of misinformation acceptance is to simply question the participants 
about what influenced their responses. Loftus, Feldman, and Dashiell (1995) attempted to 
identify the most common cause for misinformation acceptance in such a manner. 
Participants (N=301) were shown slides about an event and afterwards, half of the 
participants were given a misleading narrative about the event (misinformation). When 
being interviewed, 49% of the participants who had been exposed to the misinformation 
had subsequently included the misinformation in their memory recall statements. 
Participants who had reported the misinformation in their statements were asked to provide 
a reason for their answer. The results indicated that 34% of these participants had simply 
guessed. A further 30% chose to include the misinformation because they had read about it 
and believed it was likely to be correct, suggesting that they were influenced as a result of 
task demand. An additional 27% of the participants who included the misinformation in their 
statements genuinely believed that they had witnessed the misinformation, suggesting that 
they were influenced as a result of source monitoring errors. Furthermore, 7% of the 
participants remembered the details from both the original event and the narrative, 
however, after, were convinced that they witnessed the misinformation. An additional 2% 
had included the misinformation because it sounded familiar. Overall, the study indicated 
that individuals can incorporate misinformation into their original reports for varying 
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reasons, which could suggest that the cause of misinformation acceptance may be related 
to individual differences. Therefore, an additional question that arises is whether the cause 
of misinformation acceptance can vary depending on the type of misinformation 
encountered. It must be acknowledged that Loftus et al. (1995) investigated the causes of 
misinformation acceptance to misleading questions, whereas the present studies focussed 
on the misinformation acceptance to co-witnesses instead. Thus, the above findings cannot 
be reliably used to predict the predominant causes of co-witness misinformation 
acceptance. The subsequent chapter investigates the causes of co-witness influence in more 
detail. 
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Chapter 3: Co-witness Influence 
 
3.1. Co-witness discussions 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, co-witnesses have been identified as one the 
most influential and frequent sources of misinformation (Jack et al., 2013; Paterson & 
Kemp, 2006b). Additionally, Gabbert et al. (2004) argued that co-witness influence was 
most influential when presented directly through a post-event discussion. Therefore, it is 
worth assessing the effects of co-witness discussions on eyewitness evidence in more depth. 
It is very common for eyewitnesses to discuss the incident with the people around 
them straight after witnessing a crime (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008a). The recurrent 
tendency for an eyewitness to engage in post-event discussion with others is motivated by 
their need to make sense of the event (Paterson & Kemp, 2006a). After witnessing a crime, 
many witnesses will be left in a state of confusion and uncertainty regarding the incident, 
due to induced emotional distress and consequent improper memory coding (Christianson, 
1992; Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004; Payne et al., 2007). When faced 
with uncertainty, many witnesses will often choose to engage in a discussion with co-
witnesses as a way of validating their own recollection (Blank, 2009; Williamson et al., 
2013). Police officers are aware of the consequences that can arise from allowing 
eyewitnesses to discuss the event with each other before giving evidence (Paterson & 
Kemp, 2006a). However, despite their best efforts to intervene, discussions among 
eyewitnesses can be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent (Yarmey, 1993). 
In an attempt to gain more accurate figures about co-witness discussions amongst 
real eyewitnesses, Paterson and Kemp (2006a) used a series of questionnaires to screen for 
previous eyewitnesses of serious events. Whilst the study was unable to determine the 
impact co-witness discussions had on the accuracy of eyewitness statements, it was able to 
highlight the likelihood of eyewitnesses encountering post-event information. A total of 773 
undergraduate students (M age=20.1) from the UK were initially approached for screening. 
Those who reported having witnessed a serious crime (homicide, attempted murder, 
manslaughter, physical assault, sexual assault, event/accident causing serious injury/death, 
abduction, property vandalism, breaking and entering, motor vehicle theft, fraud, blackmail, 
extortion, arson, or robbery) in the presence of other co-witnesses were contacted to 
complete a follow-up questionnaire to determine whether they discussed the event and the 
nature of their interactions. Initially, 75% of the participants reported having witnessed at 
least one serious event in the past, of which 30% were victims and 70% were witnesses. 
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With regards to the type of crimes witnessed; the most commonly witnessed crime was 
physical assault (30%), followed by an incident that resulted in serious injury/death (27%) 
and robbery (18%). In total, 86% of previous eyewitnesses reported having witnessed the 
event with at least one other co-witness present; the survey suggested that on average, 
there were 6.77 co-witnesses present during a crime. Of these individuals, 86% admitted to 
discussing the event with a co-witness after witnessing the event. Cumulatively, the figures 
reported by Paterson and Kemp (2006a) suggest that co-witness discussions are a common 
occurrence after a serious criminal incident.  
The survey also found that the time interval between witnessing the event and 
discussing it with others varied from immediate discussion to 6 months (Paterson & Kemp, 
2006a). However, the majority (67%) of the respondents reported discussing the event with 
other co-witnesses immediately after witnessing the incident and an additional 22% 
reported discussing the event later the same day. When investigating the different 
motivations for discussing the event with co-witnesses, the survey indicated that the 
majority of respondents (44%) had chosen to discuss the event with others in an attempt to 
provide information to others. An additional 41% chose to engage in a co-witness discussion 
for emotional support. This finding was fitting, as the survey had also found that the 
majority of eyewitnesses had exhibited some level of fear during the incident. When asked 
to give a rating on their level of fear during the incident, eyewitnesses reported an average 
score of 3.4 (out of six). Some of the less frequent causes for co-witness discussion that 
were reported included storytelling (21%) and advice seeking (18%). Although the survey 
from Paterson and Kemp (2006a) was based on a student-only sample, it offers a highly 
descriptive report on the prevalence of post-event discussions within real criminal 
investigations. Furthermore, Skagerberg and Wright (2008a) conducted a similar study on 
real eyewitnesses, using a more diverse sample. The study produced similar results to 
Paterson and Kemp (2006a), suggesting that their findings were generalisable, despite 
coming from a student-only population. A limitation of the surveys was that the researchers 
did not ask the participants whether they provided an official court testimony, making it 
difficult to determine whether participants who are willing to provide official testimonies are 
as likely to have engaged in co-witness discussions. 
Practitioners within the criminal justice system are well aware of witnesses’ 
tendencies to engage in post-event discussions. Consequently, lawyers will usually question 
the witnesses to determine whether they have discussed the event with other co-witnesses 
(Yarmey & Morris, 1998). Additionally, it is common practise for judges to prohibit 
witnesses from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses and to instruct each individual 
witness not to discuss the event with others during a trial (Yarmey & Morris, 1998). In 
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relation to policing practices, the UK guidelines on identification parades explicitly state that 
when multiple eyewitnesses are present investigators should make the effort to ensure that 
the witnesses are separated during the investigation (Home Office, 2003). Similar practices 
of separating eyewitnesses during interviews have also been integrated by police forces in 
Australia (Field Operations, 1997) and the United States (NIJ, 1999). Such interventions 
were notably enforced within the United States during the 2002 D.C sniper attacks in 
Washington, where police officers were instructing eyewitnesses from the crime scenes not 
to discuss the event with each other to prevent co-witness contamination (Morello & Davis, 
2002). However, when questioning previous witnesses within the UK about their experience 
with how the police handled criminal incidents, Paterson and Kemp (2006a) found that the 
responses given contradicted the practices that have been set out by the policing framework 
within the UK. Although the Home Office (2003) states that the UK guidelines instruct 
officers to keep witnesses separated, only 14% of the previous eyewitnesses in Paterson 
and Kemp’s (2006a) survey had been instructed by a police officer not to discuss the event 
with co-witnesses. Furthermore, 24% of the respondents reported that a police officer had 
actually encouraged them to discuss the event with their co-witnesses. The findings suggest 
that despite being encouraged to prevent co-witness discussions, many police officers will 
fail to implement this intervention during most incidents — however, it must be 
acknowledged that Paterson and Kemp did not exclude participants who may have 
witnessed a crime before 2013, meaning that some participants may discussed their 
experiences of giving a statement before the Home Office introduced mandates to keep 
witnesses separated. 
Failure to prevent co-witness discussions can be attributed to different causes. As 
mentioned above, the majority (64%) of eyewitnesses who engage in co-witness 
discussions choose to discuss the event immediately after witnessing the incident (Paterson 
& Kemp, 2006a). Many police officers will not be able to arrive at the incident immediately, 
allowing these witnesses to engage in a discussion without being interrupted. Additionally, 
in another survey on police officers, Paterson and Kemp (2005) found that not all officers 
believed that co-witness discussions were detrimental to memory reports, which could 
suggest that some officers may intentionally choose not to disrupt a co-witness discussion. 
The survey also found that many police officers believed that co-witness discussions carried 
some advantages in improving statement quality; this would explain why almost a quarter 
of the previous eyewitnesses from the Paterson and Kemp (2006a) study had been 
encouraged by an officer to engage in a post-event discussion.   
Problems from co-witness discussions can arise if the eyewitnesses hold 
contradicting views; the inability to settle on the details of an event between each other can 
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have enormous consequences for the investigation (French, Garry, & Mori, 2008). 
Longitudinal research has found that individuals who are present during the same event are 
likely to hold different recollections later on (French et al., 2006). This can be due to various 
different situational factors. In particular, eyewitnesses may have different recollections due 
to fixating on different cues during the event (Gabbert et al., 2006). Memory reports 
between eyewitnesses can also vary if the witnesses were situated at different vantage 
points (Gabbert et al., 2003). Other factors that can cause discrepancies between 
eyewitness recollections include the level of stress exhibited by the witness (Deffenbacher 
et al., 2004) and memory decay (Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). Problems can arise from co-
witness discussions when some of the witnesses hold a false recollection of the event. In 
such circumstances, a post-event discussion can cause some witnesses to incorporate the 
false recollection of others into their own statements, this effect has been termed as 
memory conformity (Carlucci et al., 2010; Davis & Meade, 2013; Garry, French, Kinzett, & 
Mori, 2008; Paterson, Kemp, & McIntyre, 2012; Wright et al., 2005). 
Previous cases of eyewitness errors have demonstrated that witnesses can be 
influenced by others when attempting to provide a statement and also when trying to make 
an identification. The previously discussed Oklahoma bombing incident (see chapter 2) 
provides a clear example of how co-witness discussions could lead to severe disruptions to 
an investigation through contaminating the memory recollection of a witness. In other 
cases, co-witness discussions have also contributed to misidentification of innocent suspects 
during an identification parade, as with the case of Barry George (see chapter 2). Although 
never fully convicted, Peter Hain was also wrongfully accused of a crime by multiple 
witnesses, due to co-witness influence. Hain, a former leader of the House of Commons, 
was falsely charged with bank robbery earlier on in his career. Despite being innocent, 
multiple witnesses had testified seeing him flee the crime scene. The witnesses were three 
teenagers (aged 12-13) who had decided to discuss the incident with each other prior to 
going to court. During discussion, all three witnesses had unanimously come to an 
agreement that Hain was the suspect that they had seen fleeing the scene (Hain, 1976). In 
reality, Hain was not involved with the incident in any way; however, it was later revealed 
by the witnesses that the erroneous report of one of the witnesses had influenced the 
reports of the others during the group discussion. 
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3.2. A theoretical model of co-witness influence 
 
The previous chapter discussed how misinformation could be incorporated into one’s 
memory through both intentional and unintentional processes. With regards to 
misinformation that is specifically encountered through co-witness discussions, researchers 
have suggested that memory conformity would be predominately facilitated by different 
forms of social influence such as informational influence (Blank, 2009; Wright et al., 2009), 
a heightened need for being correct can persuade an eyewitness to report newly learnt 
misinformation, if they perceive the source to be accurate (French et al., 2011; Williamson 
et al., 2013); and normative influence, the pressure to conform as a means for social 
approval (Wright et al., 2009). However, in relation to eyewitness evidence, if police 
investigators are trained to collect statements privately, a witness’s statement would bear 
less social repercussions and thus, the level of normative influence would be significantly 
reduced. However, one could argue that a witness would still exhibit some level of 
normative pressure from the investigator and thus, normative influence would not be 
completely eradicated during an eyewitness interview. Based on research suggesting that 
co-witness influence will be predominantly caused by informational influence (Thorley, 
2015), the fundamental theoretical frameworks relating social influence are explored below. 
 
3.2.1. History of social conformity research 
 
Social conformity is the act of an individual changing their behaviour in order to 
match that of other individuals around them (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The act of social 
conformity can influence an individual’s behaviour in a vast array of contexts, from simple 
personal views such as musical preferences (Berns, Capra, Morre, & Noussair, 2010) to 
more serious implications such as giving a verdict as a jury member (Walters & Hans, 
2009).  The behavioural act of social conformity has been well investigated since 1936 (see 
Sheriff, 1936). Perhaps the most notable paradigm used to observe the effects of social 
conformity is Solomon E. Asch’s line-judgment experiments (e.g. Asch, 1951, 1952, 1956). 
Asch’s paradigm (see Asch, 1952) placed participants in groups, where all but one of the 
participants were confederates (actors). The participants carried out a perceptual task 
where they were shown an image of a line and then presented with three differently-sized 
lines and asked to identify which one of the three lines was the same size as the original. 
The experiment was manipulated so that the confederates always answered incorrectly and 
the true participant was always the last to answer. The task difficulty was deliberately made 
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easy, with only one percent of the control group failing it. This way, any significant 
increases in false responses could be confidently attributed to another external factor 
(group pressure). The study found that on average there was a conformity rate of 33%, 
with 75% of the participants conforming in at least one of their twelve trials.  
Through manipulation of the majority size between experiments, the data indicated 
that the addition of the third confederate had the greatest impact on conformity rates. The 
data also illustrated that after the addition of the third confederate, the effect of any 
additional confederates on conformity rates was minimal. Based on these findings, Asch 
theorised that after the addition of the third group member, additional group members 
would not increase an individual’s probability of conforming any further. He stated that this 
was because after the addition of the third individual, the respondent would view the group 
as one collective source of information and therefore, additional group members would not 
be seen as different sources of information. Although being relatively dated studies, more 
recent research has reproduced the experimental paradigm and continued to find similar 
findings (see Chen, Wu, Tong, Guan, & Zhou, 2012; Mori & Arai, 2010). However, early 
research on social influence was primarily based on simplistic tasks (i.e. line judgement), 
where the task difficulty was very low and the level of informational influence would have 
consequently been lower (Festinger, 1954). When considering the process of producing an 
accurate eyewitness statement, the task at hand is arguably more difficult and ambiguous 
than the simplistic judgement tasks incorporated by the majority of early conformity studies 
(e.g. line judgement). Thus, the theoretical models of social influence that were derived 
from simple geometric tasks must be interpreted cautiously when attempting to explain 
informational influence amongst co-witnesses. 
 
3.2.2. Normative VS informational influence. 
3.2.2.1. Normative influence. 
 
Researchers have identified that there are multiple influential causes for conformity, 
normative and informational influences (Deutsch and Gerard; 1955; Kaplan & Miller, 1987; 
Toelch & Dolan, 2015). Normative influence refers to the pressures that an individual may 
face to conform to another person or group in order to gain social approval and acceptance 
from them (Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2005). The need for social approval and the fear of 
rejection is a consistent attitude held across all cultures (Forgas & Von Hippel, 2005; Leary 
& Baumeister, 2000). Normative influence is more effective when acceptance by the group 
is deemed to be rewarding by the individual and thus, the individual is motivated to conform 
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to them in order to gain their acceptance, build relationships with the individuals, and reap 
the perceived rewards. These rewards can range from higher social status to actual material 
gain from the group. Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) also found that gaining social approval 
can enhance an individual’s self-esteem, which can act as further motivation for wanting to 
conform. 
 As well as gaining social acceptance, normative influence also relates to the fear of 
rejection and ridicule by the majority, which in turn can be just as just as influential in 
facilitating conformity. Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2005) found that fears of social rejection 
and exclusion from a social group were influential on an individual’s decision to conform to 
others. This was evident in Asch (1952). After participants had taken part in the line-
judgement task, Asch interviewed the participants and found that despite conformity being 
mainly due to informational influence (the need to obtain the correct information), many 
participants stated that they did not believe the answers they conformed to, but said it in 
order to prevent themselves from standing out. Research has even shown that fear of social 
punishment can be more effective than the reward of social acceptance for social conformity 
(Lewis et al., 2008; Stewart, Morris, Mellings, & Komar, 2006; Zipf, 1960). Further evidence 
highlighting the presence of normative influence was produced by Deutsch and Gerard 
(1955). Within their study, participants carried out tasks similar to Asch’s line perception 
task; however, the experiment was manipulated so that some participants gave their 
answers anonymously, whilst others gave their responses in front of other group members. 
The study found that conformity rates were significantly reduced when the participants 
could give their answers anonymously and avoid being socially rejected by others. When 
interviewing the participants who had to give their answers in front of other group 
members, seven out of fourteen participants claimed that they felt obligated to conform to 
the others within their group, whereas the participants from the anonymous conditions did 
not mention feeling any obligations to agree with others. Although Asch's line judgement 
experiments were based on a simplistic line matching task and not a memory recall or 
blame attribution task, the findings could suggest that eyewitnesses could be susceptible to 
conforming to the recollections of their co-witnesses in order to prevent negative 
evaluation— however, more direct evidence is needed to support this assertion.  
Similar effects of normative influence have been observed on individuals when faced 
with tasks that relate more to giving an eyewitness statement — such memory recall tests. 
In relation to the normative pressures affecting an individual’s memory recall, Wright et al. 
(2009) found that during a series of collaborative memory recall trials, many participants 
had chosen to conform to their partners’ erroneous reports to avoid receiving any negative 
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evaluation from them. As explained previously however, if police investigators are trained to 
collect statements privately, such normative pressures for conforming would be reduced.  
 
3.2.2.2. Informational influence 
 
Informational influence is a process where an individual obtains information from a 
group and accepts it as accurate information about reality (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Lord, Lee, 
& Choong, 2001). Informational influence is at its strongest when an individual is uncertain 
about the task or topic at hand. The uncertainty causes the individual to rely on external 
sources for the correct information (Suls & Wheeler, 2000). Researchers have argued that 
when an individual cannot make an accurate judgement objectively, they become reliant on 
socially encountered information to assess the accuracy of their own judgement (Festinger, 
1954; Shainyak, 2013). For informational influence to be effective, the target must believe 
that the information source is more likely to be correct than them (French et al., 2011; 
Williamson et al., 2013). The social information will be more likely to be perceived as being 
reliable when it is unanimously presented by all of the group members. This is because 
individuals are less likely to perceive information that is held consistently by multiple 
individuals as being incorrect — a process referred to as the frequency-validity principle 
(Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoffrage, 1997). Ciadini and Trost (1998) also state 
that society has been led to believe that the majority consensus represents the social norm, 
therefore individuals are more likely to believe that a certain belief that is held by the 
majority of a group is likely to be correct. Post-experimental interviews with participants 
that had exhibited social conformity have found that many participants choose to adopt the 
same views as the majority because they assume it is the correct view, due to being held by 
the majority of the group (Asch, 1952; Fiedler, 2000; Sherif, 1961). With regard to co-
witness influence on both memory recall and identification, multiple eyewitness studies have 
shown that eyewitnesses will only accept misinformation from co-witnesses that they deem 
as having accurate memory and eyesight abilities (identification: Skagerberg & Wright; 
2009. Eyewitness recall: Stanny & Johnson, 2000; Thorley, 2015; Williamson et al., 2013) 
— providing evidence to suggest that co-witness influence is caused by informational 
influence. Resultantly, the subsequent chapters within the thesis primarily draw on the 
theoretical model of informational influence when investigating the predictors of co-witness 
influence. 
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3.3. Measuring co-witness influence in a laboratory setting 
 
Previous research has incorporated different experimental procedures that can be 
used to observe the effects of co-witness discussions on memory reports, most of which 
have been based on the procedural framework of the misinformation effect paradigm (see 
Chapter 2). Despite the fact that many of these paradigms have not been used to directly 
observe the behaviour of crime eyewitnesses, they allow researchers to observe the effects 
of group discussions on memory recall — the integral foundation of co-witness influence. 
Most notably, the following three paradigms have been used to observe the potential effects 
of group discussions: The social contagion of memory, memory conformity, and 
collaborative recall (Harris, Paterson, & Kemp, 2008). It must be noted that the names used 
to refer to the following paradigms were incorporated from early research studies which 
notably incorporated the respective experimental designs. 
 
3.3.1. Collaborative recall paradigm 
 
Although not directly linked to misinformation acceptance, the collaborative recall 
paradigm has allowed researchers to observe the effects of group discussion on memory 
recall (See Basden et al., 1997; Basden, Basden, Thomas, & Souphasith, 1998; Thorley & 
Dewhurst, 2007). Typically, groups of participants would be given a list of items to 
remember (such as words or images). After completing a filler task (an unrelated task used 
to divert the participants' attention for a brief amount of time), participants would be 
instructed to work as a group and verbally recall as many items as they could remember. 
Following the initial recall test, participants would then be individually tested and asked to 
write down as many items as they could remember. The interviewer would instruct 
participants not to guess, and to only write down the items that they confidently 
remembered witnessing. Studies using the collaborative recall paradigm have typically 
found that individuals who engage in a collaborative discussion with others are at a higher 
risk of making memory recall errors when questioned individually later on (Basden et al., 
1998; Meade & Roediger, 2009; Thorley & Dewhurst, 2007). Although the collaborative 
recall paradigm can allow researchers to observe the effects of group discussion on general 
memory recall, the design does not accurately simulate a co-witness discussion, mainly due 
to the fact that participants are asked to memorise a series of words or items rather than an 
event. The recollection of a series of words requires the individual to retrieve items from 
their short-term memory and recall it (Seidlitz & Diener, 1998), whereas the recollection of 
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an event would require an individual to not only recall information from their short-term 
memory, but to also use cognitive reasoning skills to order and interpret the event correctly 
(Devine, 2012; Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001), thus a more realistic 
paradigm is required to observe the effects of co-witness influence on eyewitness 
testimonies. 
 
3.3.2. Social contagion of memory paradigm 
 
The social contagion of memory paradigm (Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001) is an 
experimental procedure that uses confederates to deliberately expose participants to 
misinformation. The paradigm was used by Roediger and colleagues to study how false 
memories could be implanted through social influence. Employing an interactive procedure 
originally conceived by Schneider and Watkins (1996), the paradigm consists of four main 
stages: a study phase, filler task, collaborative recall (discussion) and a final individual 
recall task. In the study phase, the participants were paired with a confederate and shown 
six different slides depicting household scenes (i.e. a bathroom or a kitchen) for a set 
amount of time. Each slide contained an average of 23.8 objects that were a mixture of high 
and low expectancy items (items that would/would not be expected to be present in certain 
scenes). Participants were instructed to pay attention to the objects in each slide. After 
witnessing all six slides, the participant and confederate were given individual filler tasks 
consisting of mathematical problems on a piece of paper. The participants were allocated 
four minutes to complete as many questions as they could. The collaborative recall phase 
was then used to replicate a co-witness discussion. The task required the participant and 
confederate to take turns in recalling an object that was present during each slide, until 
they had each recalled 6 objects (12 collaboratively) from each slide. The confederate had 
received previous instructions to recall some objects that were not present in the slides 
(misinformation). More specifically, the confederates had been instructed to falsely recall 
one high-expectancy object (e.g. a toothbrush in the bathroom) and one low-expectancy 
object (e.g. screwdriver in the bathroom) for each slide. Finally, the individual recall task 
was used to replicate an eyewitness statement. The participant was asked to list all of the 
items that they remembered seeing from each slide on multiple sheets of paper (a separate 
sheet was used for each slide).  
Roediger et al. (2001) found that participants were more likely to report seeing 
erroneous objects within the slides if they had been suggested to them by the confederate 
during the collaborative recall. The paradigm has been adopted in numerous additional 
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research studies on co-witness influence. Concordantly, the majority of research using the 
social contagion of memory paradigm have produced similar observations to Roediger et al. 
(2001), identifying a relationship between exposure to misinformation from confederates 
and false eyewitness memory reports (see Allan & Gabbert, 2008; Gabbert et al., 2004; 
Ost, Ghonouie, Cook, & Vrij, 2008; Ost, Hogbin, & Granhag, 2006; Shaw, Garven, & Wood, 
1997; Wright et al., 2005). 
 
3.3.3. Memory conformity paradigm 
 
The memory conformity paradigm allowed researchers to avoid the use of 
confederates by presenting the participants with different information about the same 
event. By presenting the pairs with different information, they would have been likely to 
hold differing recollections to each other. Subsequently when discussing the event, the 
participants would encounter some details about the event that they would not have been 
able to witness (see Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). This 
approach was utilised by Gabbert et al. (2003), who showed participant dyads slightly 
different videos of the same event. Both videos contained the exact same sequence of 
events, but were filmed from different angles, allowing the participants to witness items 
that would not have been present in their partner’s footage. Shortly after viewing the 
footage, the participants engaged in a discussion with their partner about the event. They 
were instructed to collaboratively discuss their answers to a series of written questions 
about the event. The participants then completed a 45-minute filler task before engaging in 
the main recall test. Participants privately completed a questionnaire about the event which 
involved providing a free recall and answering eight specific questions. Using the memory 
conformity paradigm, Gabbert et al. (2003) demonstrated that participants who discussed 
the event with a co-witness were susceptible to reporting unwitnessed information from 
their partner in their individual statements. 
When using the memory conformity paradigm, the experimenter must ensure that 
participants do not suspect viewing different footage from their co-witness, otherwise, 
participants may become aware of the study’s purpose and change their behaviour 
accordingly. To avoid this, researchers have employed various methods to present 
participants with differing videos without arousing suspicion. The majority of research using 
this paradigm has simply used a screen to separate the participants when showing them 
different videos (see Gabbert et al., 2003; Hope, Ost, Gabbert, Healey, & Lenton, 2008; 
Skagerberg & Wright, 2008c). The researchers would usually provide the participants with a 
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misleading explanation for making the participants view the footage separately. For 
instance, Skagerberg and Wright (2008c) told their participants that two monitors had to be 
used to ensure that both participants viewed the footage from the same angle; similarly, 
Hope et al. (2008) told participants that there was only one monitor available and the 
researchers wanted to ensure that the participants viewed the event from the same 
distance. A limitation to this ‘dual-screened’ approach is that the participants would be 
separated from their co-witnesses when witnessing the event, reducing the ecological 
validity of the experiment. An alternative method for presenting participants with different 
videos without them noticing is the MORI (manipulation of rivalrous images by polarizing 
filters) technique (Mori, 2003; 2007). The procedure enables the experimenter to project 
two different videos on the same screen by utilizing light polarization. Two videos are 
polarized at different angles allowing the experimenter to block out either of the videos by 
using an appropriately adjusted polarizing filter. By allowing participants to view the 
projection through different polarization filters (worn as spectacles), the experimenter can 
present the participants with different videos at the same time and location. Owing to these 
benefits, the MORI technique has been widely adopted within research studies on memory 
conformity (French, Garry, & Mori, 2008; Hirokawa, Matsuno, Mori, & Ukita, 2006; Mori & 
Mori, 2008). An issue with the majority of paradigms used to observe co-witness influence 
was that all participants believed that they had seen the footage from the same view/angel. 
In reality, many participants would be aware that their co-witnesses may have witnessed 
the incident from a different vantage point and as this could have an impact on their 
willingness to accept their co-witnesses' information.  
 
3.4. Empirical research findings 
 
As discussed in chapter one, eyewitnesses can contribute to an investigation by 
providing an identification of the suspect (from a line-up), or by providing a statement 
about their recollection of the incident (Brewer & Wells, 2011; Bruer, Harvey, & Adams, 
2017; Gronlund, Wixted, & Mickes, 2014; Lindholm, 2008). The two tasks are facilitated by 
different cognitive processes, with eyewitness recall primarily relying on working memory 
capacity and memory retrieval (Berger & Herringer, 1991); whereas eyewitness 
identification relies more on memory recognition pathways and facial recognition ability 
(Andersen, Carlson, Carlson, & Gronlund, 2014; Bindermann, Brown, Koyas, & Russ, 2012). 
However, despite these slight differences in underlying processes, research has indicated 
that eyewitnesses can be influenced by their co-witnesses during both tasks— a process 
that is more commonly known as memory conformity (Gabbert et al., 2003; Paterson et al., 
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2012; Zajac & Henderson, 2009). As well as influencing what a witness remembers seeing 
(memory conformity), co-witness discussions can also have an influence on the confidence 
that a witness places in their statement and also how they interpret the event and 
subsequently attribute blame (blame conformity). The aforementioned effects of co-witness 
influence are discussed extensively below.   
 
3.4.1. Memory conformity 
 
Memory conformity is the most commonly observed effect of co-witness influence 
(Carlucci et al., 2010; Davis & Meade, 2013; Garry et al., 2008; Paterson et al., 2012; 
Wright et al., 2005). However, the exact nature of the types of information that witnesses 
can conform to falsely witnessing can vary. Research on memory conformity has most 
commonly found that witnesses can be influenced into erroneously recalling peripheral 
details that may have been present during the incident (i.e. the colour of the getaway car or 
the type of weapon used). Other research has found that certain items can also be falsely 
recalled or missed out completely due to memory conformity (Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert 
et al., 2004). For instance, Gabbert et al. (2004) found that many participants could be 
influenced by their co-witnesses into falsely reporting the wrong item of clothing on the 
offender and also reporting seeing a gun, when no weapon was used. 
Memory conformity can also involve the false recollection of more salient and central 
details of an incident which could have a greater impact on the investigation, such as 
identifying the number of suspects that were present during a crime (as evident in the 
Oklahoma Bombing investigation). Wright et al. (2000, Experiment 2) created an 
experimental scenario to see whether individuals could be influenced by their co-witnesses 
into falsely reporting seeing additional accomplices to a crime. The memory conformity 
paradigm was used, participants (N=40) were paired up and presented with 21 images 
depicting a series of events where two men met each other and entered a snooker hall to 
play a game of snooker. Whilst playing snooker, the pictures depict a woman stealing one of 
the men’s wallets. The researchers had slightly altered some of the images, so that half the 
pairs only saw the women committing the crime, whilst the other half saw the women 
committing the crime with multiple accomplices. After discussing the event with each other, 
the participants filled out a questionnaire about the incident (with one of the questions 
asking whether the suspect entered the building alone or with accomplices). The results 
indicated that participants were susceptible to conforming to their partners’ reports. More 
specifically, 15 (79%) of the pairs came to an agreement on whether the suspect was alone 
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or accompanied by others, indicating that one of the participants will have conformed to the 
conflicting memory report of their partner. With regards to the direction of the conformity, 
seven of the conforming pairs agreed that there were accomplices present, and the other 
eight pairs decided that the suspect entered the building alone, suggesting that there was 
no general tendency for the memory conformity to be skewed in one direction. Instead, the 
results suggested that the direction of conformity was dependent on which partner was 
more confident in their judgement; the participant who was more confident in their 
judgement was more likely to influence their co-witness into accepting their memory report. 
Similar relationships between confidence and co-witness influence have been repeatedly 
reported by previous research (Goodwin et al., 2012; Schneider & Watkins, 1996). 
Schneider and Watkins (1996) reported that when a person displayed high levels of 
confidence, the other person would be more likely to be persuaded by them. 
Correspondingly, it is believed that after the Oklahoma bombing incident, Tom Kessinger 
was able to influence the other co-witnesses because of his confident recollection (Memon & 
Wright, 1999). 
 
3.4.1.1. Memory conformity during line-up identification 
 
Co-witness discussions can also influence a witness’s decision during suspect 
identification, which can consequently contribute to causing a false conviction (Zajac & 
Henderson, 2009). Within many investigations where the police have identified a potential 
suspect, a photographic line-up (or an identification parade when live actors/suspects are 
used instead of photos) is used to determine whether an eyewitness can identify the correct 
suspect to the crime. Typically, a photo of the suspect is placed among the photos of 
multiple innocent people who are unrelated to the crime (foils). The witness is asked if they 
can identify the suspect from the line-up. Any identifications made by the witness can then 
be used as legal evidence to convict the suspect. Wright and McDaid (1996) estimated that 
in 83% of police line-ups, multiple witnesses are used. Therefore, it is likely that most 
witnesses who are asked to make an identification could have encountered co-witness 
information beforehand.  
However, photographic line-ups can be unreliable due to most witnesses having a 
tendency to believe that the perpetrator is present within the line-up (Memon, Hope, & 
Gabbert, 2002). By holding this presumption, many witnesses will be motivated to make an 
identification, even if the target is not present within the line-up (Davies, 1996). In addition, 
many witnesses are at risk of falsely identifying an innocent bystander as being the 
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offender, through the process of unconscious transference. Unconscious transference refers 
to a processing error where an eyewitness can falsely identify an innocent bystander as the 
perpetrator because of a previous encounter with the bystander in another context. The 
misattributed sense of familiarity can consequently influence the witness to make a 
misidentification (Read, Tollestrup, Hammersley, McFadzen, & Christensen, 1990; Ross, 
Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 1994). Buckhout (1974) demonstrated the prevalence of 
unconscious transference, participants would watch crime footage and later be asked if they 
could identify the suspect from a line-up. The study found that approximately 25% of the 
participants identified an innocent bystander who was present during the crime.  
Loftus and Greene (1980) found that participants were vulnerable to incorporating a 
co-witness’s erroneous descriptions of a target into their memory reports. In the first 
experiment, participants viewed a crime and then read a hypothetical statement from a 
previous participant (co-witness), which included false information about the suspect’s 
appearance. The study found that approximately one in three of the participants were 
susceptible to including the erroneous description of the offender when giving their own 
statement to the interviewer, relative to only one in twenty participants from the control 
condition. This was attributed to natural errors. In their second experiment, the researchers 
found that participants were also vulnerable to acting on these erroneous descriptions 
during an identification line-up. Sixty-nine percent of the participants who read a misleading 
narrative that falsely claimed the offender had a moustache picked out a foil with a 
moustache, whereas only thirteen percent of the participants from the control condition 
made this mistake. Although the co-witness misinformation within the study was presented 
indirectly, research suggests that the same effect is likely to be amplified when it is 
presented through a co-witness discussion (Gabbert et al., 2004). Similar findings were 
reported by Gabbert, Brewer, and Hope (2007), who also found that a witness’s line-up 
performance was heavily influenced by their knowledge of how previous witnesses had 
performed. 
In a slightly more recent study, Zajac and Henderson (2009) demonstrated the 
effects of co-witness discussions on memory recall and line-up identification. Participants 
(N=79) viewed a CCTV footage of a crime taking place and were later asked to discuss the 
footage with a confederate who had been instructed to falsely claim that the perpetrator 
had blue eyes (brown eyes in reality). When giving a suspect description, amongst the 
participants who had not discussed the event with a confederate, only 7.9% identified a 
person with blue eyes. However, amongst the participants who had discussed the event 
with the confederate, 66.7% had confidently claimed that the suspect had blue eyes. Of 
these conforming individuals, 85.7% were initially unsure about the suspect’s eye colour, 
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suggesting that the effects of a co-witness influence are more significant when the targeted 
individual does not have a clear recollection. In regard to the line-up identification, 
participants who engaged in a co-witness discussion with the misleading co-witness were 
47.2% likely to falsely choose a foil as the suspect, compared to only 23.6% of participants 
from the control condition. The findings from the study suggested that participants who 
were exposed to misleading information from co-witnesses were twice as likely to accuse an 
innocent person of committing a crime. In a second experiment, the participants were 
presented a line-up containing only brown-eyed members. This time, there were no 
differences in false-identification rates between the misinformation and control group, 
suggesting that the increase in misidentification rates within the first experiment will have 
been caused by the co-witness’s misinformation. The effects of co-witness misinformation 
on line-up identification can be explained by considering the memory process behind 
identification. Witnesses who attempt to make an identification rely on their recognition 
memory to determine whether someone from a line-up can be matched to their memory of 
the incident (Radvansky, 2017). However, as discussed in chapter one, misleading post-
event information could be integrated as a visual memory and resultantly, cause the 
witness to identify someone due to the familiarity between the chosen suspect and the post-
event information (Loftus et al., 1978; Searcy et al., 2000). 
 
3.4.2. Interpreting the event and blame conformity 
 
Memory conformity indicates that an eyewitness can incorporate the misinformation 
of other co-witnesses into their personal memory reports when attempting to reconstruct an 
event (see Carlucci, et al., 2010; Davis & Meade, 2013; Garry et al., 2008). However, much 
of the literature discussed so far has only looked at the effects of co-witness influence on 
memory recall accuracy. Co-witnesses can also influence the way an individual interprets a 
witnessed event. Moreover, researchers have demonstrated that eyewitnesses can be 
influenced by other co-witnesses when attempting to determine which person from an 
incident is to blame, information that is highly central to the event (Thorley, 2015), a 
process first termed by Thorley and Rushton-Woods (2013) as blame conformity. Blame 
conformity refers to a sub-form of memory conformity. Where memory conformity is 
concerned with the act of conformity to any memory about an event, blame conformity is 
specifically concerned with the act of conformity to the blame attribution of another 
individual.  
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Although a relatively historic case, the Boston Massacre incident demonstrates how 
the malleability of blame attribution can have an effect on the criminal justice system. On 
the 5th of March 1770, a group of British Army soldiers shot and killed multiple members of 
an angry mob. The soldiers were tried for murder and there was controversy surrounding 
their commander, Captain Thomas Preston, who was accused by some for issuing the order 
to open fire on the civilians. There were discrepancies amongst the witnesses on who was to 
blame. Whilst some testified that they heard Captain Preston issue the order to open fire; 
another witness had claimed that the command had come from another soldier; and other 
witnesses contested that a soldier had fired his weapon on his own accord (Kidder, 1870; 
Zobel, 1970). Leading up to the trial, it is believed that propaganda had been distributed to 
influence the public’s interpretation of the event. It is conceivable that many witnesses at 
the trial will have been influenced by these depositions, consequently leading to Captain 
Preston being acquitted. The Boston Massacre example demonstrates how the recollections 
and interpretations of, and subsequent blame attributions for, an event can deviate between 
co-witnesses, and — more importantly — how these interpretations can be influenced by 
external sources. A subsequent question to then ask is why the attribution of blame by 
eyewitnesses for a single event can be so malleable. 
Whilst, the task of attributing blame also requires the individual to first retrieve 
information through recall memory, the process of attributing blame is significantly more 
cognitively demanding than general memory recall tasks. Moreover, it is a decision-making 
process that not only requires the witness to recall the central details to an event, but also 
requires them to interpret the information correctly in order to deliberate which potential 
suspect is at guilt (Remijn & Crombag, 2007). Due to the heuristic nature of blame 
attribution, an eyewitness may interpret a witnessed event differently from their co-
witnesses and blame a different person, making blame attribution a relatively subjective 
process in comparison to conventional memory recall tasks. Of course, during many events 
where the victim can be clearly differentiated from the offender (such a robbery), there will 
be little contention regarding who is at fault. However, disagreements in eyewitness blame 
attributions are more prevalent during incidents where neither party can be clearly 
identified as a victim (such as a fight between two parties or a motor collision involving two 
drivers) or incidents where there may be multiple perpetrators present (such as the Boston 
Massacre incident). In addition, an individual who was involved in the incident or associated 
with someone who was, may be motivated to present co-witnesses with a false 
interpretation of the event, in an attempt to avoid persecution.  
Research suggests that during an incident where determining who is at fault is not as 
easily clear, eyewitnesses can be influenced by co-witnesses when attributing blame. 
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Through using a misinformation paradigm, Thorley and Rushton-Woods (2013) showed 
participants (N=156) video footage depicting two men, in distinctively differently coloured 
clothing (one was wearing a brown t-shirt, the other was wearing a grey t-shirt), colliding 
into each other whilst crossing the road. Based on the nature of the collision, it could be 
deduced that neither person was particularly at blame, as both men were looking at an 
electronic device (MP3 player and mobile phone) whilst crossing the road. Participants were 
then presented with one of three statements from a supposed female eyewitness who was 
present during the incident. The three statements differed in one aspect: the person who 
was blamed for the collision. Participants either read that the man in brown t-shirt was to 
blame for the collision, the man in the grey t-shirt was to blame for the collision, or no 
mention was made about who was at fault (control group). The results found a significant 
association between who the co-witness had blamed for the collision and who the 
participants subsequently ended up blaming. More specifically, when the co-witness blamed 
the person in the brown t-shirt, 34.6% of the participants also made this blame attribution, 
relative to 0% of the participants from the control group. Similarly, when the co-witness 
blamed the man in the grey t-shirt, 38.5% of the participants also made this blame 
attribution, relative to 3.8% of the participants from the control condition. The majority of 
the participants in the control condition were unable to attribute blame to just one of the 
individuals. 
In a later study, Thorley (2015) found that even when the ambiguity surrounding 
blame attribution was reduced (making it relatively easy to identify which person was to 
blame), participants were still vulnerable to blame conformity. Participants (N= 168) 
watched a crime video which depicted a man selling stolen goods to a woman within a pub. 
The footage depicted a man walking into a bar and attempting to sell a stolen camera to 
multiple participants, who refused. Eventually, the man approached three individuals who 
were sat at a table (one man and two women) and successfully sold the camera to one of 
the women. After viewing the footage, the participants read a statement from a 
(hypothetical) previous co-witness along with a photo of the witness, who was either an 
elderly woman or a younger female adult. The statement either blamed the correct woman, 
the incorrect woman, or did not specify which woman brought the camera (i.e. “one of the 
women bought the camera.”). Later, when questioning the participants, Thorley found that 
when the co-witness did not blame the innocent woman, only 7.1% of the participants 
blamed her for buying the camera. However, when the co-witness blamed the innocent 
woman for buying the camera, 42.90% of the participants also blamed her for buying the 
camera. This effect of blame conformity was only present when the co-witness 
misinformation belonged to the young adult. When the same misleading co-witness 
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statement was presented by an elderly co-witness, there were no significant differences in 
false blame attribution rates. 
Several implications can be drawn from the findings of Thorley (2015). Firstly, the 
study suggests that the participants had consciously chosen whether or conform to the co-
witness, depending on the co-witness’s characteristics. Thorley suggested that participants 
appeared less likely to perceive an elderly co-witness as having an accurate memory or 
good eyesight and would have therefore been less inclined to accept her judgement. As a 
result, it can be deduced that blame conformity will be predominantly caused by 
informational influence; or at the very least, that source monitoring errors would require the 
individual to first accept the information as being correct before it can be misattributed as 
witnessed information. Secondly, the study indicates that eyewitnesses can be influenced by 
co-witnesses into misinterpreting an event and consequently attributing blame to the wrong 
person, even when it is initially clear as to who is at fault. Further, the study demonstrated 
how easily innocent bystanders could be accused of committing a crime through co-witness 
influence. As discussed previously, innocent bystanders can be mistakenly blamed for 
committing a crime by eyewitnesses as a result of unconscious transference (Read, 
Tollestrup, Hammersley, McFadzen, Christensen, 1990; Ross, Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 
1994). Theories on blame conformity would therefore suggest that individuals who possess 
an inaccurate reconstruction of the event (through either unconscious transference or an 
idiosyncratic mistake) will be at risk of contaminating the statements of their co-witnesses if 
they engage in a post-event discussion with them. As a result, the empirical studies within 
the present thesis primarily focused on the effect of co-witness influence as a product of 
blame conformity.  
 
3.4.3. Eyewitness confidence  
 
Exposure to co-witness misinformation can also influence the level of confidence a 
witness will have in their statement, which can consequently have an impact on their 
willingness to give evidence in court (Allwood, Knutsson, & Granhag, 2005; Luus & Wells, 
1994; Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009). Exposure to co-
witness misinformation can have varying effects on an eyewitness’s confidence depending 
on their initial interpretation of the event, and whether they conform to the misinformation 
in their final report. In cases where the witness conforms to misinformation that contradicts 
their original recollection, research suggests that many witnesses would lose confidence in 
their reconstructed reports. Gabbert et al. (2003) compared the self-reported confidence 
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scores of participants who had been exposed to misinformation from co-witnesses with 
participants from a control group (no misinformation was presented). Their study found that 
younger participants (18-30 years) were less confident in their statements when recalling 
unwitnessed information. However, older eyewitnesses (60-80 years) exhibited the same 
level of confidence in their statements when recalling both witnessed and unwitnessed 
information, suggesting that the effects of co-witness discussions on eyewitness confidence 
may be mediated by the individual’s age. 
In cases where the witness encounters contradicting information but refrains from 
conforming to the misinformation, research suggests that exposure to the disconfirmatory 
information would reduce the witness’s confidence in their memory report. Luus and Wells 
(1994) presented participants with feedback regarding their co-witness’s responses during a 
line-up identification task. The study found that confidence deflation occurred when the 
participants were told that their co-witness’s response contradicted theirs. However, 
although the study suggests that exposure to conflicting information can reduce a witness’s 
confidence in their original recollection, other studies which have recreated the experimental 
paradigm have failed to find such a relationship between co-witness misinformation and 
confidence deflation (see Allwood et al., 2005; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009). 
In cases where the witness already holds an incorrect recollection of the event prior 
to discussing the event with co-witnesses, research suggests that exposure to similar 
misinformation could cause the witness to gain more confidence in their erroneous memory 
(Allwood et al., 2006; Semmler et al., 2004). Allwood et al. (2006) presented participants 
with post-identification feedback in the form of a written statement from a previous 
participant. The study found that participants who were exposed to confirmatory feedback 
were more likely to report higher levels of confidence, relative to participants who had not 
received any feedback. 
 
3.4.4. The effects of group discussion on memory recall 
 
Although a large body of research has demonstrated the negative implications of co-
witness discussions, a great proportion of these studies only observed the effects of co-
witness discussions when participants were presented with erroneous co-witness 
information. Roediger et al. (2001) described such research as being ‘one-sided’, due to 
only emphasizing the negative effects of social influence. In reality, post-event information 
which is encountered during a co-witness discussion will not always be incorrect. Therefore, 
the risks of misinformation acceptance during real co-witness discussions will be lower than 
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predicted by the existing research. In addition, some researchers have debated whether 
collaborations between eyewitnesses could provide benefits to the investigation process by 
enhancing the performance of eyewitnesses (Paterson & Kemp, 2005; Zajac & Henderson, 
2009). Therefore, a question worth addressing is whether a group discussion is beneficial or 
detrimental to memory performance, when misinformation is not purposely presented. In 
short, research indicates that group discussions can have both positive and negative effects 
on eyewitness performance. Clark, Stephenson, and Kniveton (1990) explained that 
collaborative recall facilitated more accurate recollections but simultaneously made the 
individuals more prone to misplacing their confidence in inaccurate recollections. 
Arguments for the positive effects of co-witness discussions can be drawn from early 
research on collaborative recall. Previous research demonstrated that individuals who 
collaborated in groups during a memory recall task were able to make more accurate 
recollections than individuals who attempted to make recollections on their own (e.g., 
Hoppe, 1962; Stephenson, Brandstatter, & Wagner, 1983; Warnick & Sanders, 1980). 
Underwood and Milton (1993) found that collaborative groups slightly outperformed 
individual participants in memory recall accuracy. However, these differences were only 
observed when the participants had been warned that a critical accident was about to occur 
within the footage. Warnick and Sanders (1980) found that when misinformation was not 
deliberately presented during a co-witness discussion, participants who discussed the event 
produced more accurate reports about a witnessed crime in comparison to participants who 
had witnessed the crime individually.  
Brown and McNeill (1966) suggested that participants who discussed the event with 
one another will have been able provide each other with sufficient cues to trigger each 
other’s memories, evoking a ‘tip-of-the-tongue’ reaction.  As discussed earlier, many police 
officers seem to agree with the notion that co-witness discussions can provide benefits. 
Paterson and Kemp (2005) found that a large proportion of police officers in their survey 
believed that a group discussion amongst co-witnesses could benefit the individual 
performance of eyewitnesses, with 27.5% of the officers in the survey stating that they 
believed a co-witness discussion would prompt eyewitnesses to recall additional details that 
they may have otherwise forgotten.  
However, many of the studies on collaborative recall have not been carried out 
within a forensic context. That is, the majority of research which has demonstrated a 
positive effect of group discussion on memory recall has involved participants providing 
their reports collaboratively rather than through giving individual statements privately. 
Thorley and Dewhurst (2007) measured memory recall accuracy between individual 
participants and participants who discussed their recollections in groups. The study found 
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that collaborative groups recalled slightly more correct items when providing their reports 
collectively. However, when asked to provide a private recollection, the study found no 
significant differences between participants who had discussed the items in a group and 
those who had not. Additionally, most research studies in favour of collaborative recall have 
produced evidence suggesting that collaborative groups perform better by comparing the 
recall of a collaborative group against an individual (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). When 
comparing the memory reports of collaborative groups with reports from the same number 
of non-collaborating individuals (nominal groups), researchers have found that collaborative 
groups are typically outperformed by the individuals (e.g., Basden et al., 1997, Basden, 
Basden, & Henry, 2000; Weldon, Blair, & Huebsch, 2000). Stephenson (1990) also argued 
that despite some research suggesting that collaborative recall provided benefits to the 
memory reports of eyewitnesses, there is also an abundance of evidence that suggests it 
could also have a negative impact on the witness’s testimony. Through co-witness 
discussions, disagreement between witnesses may be camouflaged, hearsay may be 
rendered acceptable, evidence may be suppressed, and effective cross-examination 
prevented.  
Weldon and Bellinger (1997) attributed the general under-performance of individuals 
in groups to collaborative inhibition, a counter-intuitive process whereby individuals within a 
collaborative group would perform less efficiently than if they were performing individually. 
One of the key causes for collaborative inhibition is the retrieval disruption hypothesis, 
which argues that exposure to conflicting information during memory recall can disrupt the 
memory retrieval process and consequently result in poorer memory recall (Basden & 
Basden, 1995; Basden et al., 1997; Dahlström et al., 2010). When individuals encode 
information, they develop an idiosyncratic organization of the information. Later, if the 
individual attempts to recall the information with others, exposure to the output of others 
can disrupt the individual’s memory retrieval strategy, which can consequently reduce the 
amount of information that is correctly recalled. Another cause of collaborative inhibition 
can be social loafing: many individuals may purposely exert less effort in attempting to 
recall accurate information about the event if they are aware that others are contributing 
(Weldon et al., 2000). Regardless of whether the direction of co-witness conformity can 
point to correct or incorrect responses, it is evident that eyewitnesses would still be 
producing responses through the influence of others. Such behaviour would tarnish the 
independence of an individual’s statement and would render their testimony as an 
inaccurate account of their experience. Therefore, the present thesis contends that attempts 
should be made by researchers and practitioners to reduce the prevalence of co-witness 
discussions and the consequent effects of co-witness influence.
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Chapter 4:  Factors Influencing Memory Conformity 
 
4.1. General introduction to the chapter 
 
Research indicates that eyewitnesses can be influenced by their co-witnesses when 
giving a statement (Carlucci et al., 2010; Garry et al., 2008; Hoffman, Granhag, See 
Kwong, & Loftus, 2001) and more specifically, when attributing blame (Thorley 2015; 
Thorley & Rushton-Woods, 2013). However, a consistent finding amongst these studies was 
that not all of the participants were influenced by their co-witnesses. The pre-existing 
literature indicates that some individuals seem to be more suggestible than others (Gabbert 
et al., 2003; Goodwin et al., 2012; Levett, 2011; Paterson et al., 2009). The observed 
individual differences in co-witness suggestibility suggest that some eyewitnesses may 
possess certain attributes that put them at a higher risk of being influenced by co-
witnesses, relative to others. Alternatively, some co-witnesses may also possess certain 
attributes that make them more influential to other co-witnesses, than others. Further 
development of the current literature’s understanding on co-witness suggestibility can 
provide significant benefits for both researchers and practitioners within the criminal justice 
system. By identifying the factors that can increase an eyewitness’s susceptibility to being 
influenced by co-witnesses, both investigators and other professionals within legal settings 
will be able to use this information to assess the reliability of a certain eyewitnesses. In 
addition, by identifying the factors associated with co-witness suggestibility, police officers 
may be able to apply this knowledge to their interviewing techniques in order to help 
eyewitnesses avoid reporting post-event information that was not directly witnessed. It is 
therefore the intention of the present studies to identify the factors which can increase an 
eyewitness’s susceptibility to memory conformity. As discussed in Chapter 3, the present 
thesis argues that blame conformity could be, perhaps, one of the most damaging forms of 
memory conformity, due to the fact that such behaviour could mislead investigators, 
contribute to the false conviction of an innocent individual and also allow the real 
perpetrator to avoid conviction. Owing to its significance, the thesis and current chapter pay 
particular attention to identifying the moderating variables that could have an impact on co-
witness influence in relation to memory recall and subsequent blame attribution. 
As discussed within the previous chapters, the act of memory conformity can be 
evoked by three different processes: Informational influence, normative influence, and 
source monitoring errors (Gabbert et al., 2003; Loftus et al., 1995; Wright, London & 
Waechter, 2009). Furthermore, research suggests that these processes can co-occur, 
meaning that the act of co-witness conformity can be motivated by multiple factors working 
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simultaneously (Loftus et al., 1995). Studies which have specifically looked at the process of 
blame conformity suggest that this form of co-witness influence is predominantly driven by 
information influence (Thorley 2015; Thorley & Rushton-Woods, 2013). However, there is 
no evidence to suggest that blame conformity cannot also be facilitated by normative 
influence or source monitoring errors. Therefore, in order to identify the factors that can 
increase an eyewitness’s vulnerability to blame conformity, the current chapter reviews the 
existing literature surrounding the three psychological constructs associated with memory 
conformity. 
The literature surrounding memory conformity has identified numerous factors which 
have been observed to increase an individual’s tendency to conform to others (French et al., 
2008; Gabbert et al., 2004; Liebman et al., 2002; Walther et al., 2002). These variables 
can be differentiated as internal and external factors. The internal factors refer to the 
inherent characteristics of an individual that make them more vulnerable to being influenced 
by co-witnesses (e.g. age, gender, personality type etc.). The external factors refer to the 
situational characteristics of the event, external to the individual, which can increase their 
risk of being influenced by co-witnesses (e.g. characteristics of the co-witness, number of 
co-witnesses presenting the information etc.). Through reviewing the existing literature, the 
present researcher identified three internal (age, gender and personality) and three external 
(group size, characteristics of information source and pre-existing relationship with 
information source) factors which have been frequently discussed amongst researchers, 
regarding their roles as mediators of memory conformity. These factors form the basis of 
the present thesis’ empirical chapters. The current chapter offers a review of the literature 
on the relationship between these mediating factors and co-witness suggestibility.  
 
4.2. Gender-related differences in co-witness suggestibility. 
4.2.1. Informational influence 
 
As discussed in chapter three, the primary cause of blame conformity (as well as 
memory conformity, in general) is informational influence (Thorley, 2015; Thorley & 
Rushton-Woods, 2013). Sistrunk and McDavid (1971) argued that the relationship between 
gender and susceptibility to informational influence was dependent on the task at hand. 
Moreover, they asserted that gender-related differences in informational influence would 
only exist if one gender struggled with the task at hand significantly more than the other. 
This is because for informational influence to be effective, the individual would have to 
believe that the source of the information is more likely to be correct than them (Suls & 
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Wheeler, 2000; Williamson et al., 2013). Therefore, an individual who exhibits greater 
levels of uncertainty at a task will be more reliant on the responses of others to obtain the 
correct answer. Based on this principle, a significant gender difference in eyewitness 
accuracy and confidence would be indicative of possible gender-related differences in co-
witness suggestibility.  
 
4.2.1.1. Gender-related differences in eyewitness performance 
 
Eyewitness performance has typically been observed through memory tasks which 
have measured an individual’s ability to recall an event (memory recall accuracy) or identify 
a previously witnessed suspect from a photo line-up (identification accuracy). With regards 
to the literature surrounding gender-related differences in eyewitness performance, the 
overall findings from previous research studies are contradictory (McKelvie, 1981). On one 
hand, numerous studies have suggested that there are no gender-related differences in 
memory recall accuracy (e.g. Barry, Bacon, & Child, 1957; Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, 
Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Clifford & Scott, 1978; Kuehn, 1974). Clifford and Scott 
(1978) found no significant gender differences in memory recall accuracy when recalling a 
non-violent incident. However, they found that when the crime being witnessed was violent, 
male eyewitnesses performed more accurately. Similarly, Kuehn (1974) found that men 
were more accurate in remembering violent crimes in comparison to women. Gender 
differences were attributed to female eyewitnesses’ inabilities to produce accurate 
recollections, rather than male eyewitnesses excelling at the task (Broverman et al., 1972). 
It has been proposed that through gender stereotypical socialisation, many female 
eyewitnesses will have learned to be more fearful and vulnerable in violent encounters 
(Barry et al., 1957; Keuhn, 1974). Another explanation could be that female participants 
may have a greater inclination to avoid watching violent incidents, as research has shown 
the women show a greater dislike to viewing violence (Hoffner & Levine, 2009). The findings 
would suggest that in the context of witnessing a violent crime, female eyewitnesses could 
be more susceptible to informational influence and, thus, more vulnerable to co-witness 
influence. However, it must be acknowledged that the aforementioned theories on gender 
stereotypical socialisation are relatively outdated, with no recent studies supporting the 
claims. Therefore, the findings of Barry et al. (1957) and Keuhn (1974) may not have any 
relevance to eyewitness performance at present time. 
In contradiction to the aforementioned observations, the majority of research on 
gender and eyewitness performance suggests that women hold a slight superiority in 
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eyewitness accuracy, both with regards to identification and recollection (Allport, 1961; 
Areh, 2011; Bruni, 1963; Hill et al., 1995; Hultsch et al., 1991; Larrabee & Crook, 1993; 
McKelvie, Standing, St. Jean & Law, 1993; Megreya et al., 2011; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007; 
Seidlitz & Diener, 1998; Smith, 1966; Washlin et al., 1993; West et al., 1992; Zelinski et 
al., 1993). Yarmey (1993) was able to demonstrate this difference in memory recall using a 
more naturalistic method for observing eyewitness recall accuracy. The study adopted a 
more realistic approach, in comparison to traditional laboratory studies, by incorporating an 
observational design. Pedestrians were approached by a female actress who engaged in a 
short discussion with them. Later, the participants were asked by an experimenter to recall 
the female’s physical characteristics. The findings indicated that female participants were 
significantly more accurate in identifying the actress’s physical characteristics than male 
participants. It could be argued that, due to the actress being a woman, the results may 
have been caused by own-sex identification biases (see Mazanec & McCall, 1975; McKelvie, 
1981; Yarmey & Jones, 1983), giving the female participants an advantage. However, 
additional research has produced similar results after controlling for such biases (see 
Megreya et al., 2011; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007). Moreover, it has been suggested that 
these gender differences in memory recall could be a result of differing cognitive strategies 
used between men and women when recalling information (Halpren, 2000; Mazanec & 
McCall, 1975). Halpren (2000), and Mazanec and McCall’s (1975) theory is supported 
through the analysis of brain lateralization — Neurological observations have identified clear 
gender differences in brain lateralization when individuals attempt to process and retrieve 
information (Wager, Phan, Liberzon & Taylor, 2003). More specifically; related to memory 
recall, Speck et al. (2000) observed brain activation of participants during working memory 
tasks. The study found women to perform with significantly higher accuracy than men in the 
working memory tasks, concurring with the existing research. Moreover, the study found 
that women showed far more brain activation of the left hemisphere when carrying out the 
working memory tasks, whereas men showed more bi-lateral or right hemisphere 
activation. The researchers deduced from the data that women’s abilities to recall more 
accurate information may be due to the gender-differences in problemsolving strategies. 
Additionally, research has suggested that females possess slight advantages in storing 
short-term memory (Jensen, 1998; Knox, Seth, Mcelveen, Bergstein & Longo, 2007) and 
episodic memory (Herlitz & Rehnman, 2008; Tulving, 1993; Zelinski et al., 1993), which 
would allow them to make more accurate recollections. If women do perform better than 
men in memory recall, this might indicate that they will be less reliant on external 
information and thus less susceptible to informational influence.  
An explanation for the conflicting results within the literature can be attributed to the 
variations of methodologies adopted by different researchers. Research has consistently 
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shown that individual differences in eyewitness recall and facial recognition can be 
dependent on the characteristics of the event (Barry et al., 1957; Keuhn, 1974) and person 
of interest (Areh, 2011). For instance, studies show that individuals will typically perform 
better at recalling the characteristics of an individual who they share greater similarities 
with (i.e. gender, see Megreya, Bindemann, & Havard, 2011; or race, see Meissner & 
Bringham, 2001). Therefore, variations in experimental stimuli between studies could elicit 
different observations in gender differences. 
Although the majority of the literature suggests that women seem to have an 
advantage in recalling the characteristics of an individual, research shows that men excel in 
recalling the incident itself. Areh (2011) conducted a laboratory study on eyewitness 
accuracy. The study possessed good external validity, due to participants being told that 
their answers would be used to identify the offender, inducing similar investigator effects 
that would be present during a real eyewitness interview. The study found that women were 
far more accurate in recalling an offender’s characteristics, which would suggest that female 
eyewitnesses would perform better at describing a crime suspect or identifying the suspect 
from a line-up. However, the study found that men were more accurate in recalling the 
incident as a whole, which would suggest that male eyewitnesses may be relatively better 
at general recall for an incident and attributing blame in comparison to female 
eyewitnesses. As a result, male eyewitnesses may be less susceptible to blame conformity. 
 
4.2.1.2. Gender-related differences in confidence 
 
Despite the evidence indicating that women perform better in most memory recall 
tasks, research on the confidence judgments of eyewitnesses shows that men are 
significantly more confident in giving statements, even when they are incorrect (Areh, 
2011; Fox & Punccohar, 1994; Yarmey, 1993). Furthermore, Instone, Major, and Bunker 
(1983) found that women tended to be less confident than men in their general abilities 
(although this was measured in a non-forensic setting). Based on the principle that 
informational influence is dependent on an individual’s perceived self-ability relative to the 
information source (Williamson et al., 2013), the overconfidence of men might suggest that 
they would be less susceptible to informational influence than women, despite being less 
accurate than them. 
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4.2.2. Source monitoring 
 
With regards to gender-related differences in source monitoring; Loftus et al. (1992) 
produced evidence that during memory recall tasks, male eyewitnesses were more likely to 
misattribute post-event information as witnessed information than female eyewitnesses. 
This difference could be due to women possessing greater abilities in the rehearsal of 
memory and retrieval of information (Seidlitz & Diener, 1998). However, the findings of 
Loftus and colleagues have since been disputed by more recent research, with numerous 
studies failing to find any gender-related differences in an individual’s susceptibility to 
making source monitoring errors (Pishkin, 1960; Roebers & McConkey, 2003; Smeets et al., 
2006). The discrepancies between the research studies can be attributed to the way in 
which the researchers have attempted to identify source monitoring errors. Typically, a 
misinformation effect paradigm (see Chapter 2) has been used to determine an individual’s 
susceptibility to misattributing post-event information as witnessed information (Gabbert et 
al., 2004; Garry et al., 2008; Greene et al., 1982). However, the internal validity of using 
such a paradigm for observing source monitoring errors can be questionable. This is 
because research has demonstrated that, within the misinformation effect paradigm, 
participants can incorporate post-event information into their memory reports through 
various other psychological processes as well (such as informational influence; Loftus et al., 
1995). Therefore, contradictions regarding gender-related differences in source monitoring 
abilities may be attributed to some of the studies failing to accurately identify source 
monitoring errors. 
 
4.2.3. Interpersonal behaviour and normative influence 
 
Sex differences in the interpersonal behaviour of eyewitnesses can also have an 
effect on their susceptibility co-witness influence. Research indicates that women are more 
likely to discuss emotionally-charged events with others around them (Birditt & Fingerman, 
2003; Harshman & Paivio, 1987). Therefore, within an eyewitness setting, individuals who 
actively seek to discuss the event with co-witnesses will be more likely to be exposed to the 
judgements of others; this can be problematic if the judgments of the co-witnesses are 
false. However, despite evidence suggesting that female eyewitnesses would be more likely 
to engage in post-event discussions, previous surveys on real eyewitnesses have failed to 
investigate this hypothesis (e.g. Paterson & Kemp, 2006a; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008a).  
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Shapiro and Penrod (1986) found in their meta-analysis that, despite performing 
better in facial recognition than men, female eyewitnesses were more prone to making 
erroneous statements. The researchers attributed this to female eyewitnesses exhibiting an 
increased desire for compliance to their investigator; as a result, female eyewitnesses would 
state as much information as they could recall. This heightened need for performance could 
consequently influence female witnesses to recall information that they learned from other 
co-witnesses, if they perceive the information as being correct. 
In relation to the gender-related differences in normative influence; Eagly (1978) 
produced data suggesting that women were more likely to conform in social situations. This 
difference was attributed to women possessing a greater concern with maintaining social 
harmony and preventing group conflict, as well as men possessing an innate preference for 
being resistant to conforming in public settings (Eagly, Wood & Fishbaugh, 1981). The 
findings suggest that female eyewitnesses will be more likely to conform to co-witnesses 
through heightened normative pressures. However, more recent research has produced 
evidence which suggests that females may not be more susceptible to normative pressures 
than males (Steinberg & Monohan, 2007; Sumter, Bojhorst, Steinberg, & Westenberg, 
2009). Furthermore, gender differences in normative influence would only be relevant in a 
context where the eyewitnesses gave their statements collectively. In reality, police 
investigators are typically trained to collect statements privately (Williamson et al., 2013). 
Therefore, a witness’s statement would bear no group-related repercussions and, thus, the 
level of normative influence would be significantly reduced. 
 
4.2.4. Research on gender and memory conformity 
 
To date, no existing research has attempted to investigate the relationship between 
an eyewitness’s gender and their susceptibility to blame conformity. However, several 
studies have attempted to investigate the relationship between eyewitness gender and co-
witness suggestibility during memory recall and line-up identification tasks (memory 
conformity). When attempting to investigate gender differences in memory conformity, the 
existing research within the literature can be inherently contradictory. Multiple studies have 
produced evidence indicating that male eyewitnesses are more susceptible to co-witness 
misinformation (Eck et al., 2008; Loftus et al., 1992). Using the memory conformity 
paradigm (described in Chapter three), Eck et al. (2008) found that male participants were 
significantly more likely to recall unwitnessed items that were suggested to them by a co-
witness, in their statements, compared to female participants. Conflictingly, there is 
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evidence which suggests that there are no gender differences in susceptibility to co-witness 
influence (Butts et al., 1995; Schwarz, 2013). Using the social contagion of memory 
paradigm (described in Chapter three), Schwarz (2013) observed that male and female 
participants were equally as likely to be misled by a confederate in recalling and reporting 
unwitnessed information. Schwarz’s results lie in agreement with the earlier research of 
Sistrunk and McDavid (1971), which suggested that no gender-related differences existed in 
general social conformity. The differences in results between the studies can be attributed 
to each study incorporating varying memory recall tasks, as the process of social influence 
is highly dependent on the task at hand (Baron et al., 1996; Suls & Wheeler, 2000).  
It must be acknowledged that the validity of the majority of existing research on 
gender and memory conformity can be questionable. For instance, the studies of Schwartz 
(2013) and Eck et al. (2008) were based on undergraduate projects, with the latter study’s 
findings being generated from a sample of only 61 participants. As a result, the observed 
gender differences may have been caused by an insignificant sample. Butts et al. (1995) 
also investigated gender differences in eyewitness testimonies, and found no significant 
differences in resistance to misinformation. The paper provides further evidence in support 
of Schwartz (2013). Although the study used a reliable and validated experimental design 
(social contagion of memory paradigm), the study recruited an even smaller sample of only 
40 participants, making the reliability of the results dubious. 
To date, the majority of research on co-witness suggestibility has investigated the 
effects of an eyewitness’s gender on memory tasks involving the recollection of items within 
an event. Although such designs can explain how eyewitnesses can misidentify a specific 
item, they fail to measure the effects of co-witness influence on blame attribution, leaving 
this area of research unaccounted for. Resultantly, there is gap within the research 
literature regarding the relationship between an eyewitness’s gender and their susceptibility 
to blame conformity. 
 
4.2.5. Limitations of previous research 
4.2.5.1. Sample size 
 
The literature on gender and co-witness influence is relatively scarce. Of the relevant 
papers, many had small sample sizes. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) stated that, to hold 
scientific value, a study’s sample size must adhere to the formula N> 50+8m, with m 
representing the number of independent variables. Two of the most relevant studies to the 
present work: Eck et al. (2008) and Butts et al. (1995), recruited a small sample size (61 & 
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40, respectively). Neither study’s sample size satisfied the law of Tabachnick & Fidell on 
producing data that could hold scientific value in its generalisability. 
 
4.2.5.2. Small group size 
 
The majority of the studies on memory recall and social influence used experimental 
designs where participants were typically placed in a small group of three or even in a pair. 
However, a disadvantage of smaller groups and pairs was that participants would be 
interacting with a small majority size of two or even none (when placed in a pair). Asch 
(1955) argued that, as well as being unanimous, it is essential for the majority to be of 
sufficient size so that their judgement cannot be deemed as being idiosyncratic. Bond 
(2004) demonstrated that for social influence to be effective a minimum majority size of 
three was necessary. Further, Eagly (1978) argued that women’s greater concern for group 
harmony and prevention of conflict would motivate them to become more conforming in 
social situations. It can be argued that the level of potential group conflict would be too 
insignificant in a group of three individuals to motivate female participants to conform, 
suggesting that a gender difference in conformity may only be present in larger groups. 
Therefore, studies observing the effects of co-witness influence should measure behaviour 
within different group sizes, to determine if the size of the group could have a moderating 
effect. 
 
4.3. Age-related differences in co-witness suggestibility 
 
The bulk of previous research on co-witness conformity has relied on student 
samples, due to their convenience and availability (e.g. Gabbert et al., 2006; Goodwin et 
al., 2012; Shaw et al., 1997), leading Loftus et al. (1992; page 93) to refer to them as the 
‘fruit flies of psychology’. Although such sampling methods can allow for faster and larger 
samples to be recruited, they will consequently lead to the research being mainly 
representative of university students who are typically young adults. However, the 
researcher acknowledges that in more recent years, the proportion of mature university 
students has increase — with 10% of UK university students in 2015 being above the age of 
40 (UCAS, 2015). Therefore, it can be argued that more recent studies using university 
students may have incorporated a slightly more diverse age range. In lieu of this, the 
present research argued that research focusing on eyewitness behaviour should still carry 
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out precautions to incorporate a diverse sample of mixed ages, considering that only a small 
percentage of real life eyewitnesses will be young adults.   
 
4.3.1. Informational influence 
 
4.3.1.1. Age-related differences in eyewitness accuracy 
 
Due to informational influence being dependent on a person's perceived ability to 
perform accurately at a task (see Sistrunk and McDavid, 1971), it is worth reviewing the 
literature surrounding age and eyewitness accuracy to gain an accurate understanding of 
the possible age-related differences in eyewitness suggestibility. When looking at age-
related differences in eyewitness performance; there is general agreement within the 
literature that elderly eyewitnesses are far less accurate than their younger counterparts in 
both memory recall (Blackman & Nilsson, 1984; Dodson et al., 2007) and suspect 
identification (Adams-Price, 1992; Memon, Bartlett et al., 2003; O’Rourke, Penrod, Cutler & 
Stuve, 1989; Searcy et al., 1999), with many studies indicating that the inaccuracy of 
elderly eyewitnesses comes more specifically in the form of false-alarm identifications 
(identifying the wrong individual as an offender or wrong item as being present during the 
incident)(Searcy et al., 1998; Yarmey, 1993). Memon et al. (2003) examined age 
differences in eyewitness identification accuracy and found that older (60-82 years) 
eyewitnesses were significantly less accurate than younger (16-33 years) eyewitnesses. The 
study offers a reliable indication of age-related effects on eyewitness identification accuracy. 
However, a limitation of the paper was that the study measured age through a dichotomy of 
two extremes. The categorisation of the participants does not allow the researchers to 
identify if this relationship is linear and does not indicate how middle-aged eyewitnesses are 
likely to perform. With regard to eyewitness testimonies (memory recall), Yarmey (1993) 
conducted an observational study on age and eyewitness recall. Unlike the study of Memon 
et al. (2003), the study divided age groups into three categories: young adults (18-29), 
middle-aged adults (30-44) and older adults (45-65). The study found that younger adults 
were superior in memory recall accuracy to middle aged adults, who in turn were more 
accurate than older adults. However, an issue with Yarmey’s experiments was that 
participants had to recall the characteristics of a young woman. Studies have previously 
identified that individuals pay more attention to others who they feel they can relate to 
better (Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Davies, 1993). Therefore, the use of a younger person as 
the stimulus may have allowed the younger participants to excel during the memory recall 
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task due to them being more familiar with, and interested in, younger adults - therefore 
raising questions as to the validity of results. Together, the findings of Yarmey (1993) and 
Memon et al. (2003) suggest that elderly eyewitnesses generally perform less accurately 
than their younger counterparts (in both recollection and identification). When comparing 
these two studies however, it must be noted that Memon et al’s (2003) study used 60-85-
year-old participants for their ‘older group’ sample whereas Yarmey's (1993) study on age 
and memory recall used participants aged 45-65. This contrast in age groups would suggest 
that more empirical evidence would be required to fully determine the memory recall 
abilities of elderly individuals over 65.  
The reduced level of eyewitness accuracy in memory recall amongst elderly 
individuals is often due to age-related deficits in their episodic memory (Naveh-Benjamin et 
al., 2003; Nyberg et al., 1996). The process of recalling a witnessed event requires the use 
of one’s episodic memory (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002); therefore, 
a deficit in the ability to recall from episodic memory could explain the significantly less 
accurate identifications made by older eyewitnesses within the literature. As well as episodic 
memory, elderly individuals are also likely to possess weaker visuospatial memory skills 
(Moffat, Zonderman & Resnick, 2001). Searcy et al. (1999) identified age-related deficits in 
visuospatial memory as a contributing factor for the relatively poor identification and recall 
accuracy of older eyewitnesses. They suggested that an elderly eyewitness’s inability to 
mentally simulate an event would significantly reduce their ability to accurately recall the 
incident. In relation to identification errors, Memon et al. (2003) attributed the age 
difference in identification accuracy to older eyewitnesses possessing a deficit in source-
recollection. As a result of poor source-recollection skills, older eyewitnesses are said to 
have an inability to remember where or when they may have seen a particular face (Cohen 
& Faulkner, 1989; McIntyre & Craik, 1987; Schacter, Osowiecki, Kaszniak, Kihlstrom, & 
Valdiserri, 1994). Consequently, they would be more likely to attribute a familiar face to the 
wrong witnessed event and, as a result, falsely identify the wrong individual as the offender. 
Although a significant relationship has been established between age and 
identification accuracy, some research has identified that there is no significant effect of age 
in event recollection, which would suggest that there may not be any age-related 
differences in eyewitness blame attribution (Adam-Price, 1992; Searcy et al., 1998). As 
mentioned previously, the conflicting findings within the literature could be due to the 
differing methodologies being employed by different researchers. As well as the 
characteristics of the witnessed individuals, procedural factors such as the length of 
duration between witnessing the event and giving a response could have a mediating effect 
on the accuracy of some participants (Mudd & Govern, 2004). Therefore, despite the 
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literature suggesting that older eyewitnesses may be more susceptible to informational 
influence during a line up identification, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that they 
would necessarily be more susceptible to blame conformity. 
 
4.3.1.2. Age-related differences in eyewitness confidence 
 
The disadvantage in reconstructing the event could potentially influence older 
eyewitnesses to becoming more receptive to the information of co-witnesses and, thus, 
more susceptible to informational influence. However, this theory operates on the 
assumption that older eyewitnesses would be aware of their potential inaccuracies. If older 
eyewitnesses are, in fact, more confident in their judgements than younger participants, 
this could suggest that they may be less susceptible to informational influence. 
Unfortunately, the literature is once again at a disagreement. With regards to age and 
eyewitness confidence; Searcy et al. (1998) found no significant differences in line-up 
identification confidence between older and younger adult eyewitnesses, despite older 
participants in the study reporting lower confidence in their general memory abilities 
beforehand.  
However, Gabbert et al. (2003) compared the self-reported confidence scores of 
participants who had been exposed to misinformation from co-witnesses with participants 
from a control group (no misinformation was presented). Their study found that younger 
participants (18-30 years) were less confident in their statements when recalling non-
witnessed information. However, older eyewitnesses (60-80 years) exhibited the same level 
of confidence in their statements when recalling both witnessed and unwitnessed 
information, suggesting that the effects of co-witness discussions on eyewitness confidence 
may be mediated by the individual’s age. In a different study, Cohen and Faulkner (1989) 
found that older eyewitnesses (60-83 years) were significantly more confident in their 
erroneous statements than younger eyewitnesses (24-39) after encountering 
misinformation. Overall, the literature on age and eyewitness confidence suggests that 
despite older eyewitnesses exhibiting similar levels of confidence in their memory reports, 
they are more likely to be overconfident when reporting co-witness misinformation, which 
could consequently increase their willingness to give evidence in court (Allwood et al., 2005; 
Luus & Wells, 1994; Semmler et al., 2004; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009), as well as their 
level of influence over other co-witnesses (Goodwin et al., 2012; Schneider & Watkins, 
1996). 
 
 69 
 
4.3.2. Source monitoring 
 
Research on human memory has consistently demonstrated that, relative to younger 
adults, older adults are more prone to making source monitoring errors when attempting to 
recall information (Ferguson et al., 1992; Glisky et al, 2001; Henkel et al., 1998; Memon, 
Bartlett, Rose, & Gray, 2003). The link between age and inaccurate source monitoring could 
suggest that older eyewitnesses are more likely to incorporate a co-witness’s 
misinformation into their own memory reports. The inability to differentiate between 
witnessed information and post-event information could consequently lead to older 
eyewitnesses drawing on misinformation from co-witnesses when attempting to reconstruct 
the event (Memon et al., 2003). 
 
4.3.3. Research on age and memory conformity 
 
The age of an eyewitness has been found to have a moderating effect on the 
individual’s suggestibility to misleading questions when attempting to provide a statement 
(Coxon & Valentine, 1997; Dodson & Krueger, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2002). Dodson and 
Krueger (2006) found that when younger (17-23 years) and older adults (60-79 years) 
were matched on their overall memory accuracy, the older eyewitnesses were more likely to 
recall seeing events in a video that had only been mentioned in a subsequent questionnaire 
(post-event information). The authors attributed the heightened level of suggestibility to the 
older eyewitness’s tendencies to misattribute the post-event information as witnessed 
information. However, the psychological processes that engender misinformation 
acceptance from misleading questions can be different to the processes that prompt 
misinformation acceptance from co-witnesses (Paterson & Kemp, 2006b). Additionally, 
participants will be likely to perceive information that is provided to them by an 
experimenter as being correct (Roebers & Schneider, 2000), whereas when presented with 
information from another participant, many individuals will be more inclined to reject the 
information, especially if it contradicts with their own recollection (Hope et al., 2008). 
Therefore, more direct research is needed to determine the relationship between age and 
co-witness suggestibility. 
When looking at the effects of co-witness influence, Gabbert et al. (2003) found no 
age-related differences in co-witness suggestibility. Using the memory conformity paradigm, 
the study found that although participants were susceptible to conforming to each other, 
there were no significant differences between the age groups (18-30 vs. 60-80) with 
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regards to conformity rates when attempting to provide a statment. However, in a later 
study, Gabbert et al. (2004) found that younger adults (17-33 years) were more susceptible 
to incorporating their co-witness’s misinformation into their own memory recall reports, 
compared to the older adults (58-80 years). The researchers attributed this to younger 
adults exhibiting greater levels of normative influence due to their heightened need for 
social acceptance, relative to older adults. The discrepancy between the studies could be 
attributed to the slight differences in experimental designs. Gabbert et al., (2003) showed 
pairs of participants altered videos from each other to allow them to expose each other to 
unwitnessed information (memory conformity paradigm), whereas Gabbert et al., (2004) 
used confederates to expose participants to unwitnessed information (social contagion of 
memory paradigm). Nonetheless, both studies indicate that an individual’s susceptibility to 
co-witness influence does not seem to bear a simple relationship to memory accuracy (i.e. 
elderly eyewitnesses being more vulnerable to co-witness influence), as the theories on 
informational influence would predict. This may be due to older eyewitness’s being more 
confident in their reports, despite possessing weaker memory. In relation to blame 
attribution; there is a gap within the literature with regards to the effects of age on an 
individual’s susceptibility to blame conformity, highlighting a further need for empirical 
research to determine whether age-related differences in blame conformity exist. 
4.3.4. Limitations of previous research: Age as a nominal variable 
 
Research studies that have attempted to measure the effects of age on co-witness 
suggestibility have done so through measuring age as a categorical variable. Such a 
subjective form of classification could facilitate improper grouping. For example; if a study 
categorises participants who are over the age of 50 as elderly and participants who are 
under the age of 50 as middle-aged, it makes an assumption that a 49-year-old and 51-
year-old participant are significantly different in age, when this is not the case.  Many 
research studies, such as Gabbert et al. (2003), attempted to reduce the risk of miss-
categorisation by creating a gap between the two age groups. The study recruited 
participants that were either aged 18-30 (young adults) or 60-80 (elderly adults). By 
filtering a sample like this, however, the paper had to work with a much smaller sample size 
of 40. In addition, although the method identified two clear separate age groups, the study 
ignored eyewitnesses who would fall between the two age groups (31-59) and, thus, the 
results cannot confidently be used to make inferences about eyewitnesses that would fall 
into the absent age bracket. As a result, it can be suggested that research investigating the 
effects of age on co-witness influence should measure the variable on a continuous scale. 
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4.4. Personality and Co-witness suggestibility 
 
Using the misinformation paradigm (see Chapter 2), Powers, Andricks, and Loftus 
(1979) found that participants subjected to identical experimental conditions varied in both 
memory recall accuracy and suggestibility when giving a statement. The variance in 
eyewitness suggestibility has led many researchers to suggest that an eyewitness’s level of 
suggestibility (to both interviewers and co-witnesses) may also be related to individual 
differences in personality (Doughty et al., 2017; Loftus, 2005; Wright et al., 2009). 
Personality is a multifaceted concept that refers to individual differences in the way a person 
thinks, feels and behaves (Kazdin, 2000). An individual’s personality is affected by the 
development of the individual through learnt responses, memories, attitudes and social 
relationships (Engler, 2009). The term ‘personality trait’ refers to consistent patterns in the 
way an individual behaves, feels or thinks (Pervin & Cervone, 2014). 
 
4.4.1. Personality and misinformation acceptance 
 
There is currently a severe lack of research investigating the relationship between 
personality differences and co-witness suggestibility. However, due to the significant 
implications and notable cases relating to investigative coercion, a large body of research 
has attempted to observe the relationship between personality traits and eyewitness 
suggestibility to misleading interviews (see Gudjonson, 1988; Merckelbach, Muris, Rassin, & 
Horselenberg, 2000; Trouve & Libkuman, 1992; Ward & Loftus. 1985). Despite the 
difference in misinformation source, comparative research suggests that the effects of 
interrogative suggestibility are homogenous with the effects co-witness suggestibility (Jack 
et al., 2014; Thorley, 2013). Therefore, the research on personality differences in 
eyewitness suggestibility to misleading questions can be used to gain a rudimentary 
understanding of the possible personality predictors of co-witness suggestibility. 
One of the earliest studies to investigate the relationship between personality traits 
and interrogative suggestibility was that of Ward and Loftus (1985). The study measured 
personality using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers and Briggs, 1962), dichotomising 
participants’ personality types to i) intuition vs sensing and ii) introversion vs extroversion. 
Although the study found no significant differences between personality types and 
eyewitness recall accuracy, the results did indicate a clear significant relationship between 
personality traits and susceptibility to post-event misinformation. Subjects who were 
classed as introverts were significantly more likely to be influenced by misleading post-
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event information. Additionally, intuitive subjects were also significantly more likely to be 
influenced by misleading post-event information. Unsurprisingly, participants who were 
classed as both introverted and intuitive were at the highest risk of being influenced by the 
misleading post-event information. An explanation for the relationship between introversion 
and eyewitness suggestibility (to both, co-witnesses and interviewers) is that the reserved 
nature of introverts and their lack of assertiveness would make them more inclined to be 
compliant and pressured by others (Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, Bragason, Einarsson, & 
Valdimorsdottir, 2004). The study of Ward and Loftus (1985) did, however, bear a 
methodological limitation in the way that the study measured personality traits. Rather than 
analysing the measures of personality on a scale, both of the aforementioned personality 
traits were dichotomised, based on the majority scores of the questionnaire. This means 
that a subject who scored as being only slightly more introverted than extroverted would 
have been classified as being the same (introvert) as an individual with extreme levels of 
introversion and no extrovert tendencies. Measuring personality traits on a scale would 
allow for a much more accurate observation of the relationship between personality 
characteristics and susceptibility to misinformation. This is because an independent variable 
with ordinal values would allow for more comparisons to be made between datasets.   
In contrast, multiple studies have produced results that contradict Ward and Loftus 
(1985). Trouve and Libkuman (1992) produced results which indicated that extroverted 
individuals were, in fact, more susceptible to misinformation acceptance than introverted 
individuals. More relevant to the present study; Pozzulo, Crescini, Lemieux, and Tawfik 
(2007) attempted to investigate the relationship between personality traits and co-witness 
suggestibility. Participants viewed an incident and were then presented with a misleading 
statement from a (hypothetical) pervious participant, before being subjected to a recall 
task. The study found no significant difference between shy and non-shy eyewitnesses in 
suggestibility to misinformation. Although shyness is not a subcategory of introversion, both 
traits are similar in their expressions (Henderson & Zimbardo, 2010). Thus; the study can 
also be deemed as contradictory to the results of Ward and Loftus (1985).  
The differences between the Ward and Loftus (1985) study and the latter studies 
may have been due to the use of different misinformation sources. Ward and Loftus 
introduced the misinformation through misleading questions from an interviewer, whereas 
Trouve and Libkuman (1992) and Pozzulo et al. (2007) both presented misinformation 
through non-social methods (misleading questionnaire and misleading statement, 
respectively). As a result, the introverted participants from Loftus and Ward’s study would 
have been more likely to conform, in order to avoid social conflict; whereas in the other 
studies, the reduction in social pressure would have allowed the introverted/shy participants 
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to reject the misinformation easily. These discrepancies suggest that the relationship 
between personality and eyewitness suggestibility will be heavily dependent on the task at 
hand. Therefore, caution must be taken when making assumptions about co-witness 
suggestibility based on the findings of research which have presented misinformation to 
participants through non-social sources. 
In her review of the misinformation effect, Loftus (2005) identified several additional 
personality traits that have been repeatedly associated with misinformation acceptance 
during memory recall, by previous research. Such traits included empathy; Tomes and Katz 
(1997) found that emotionally empathetic individuals were more habitually susceptible to 
accepting post-event misinformation.  Loftus also identified self-monitoring as a predictor of 
eyewitness suggestibility, Mullen (1987) suggested that the more attention was focused on 
the self, the more an individual would attempt to match their attitudes to that of the people 
around them. Absorption was also identified; Platt, Lacey, Iobst, and Finkelman (1998) 
identified a negative relationship between scores on the Tellegen Absorption Scale and 
memory distortions, which was correspondingly associated with the acceptance of false 
memories. In addition, Wright and Livingston-Raper (2002) also found that approximately 
10% of the variance in misinformation acceptance within a non-clinical sample was 
accounted for by disassociation scores. Although many of the above studies were based on 
eyewitness suggestibility to misleading interviews, comparative research suggests that the 
psychological attributes of interrogative suggestibility are concurrent with that of co-witness 
suggestibility (Jack et al., 2014; Thorley, 2013).  
Some more general personality assessments have also been able to determine an 
individual’s vulnerability to co-witness influence. Using the Ten-Item Personality 
Questionnaire (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swan, 2003), Doughty, Paterson, MacCann, 
and Monds (2017) found that participants who scored lower on measures of openness, 
extraversion and neuroticism were significantly more susceptible to memory conformity, 
relative to higher scoring participants. Further, Liebman et al. (2002) displayed a range of 
personality inventories (NEO OI- Revised; the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire; 
Locus of Control; and Memory Efficacy) which could reliably predict the suggestibility of 
eyewitnesses to misleading questions. More specifically; the study found that eyewitnesses 
with a high external locus of control, low memory efficacy and/or high levels of neuroticism 
were significantly more vulnerable to interrogative suggestibility.  
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4.4.2. Interpersonal characteristics and co-witness suggestibility 
 
Whilst observations on general personality differences have allowed researchers to 
identify the fundamental predictors of eyewitness suggestibility, the present thesis argues 
that co-witness suggestibility could be predicted more accurately by observing the 
interpersonal characteristics of eyewitnesses. This is because the informational and 
normative pressures of conformity are heavily mediated by the interpersonal characteristics 
of the targeted individual (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Glomb & Liao, 2003; Heerdink, van 
Kleef, Homan, & Fischer, 2013), due to the exchanging of information between individuals 
being a highly social interaction (Gabbert et al., 2004) and the act of conformity being an 
interpersonal behaviour (Bass, 1960). The relationship between some interpersonal 
characteristics and eyewitness suggestibility have be demonstrated by previous research.  
Zhu et al. (2010) found that certain interpersonal characteristics could predict an 
individual’s risk of incorporating misleading post-event information into their memory recall 
reports. More specifically; cooperativeness and reward dependence (interpersonal 
characteristics related to a concern of satisfying other individuals, as well as gaining their 
approval; Cloninger, 1998) were found to be significantly linked to misinformation 
acceptance. However, the study bore multiple limitations. Firstly, the procedure used a 
presentation of still images rather than video footage for the witnessed stimulus, which 
significantly reduces the study’s ecological validity. Secondly, the misinformation was not 
presented through a social medium; instead, participants read the misinformation off a 
sheet. This will have reduced the level of social pressure exerted on the participant 
significantly, as well as reducing the experiment’s ecological validity. More relevant to the 
present study (by looking at co-witness influence), Wright et al. (2009) were able to identify 
a link between interpersonal characteristics and co-witness suggestibility. They found that 
individuals with higher levels of social anxiety were more vulnerable to being influenced by 
a co-witness during memory recall, due to a greater fear of negative evaluation making 
them more susceptible to normative influence. These findings fundamentally suggest that 
the individual differences in co-witness suggestibility may be accurately accounted for by 
the witness’s interpersonal characteristics. However, to date there is a lack of research 
investigating the interpersonal correlates of co-witness suggestibility (with the exception of 
Wright et al., 2009). 
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4.4.3. Predicting co-witness suggestibility 
 
The ability to identify vulnerable eyewitnesses can have significant benefits within a 
legal context. Through identifying witnesses who would be at a higher risk of reporting 
unwitnessed information, jurors and legal professionals would be able to assess the 
reliability of their statements more accurately. This, in turn, may help reduce the risks of 
false convictions. In addition, through identifying the underlying causes for co-witness 
suggestibility, investigators may be able to work on implementing interventions to prevent 
vulnerable eyewitnesses from reporting non-witnessed information. 
A potentially suitable measure of interpersonal characteristics is the Temperament 
and Character Inventory-Revised (TCI-R) Scale, a psychological construct that attempts to 
measure an inventory of personality traits through a 240-item questionnaire (Cloninger, 
1999). The inventory was constructed as seven multiple subscales: Novelty seeking (NS), 
Harm avoidance (HA), Reward dependence (RD), Persistence (PS), Self-directedness (SD), 
Cooperativeness (C), and Self-transcendence (SD). The model has been acknowledged and 
widely used by researchers in an array of research on personality, including studies on the 
learning of personality, stability of traits and cultural differences (Cloninger & Svrakic, 1992; 
Corr, Pickering, & Gray, 1995; Svrakic, Przybeck, & Cloninger, 1991; Svrakic, 1993; Farmer 
et al., 2003; Sigvardsson, Bohman, & Cloninger, 1987). However, within the literature there 
is a compilation of more recent research studies that have failed to support the validity of 
the TCI-R as a psychological model of personality (see Ando et al., 2004; Chapman, Mayer, 
Specht, Farmer, & Field, 2003; Comings, Gonzales, Saucier, Johnson, & MacMurray, 2000; 
Gana & Trouillet, 2003; Hansenne et al., 2000; Herbst, Zonderman, McCrae, and Costa 
2000; Newman et al., 2000). Farmer and Goldberg (2008) evaluated the psychometric 
properties of the TCI-R. Through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), the paper produced 
data that did not support the associations made by the model between TCI-R facet scales 
and their domains. The results also suggested that there was some possible multicollinearity 
between the facets RD and C. Further, additional CFA tests highlighted the scale’s main 
limitation as failing to differentiate between multiple facet sub-scales, with five out of the 29 
sub-scales displaying relatively low internal consistency. Therefore, the present study 
disregarded the TCI-R as a suitable scale for accurately measuring participants’ 
interpersonal characteristics. 
One tool which has repeatedly been used to identify potential interpersonal 
correlates of conforming behaviour is the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-
Behaviour assessment (FIRO-B; Schutz, 1958) (see Huertas & Powell, 1986; Willcoxson & 
Chatam, 2006). Despite being a relatively dated psychometric tool, the assessment has 
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been validated by more recent research on US, UK and Australian-based samples (see 
Naydenova, 2007; Poorman & Seelau, 2001; Willcoxson & Chatam, 2006). The self-
assessment inventory measures the interpersonal characteristics of an individual through 
three interpersonal dimensions: Control, inclusion and affection. All three dimensions are 
measured through both expressed and wanted needs, creating a total of six interpersonal 
scales. The control dimension reflects the degree to which an individual asserts control over 
the actions of others (expressed), and the degree to which an individual wants their actions 
to be controlled by others (wanted). The inclusion dimension reflects the degree to which an 
individual involves other people into their activities (expressed), and the degree to which 
they want to be included in the in the activities of others (wanted). Finally, the affection 
dimension reflects the level of emotional attachment that individuals place onto others 
(expressed), and the level of emotional attachment that individuals desire from others 
(wanted) (see 8.3.2 for detailed description of FIRO-B assessment). 
Although the FIRO-B was initially developed as a clinical tool, it has been widely 
adopted by many researchers to accurately predict a magnitude of interpersonal 
behaviours, such as loneliness (Jones, Freemon & Goswick, 1981), partner control 
(Naydenova, 2007), and even domestic abuse (Poorman & Seelau, 2001). Despite receiving 
some criticism for its supposed lack of construct validity (Mahoney & Stasson, 2005; Ryan, 
Maguire, & Ryan, 1970), many research studies have demonstrated the reliability of the 
FIRO-B scales in consistently measuring the six interpersonal characteristics (Gluck, 1983; 
Kramer, 1967; Poorman & Seelau, 2001). Furthermore, Kramer (1967) compared the 
scores from all six scales with a self-reported rating of each corresponding trait. Rank order 
correlations indicated that five out of the six scales were significantly correlated with the 
self-reported ratings (excluding expressed inclusion), supporting the construct validity of 
the FIRO-B assessment.  
Previous research using the FIRO-B assessment have produced evidence suggesting 
a possible relationship between some of the scales and susceptibility to peer influence. The 
FIRO-B questionnaire was used by Huertas and Powell (1986) to successfully predict 
conforming behaviour within a different sample demographic. Using the inventory, the 
researchers examined the relationships between interpersonal characteristics and 
suggestibility, in teams of participants during a group task. The study’s main aim was to 
examine the effects of a group leader on group conformity rates, with the experimental 
group having an allocated leader and the control group having no leaders. The results found 
significant positive correlations between conformity rates and the following interpersonal 
characteristics: expressed affection (r=.28), wanted affection (r=.27), expressed control 
(r=.32), and wanted control (r=.25).  Although the findings offer some insight into the 
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interpersonal causes for suggestibility, many of the correlations observed may not be 
applicable to eyewitnesses. This is because the main aim of Heurtas and Powell’s study was 
to identify the effects of conformity to group leaders, with each group having a group leader 
appointed. In addition, participants within the study were asked to report their answers in 
front of their team members. Therefore, the relationship between wanted affection and 
expressed control with conformity may have been caused by an individual’s willingness to 
conform to the group to obtain the desired position of leadership (Huertas & Powell, 1986). 
During an eyewitness interview, there is no appointed leader and eyewitnesses would 
typically state their answers privately. Thus, in theory, the relationship between wanted 
affection and expressed control with conformity should be insignificant within such a 
context. However, there is not enough data within the previous literature to substantiate 
this inference. To gain a more reliable understanding of the interpersonal correlates of co-
witness suggestibility, a more direct observation is needed. However, to date, no study has 
attempted to directly examine the relationship between these interpersonal characteristics 
and co-witness suggestibility. Based on the FIRO-B scale’s wanted control dimension 
measuring an individual’s need to have their actions and decisions controlled by others 
(Schutz, 1958), the present thesis contended that individuals scoring high on this dimension 
could be more vulnerable to co-witness influence. 
 
4.4.4. Limitations of previous research 
4.4.4.1. Interrogative suggestibility vs co-witness suggestibility 
 
As mentioned previously, there is a severe lack of research investigating the 
relationship between personality traits and co-witness suggestibility. In lieu of this, 
researchers have had to rely on studies investigating the relationship between personality 
and interrogative suggestibility to gain a rudimentary understanding of the potential 
personality correlates of co-witness suggestibility. Although some comparative research 
suggests that the effects of interrogative suggestibility can be co-morbid with co-witness 
suggestibility (Jack et al., 2014; Thorley, 2013), there are still some sizeable differences 
between the two processes. Firstly, Paterson and Kemp (2006b) identified significant 
differences in the level of influence between misinformation that is presented through 
misleading questions and misinformation that is presented through co-witness discussions. 
Secondly, it can be inferred that misinformation acceptance can be facilitated by different 
processes depending on the source. Interviewers/investigators will carry a higher level of 
authority than participants/co-witnesses; as a result, many individuals who conform to 
interviewers will do so through an act of obedience to authority (Martin & Hewstone, 2003). 
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This could suggest that the personality correlates of interrogative suggestibility may be 
related to authority obedience and, thus, may not be predictive of an eyewitness’s 
suggestibility to co-witnesses. The only way to identify accurate predictors of co-witness 
suggestibility is to observe this relationship directly, rather than relying on research which 
has been carried out on interrogative suggestibility. 
 
4.4.4.2 Controlling for group size 
 
The theoretical models of social influence suggest that the size of an information 
source can have a moderating effect on the level of influence exerted (Asch 1955; Bond, 
2005; Latane, 1981; Thorley & Dewhurst, 2009; Vrij, Pannell, & Ost, 2005). Liebman et al. 
(2002) proposed that the relationship between personality differences and eyewitness 
suggestibility was heavily dependent on the experimental paradigm. Moreover, it can be 
suggested that some personality differences may only be able to predict co-witness 
suggestibility under certain circumstances (i.e. only when the misinformation is presented 
unanimously or by a large majority). However, despite evidence suggesting that 
misinformation size can have a mediating effect on co-witness suggestibility, very little 
research has attempted to control for this variable when attempting to identify the 
personality correlates of eyewitness suggestibility (See Doughty et al., 2017; Liebman et 
al., 2002). Therefore, the present thesis suggested that the relationship between 
personality differences and co-witness suggestibility should be repeatedly measured under 
different experimental conditions, to allow more accurate inferences to be made from the 
results. 
 
4.5. Group size and co-witness suggestibility 
 
The implications of co-witness influence have been discussed by many researchers 
and legal professionals, with numerous studies suggesting that the prevalence of co-witness 
influence contributes to a large proportion of false convictions every year (Gabbert et al., 
2003; Mojtahedi, 2017; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008b). However, to gain a realistic 
understanding of the true risks of co-witness influence during real criminal incidents, 
research must first ensure that the process of a co-witness discussion is simulated and 
observed within an environment that boasts high ecological validity. The characteristics of a 
criminal incident will often vary depending on the type of crime and other situational 
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variables. Therefore, it is important to study the effects of co-witness influence within 
different situational settings, to allow researchers to determine the true prevalence of co-
witness influence during real incidents. 
 
4.5.1. Prevalence of pair studies within the existing literature 
 
The majority of previous research on co-witness influence have typically studied the 
effects of post-event discussions on eyewitness pairs (or dyads, as referred to by previous 
research), where a participant would view and discuss a criminal event with either another 
participant who had viewed a different video (traditional memory conformity paradigm), or 
a misleading confederate, introduced as a fellow participant (traditional social contagion of 
memory paradigm) (e.g. Gabbert et al.,  2003; French et al.,  2008; Hope et al.,  2008; 
Kieckhaefer & Wright, 2014;  Paterson et al.,  2009; Roediger et al.,  2001). Using the 
memory conformity paradigm, Gabbert et al., (2003) found that a significant proportion 
(71%) of witnesses reported seeing non-witnessed information that they had encountered 
during a post-event discussion with their co-witness. Similar effects have been observed by 
additional research on co-witness influence (see Paterson et al., 2009; Roediger et al., 
2001), suggesting that the risks of misinformation acceptance during a co-witness 
discussion can be high. Additionally, research has found that misleading information 
presented by a single eyewitness can cause other co-witnesses to gain confidence in their 
erroneous judgements (Allwood et al., 2006; Paterson et al., 2009; Semmler et al., 2004), 
and can also cause non-conforming eyewitnesses to lose confidence in their judgements 
(Luus and Wells, 1994). This could be problematic for an investigation, as an eyewitness’s 
confidence in their judgement can have an impact on their willingness to give evidence in 
court (Allwood et al., 2005; Luus & Wells, 1994; Semmler et al., 2004; Skagerberg & 
Wright, 2009). 
However, these observations were made in studies that looked at the effects of co-
witness discussions with only two co-witnesses present. During real criminal events, there 
will often be more than two eyewitnesses present (Memon, Dalton, Horry, Milne, & Wright, 
2016; Paterson & Kemp, 2006a; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008b). A survey by Paterson and 
Kemp (2006a) calculated the mean number of eyewitnesses present during a witnessed 
criminal incident to be 6.77. Additionally, the survey found that 86% of eyewitnesses would 
choose to engage in a discussion with their co-witnesses. After combining the two statistics 
(M number of co-witnesses X percentage of witnesses who engage in group discussions), 
the figures loosely suggest that on average, 5.82 co-witnesses would engage in a group 
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discussion with their co-witnesses. Additionally, a review on over 175 cases of eyewitness 
misidentification within the US by The Innocence Project identified that in 38% of the cases 
of misidentification there were multiple eyewitnesses misidentifying the same innocent 
individual as the offender (Cardozo, 2009). Two inferences can be made from this observed 
statistic: the first is that the misinformation of one witness may have influenced other co-
witnesses into misidentifying the wrong individual. The second suggests that during a co-
witness discussion, it is not uncommon for an eyewitness to encounter misleading 
information from multiple co-witnesses.  
However, despite these figures suggesting that co-witness discussions will most 
often involve larger groups, and that misinformation can be presented by multiple sources, 
the majority of research has only observed the effects of co-witness influence on pairs, with 
very little research attempting to observe these effects within larger groups. Failure to study 
co-witness influence in larger and more realistic group sizes could result in inaccurate 
inferences being made about the behaviour of real eyewitnesses. Moreover, the generalized 
findings could cause researchers to produce unrealistic estimations about the prevalence of 
co-witness influence within real investigations. This is because traditional theories on social 
influence suggest that the size of an eyewitness group could have a mediating effect on the 
risks of co-witness influence. In particular, Bond (2005) highlighted the significance of the 
unanimity of misinformation, target group size and misinformation size in moderating the 
level of social influence an individual will be subjected to. 
 
4.5.2. Misinformation size 
 
The risk of informational influence has been shown to be positively correlated with 
the size of the information source (Bond, 2005). Early research on social conformity 
demonstrated that social influence was significantly greater when participants were exposed 
to misinformation from three sources than from one (Asch, 1955; Gerard et al., 1968; 
Rosenberg, 1961; Stang, 1976). Later research suggested that the level of social influence 
would continue to increase when more than three sources of information were present 
(Gerard et al., 1968; Latané & Wolf, 1981; Nordholm, 1975; Stang, 1976). However, such 
studies were based on simplistic tasks (i.e. line judgement; see Asch, 1955), where the task 
difficulty was very low and the level of informational influence would have consequently 
been lower (Festinger, 1954). When considering the giving an accurate eyewitness 
statement, the task at hand is arguably more difficult and ambiguous than the majority of 
judgement tasks incorporated by the majority of conformity studies (e.g. line judgement). 
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Line judgement tasks solely rely on an individual’s ability to measure shapes, whereas the 
task of giving an eyewitness statement requires the individual to reconstruct and interpret 
memories which may have been distorted through various factors such as memory decay 
(Tuckey & Brewer, 2003), poor visibility (Kebbell & Wagstaff, 1999) and induced stress 
(Deffenbacher et al., 2004). Therefore, findings from more direct observations must be 
sought to gain an accurate understanding of the relationship between misinformation size 
and co-witness influence. 
Despite the scarcity of literature on group size and co-witness influence, the 
relationship between the two variables has been investigated by some researchers. Foster, 
Huthwaite, Yesberg, Garry, and Loftus (2012) compared the effects of co-witness influence 
memory recollection within different conditions. Participants either encountered the 
misinformation from one co-witness or from three co-witnesses. Although the results found 
that exposure to co-witness misinformation had an influencing effect on the participant’s 
memory reports, the study found no significant differences in memory conformity rates 
between either of the experimental conditions. The findings suggest that the inclusion of the 
first misinformation source would have had the greatest effect of social influence and any 
additional members would have had no significant effect on the participants. However, the 
study did not use live co-witnesses; instead, participants were presented with the 
statements of previous participants. As a result, the participants may have assumed that 
the misleading statement of one witness was correct, due to the fact that it was presented 
to them by the interviewer, and, thus, any additional co-witness statements would not have 
had an increasing effect. Consequently, it can be inferred that the findings would not offer 
an accurate representation of the relationship between misinformation size and co-witness 
influence during a co-witness discussion. Walther et al. (2002) investigated the relationship 
between group size (five versus ten) and memory conformity on eyewitness statements, 
using live confederates. Participants witnessed an incident and later discussed the event 
with a group of other co-witnesses. Participants were either subjected to co-witness 
misinformation from a group of five co-witnesses or ten co-witnesses (using confederates). 
The results suggested that misinformation was more influential when presented by the 
larger groups (ten). However, this difference was only observed when the task difficulty was 
low. When the task difficulty was increased (consequently increasing uncertainty), both 
group sizes had the same level of influence on the participants’ responses. This is because 
an increase in task difficulty would have made the target more vulnerable to informational 
influence (Baron et al., 1996) and, as a result, fewer individuals would have been required 
to convince the targeted individual to conform to their judgement. The findings of Walter et 
al. (2002) also indicate that the relationship between misinformation size and co-witness 
influence is dependent on the task at hand. Moreover, the study suggests that the more 
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difficult a task is, the fewer sources will be required to facilitate co-witness conformity. 
Unfortunately, the research of Walther et al. (2002) is one of the very few studies to 
measure the effects of memory conformity as a function of group size. Walther and 
colleagues were able to accurately identify the differences in co-witness influence between 
groups of five and ten co-witnesses. However, research suggests that within real criminal 
incidents it is relatively rare for ten co-witnesses to engage in a co-witness discussion; the 
number is often much smaller (Paterson & Kemp, 2006a). Therefore, the present study was 
more interested in comparing the levels of co-witness influence between groups of two (as 
typically measured within the majority of memory conformity studies) to six (rounded 
average eyewitness group size; Paterson & Kemp, 2006a) eyewitnesses. To date, no such 
research has attempted to make this observation. 
Multiple psychological theories have been presented to explain the relationship 
between misinformation size and group influence.  Asch (1955) suggested that an increase 
in misinformation size would mean that targets would be less likely to perceive the 
misinformation as being an idiosyncratic judgement, and would therefore be more likely to 
accept it as being correct information about reality through informational influence. Mullen’s 
(1983) theory on self-attention and conformity can also be used to explain the relationship 
between misinformation size and group influence, in relation to normative and informational 
pressure.  Self-attention theory is concerned with self-regulation processes that control the 
direction of an individual’s behaviour. When there is high self-focus, self-attention evokes a 
matching to standard process, where individuals will interpret the behaviour of the majority 
as the norm and attempt to conform to it (Carver & Scheier, 1981); thus, larger groups will 
have more influence on individuals through eliciting a greater level of self-focus onto the 
target. 
An increase in group size can also influence an individual through increased memory 
distortions. The retrieval-strategy disruption (RTD) hypothesis (Basden & Basden, 1995; 
Basden et al., 1997; Dahlström et al., 2010) suggests that exposure to conflicting 
information during memory recall can disrupt an individual’s memory retrieval process and 
consequently result in poorer memory recall. With inter-group conflict being more prevalent 
in larger groups (Curral et al., 2010), it may be the case that eyewitnesses in larger groups 
could face greater uncertainty when recalling the event - which may consequently increase 
their vulnerability to co-witness influence (Walther et al., 2002). The effects of RTD were 
demonstrated by Thorley and Dewhurst (2009). Participants were placed into different sized 
groups (1, 2, 3 or 4) and asked to memorise a series of words. They were later asked to 
work as in their teams to recall as many items as they could remember. The results 
indicated that the error rates in collaborative memory recall were higher and more similar 
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within groups of four participants, relative to individual or two-person groups. The 
researchers explained that the participants within the four-person groups would have been 
likely to encounter conflicting information from the other participants more frequently. The 
constant exposure to conflicting information during memory retrieval would have impeded 
their abilities to retrieve as much information accurately. As a result, they will have been 
less likely to remember as many words and, consequently, more susceptible to mistaking 
the erroneous judgements of their group as being correct. 
Up to now, the present chapter has neglected the relationship that misinformation 
size could have with another cause of memory conformity, source monitoring errors. 
Theories on source monitoring suggest that eyewitnesses could also incorporate their co-
witness’s misinformation into their memory reports unintentionally, by misattributing the 
post-event information as witnessed information due to memory errors (Cann & Katz, 2005; 
Schacter et al., 2011; Tousignant et al., 1986). Individuals who report their co-witness’s 
misinformation through source monitoring errors will not be aware of their errors. As a 
result, the observed effects of misinformation size on informational influence should have 
little impact on an eyewitness’s susceptibility to making source monitoring errors. However, 
the present study presents multiple theories which suggest that misinformation size can 
also increase an individual’s risk of misattributing post-event information as witnessed 
information. Firstly, research suggests that for an individual to misattribute post-event 
information as witnessed information they must first accept it as being valid; if the 
information is immediately perceived as being incorrect, the individual will be unlikely to 
misattribute it as witnessed information (Tousignant et al., 1986). Individuals are more 
likely to accept newly learnt information as being correct if it is presented by a larger group 
of individuals (Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig et al., 1997); therefore, an individual’s risk of 
misattributing co-witness information as witnessed information would be higher if the 
information is presented by multiple individuals. Additionally, it can be argued that repeat 
exposure to the same misinformation would have an increasing effect on the probability of 
the misinformation being misattributed as witnessed information. However, the effect size 
of the relationship between misinformation size and source monitoring errors may be 
significantly weaker than the effect size of the relationship between misinformation size and 
social influence, due to the significantly greater amount of research supporting the latter 
relationship. 
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4.5.2.1. Using models of social influence to predict the relationship 
between misinformation size and co-witness influence. 
 
Although previous studies have been able to demonstrate that co-witness influence 
is moderated by the misinformation size, a question that remains unanswered by the 
existing literature is whether this relationship is linear or not. In other words, does the 
addition of each new co-witness provide the same level of increase in co-witness influence 
or does the level of co-witness influence plateau after a certain misinformation size has 
been reached (suggesting that an ‘optimum misinformation size’ may exist)? Further, if the 
relationship is not straightforward and linear, it would be of interest for researchers to 
determine which additional information source would provide the biggest increase in co-
witness influence (i.e. would the addition of the second misinformation source provide the 
biggest increase in co-witness influence, relative to the third and fourth etc.?). By 
identifying the nature of the relationship between majority size and co-witness influence, 
practitioners within the criminal justice system may be able to determine the risks of co-
witness contamination within an investigation more accurately. Although research has 
identified that such a relationship would be heavily dependent on the task at hand (Baron et 
al., 1996), a review of the existing models of social influence and conformity can still 
provide some insight on the potential relationship between misinformation size and co-
witness influence. 
When looking at the general models of social psychology, the relationship between 
misinformation size and conformity is a subject which has generated varying opinions within 
the literature. In his meta-analysis of the existing literature on conformity, Bond (2005) 
indicated that previous research has identified two main trends:  Asch (1955) produced data 
which suggested that the relationship between majority size and group pressure was 
nonlinear - the results showed that conformity rates were highest when there was a 
majority size of three and that any additional confederates would not cause a significant 
increase to the conformity rate. An alternative relationship, also supported by previous 
research, argues that the relationship between the two variables is linear. Latané (1981) 
argued that conformity rates would continue to increase after the majority size exceeded 
three individuals. However, the theory did state that the rate of increase in conformity rates 
- per extra individual - would decelerate as the group size increased.  
 Many studies have attempted to identify the exact form of relationship between the 
two variables, and the results have varied. Asch (1951, 1955), Reitan (1969), and 
Rosenberg (1961) produced data in support of the nonlinear relationship, whereas other 
studies have produced strong evidence in favour of the linear relationship (Gerard et al., 
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1968; Nordholm, 1975; Stang, 1976). Alternatively, there is evidence to indicate that there 
is no difference in conformity rates once the majority size exceeds more than two group 
members (Goldberg, 1954; Kidd, 1956). With regards to an ‘optimum majority size’, 
previous studies have produced evidence suggesting that the optimum majority size for 
social influence to be at its highest can range from two (Reitan, 1969) to ten (Kumar, 
1983). Contradictions in the literature are as to be expected when dealing with the process 
of conformity. This is because the social pressures exerted on an individual from a majority 
are highly dependent on numerous external factors, such as the task at hand, the type of 
influence that predominates (normative or informational), and the characteristics of the 
majority group members. Due to the varying studies incorporating different methodological 
designs, different research studies produce different results. Campbell and Fairey (1989) 
proposed that the relationship between social conformity and group size was dependent on 
what type of influence predominated. They stated that when the influence was 
predominantly normative (pressure to conform for group acceptance), it would entail a 
sigmoid shaped (non-linear) relationship between group size and social conformity, as 
proposed by Asch’s theory on social conformity (1952).  If the influence was predominantly 
informational, they argue that it would entail a more linear shaped relationship between 
group size and social conformity as proposed by Mullen (1983).  
With regards to co-witness conformity after a post-event discussion, the influence 
would be predominately informational due to eyewitnesses giving their responses privately 
(Goodwin et al., 2012). In such cases, research studies investigating the relationship 
between majority size and conformity have found that the relationship can be explained by 
two different psychological models; Social Impact Theory (SIT; Latané , 1981) and Self-
Attention Theory (Mullen, 1983). 
Social Impact theory (SIT) fixates on the psychological changes caused to a person 
by the presence of other individuals (Latané, 1981).  The theory states that there are three 
main dimensions of a group that determine the amount of social impact given off: group 
strength (status), immediacy and size. SIT also takes into account the effects of the target 
group size (number of individuals who are subjected to the group pressure). The theory was 
not developed specifically to explain social conformity but instead, it is used to explain the 
relationship between group size and social impact.  Latané (1981) used the term ‘social 
impact’ to describe various social pressures exerted on individuals by groups, including the 
pressure to conform to the group. Thus, SIT can be used as a generalised representation of 
how group size interacts with social influence. The theory uses the psychological law of 
I=sN^t (t<1), where I is the amount of social impact, t will equal a power less than one, N 
is the number of sources in the group, and s represents a scaling constant. Latané (1981) 
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produced this law to represent the relationship between group size and social impact. The 
law states that the addition of an individual has less of an effect on the target as the 
number of individual’s increase. 
Mullen (1983) used self-attention theory to explain how the size of groups can have 
an impact on an individual’s tendencies to conform.  Self-attention theory is a self-
regulation process that controls the direction of an individual’s behaviour.  When there is 
high self-focus, self-attention evokes a matching to standard process where individuals will 
interpret the behaviour of the majority as the norm and attempt to conform to it (Carver & 
Scheier, 1981). The theory was derived from Koffka’s (1935) ‘figure-ground principle’, 
where the figure is likely to become self-attentive and more likely to conform to the ground. 
The theory used a formula for measuring the relationship between group size and 
conformity known as the Other-Total Ratio (OTR). OTR uses the formula O/(O+S), with O 
representing the number of people in the majority group and S representing the number of 
individuals in the target group. 
Both models share a key similarity in that they identify the relationship between 
group pressure and majority size as being asymptotic, with each additional majority group 
member having less of an impact on the overall group pressure. To understand this 
relationship, we must inspect the concept of informational influence. Informational influence 
is the process of accepting a group’s view as accurate information about reality; an 
individual who conforms through information influence does so because they believe that 
the information source is correct (Kaplan & Miller, 1987). The inclusion of the first 
information source would be deemed as the most effective as it presents the target with 
new information which they may or may not choose to accept as being correct. An increase 
in the number of information sources would not offer any further information for the target 
to process its validity, instead it will only strengthen the perceived reliability of the 
information (Bond, 2005). Therefore, the actual content of the information presented by the 
information source will have more of an influence on the target than the size of the group 
presenting the information. The proposed relationship between majority size and conformity 
is supported by numerous research studies that have attempted to observe this 
relationship. Mullen (1983) cross-analysed 11 studies on group conformity and identified 
that OTR was able to significantly predict conformity rates in the majority of the studies 
(p<.00001). Adding further support, an experimental study adopting Asch’s line paradigm 
measured conformity rates to majority groups of one to seven group members. The study 
found that the first and second group members had the greatest impact on conformity 
rates, as predicted by SIT and self-attention theory (Gerard et al., 1968). Both self-
attention theory and SIT would suggest that in an eyewitness setting each additional 
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misleading co-witness would have less of an impact on the overall level of co-witness 
influence. In relation to co-witness influence; Foster et al., (2012) found no differences in 
the rate of co-witness conformity between participants who encountered misinformation 
from one co-witnesses and participants who encountered misinformation from three co-
witnesses, supporting both models’ proposed relationship between misinformation size and 
co-witness influence. However, due to the study only comparing two different 
misinformation sizes (1 and 3), more research is needed to gain a reliable understanding of 
this relationship. 
As mentioned previously; both of the above models were based on the psychological 
constructs of social influence and, thus, the predicted relationships may not be applicable to 
the process of memory conformity. The models do not take into account the fact that some 
eyewitnesses may incorporate their co-witness's misinformation through non-social 
pressures (source monitoring errors). Additionally, individuals who witness a crime will be 
affected by additional moderating factors which can have an effect on their behaviour and 
susceptibility to co-witness influence (i.e. induced stress and pressure to perform). 
Therefore, whilst the models of social influence offer interesting predictions on the 
relationship between misinformation size and co-witness influence, more direct observations 
on eyewitnesses are needed for researchers to accurately determine the true relationship 
between these two variables. 
 
4.5.3. Unanimity of misinformation 
 
Theories on informational influence suggest that for misinformation to have a 
significant influence on the target it must also be unanimously held by the group (Asch, 
1955; Baron, et al., 1996). If not, the presence of a dissenter will break the chain of 
consensus and consequently reduce the level of influence the majority group will have on 
the target (Allen & Levine, 1968; Asch, 1951; Hardy, 1957; Malof & Lott, 1962; Morris & 
Miller, 1975). To demonstrate the importance of unanimity for group influence, Asch (1951; 
1952) conducted a series of line perception tasks on participants. When an individual 
participant was placed in a group of confederates (unanimous misinformation), 
approximately 33% of the participants conformed. However, when there was only one 
confederate against a group of participants (eliminating the presence of a unanimous 
group), the study found that none of the participants would conform to the confederate.  
In a study more relevant to the present work, Walther et al. (2002) were able to 
demonstrate this effect amongst co-witnesses. As well as measuring the effects of 
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misinformation size, the study also measured the effects that a dissenter would have on the 
majority group’s influence. Participants were either exposed to misinformation from a group 
of co-witnesses with no dissenters present (unanimous majority), or they were exposed to 
misinformation from a majority group with a dissenter (someone who disagreed with the 
majority) present. The study found that misinformation presented by a majority group was 
significantly less influential on eyewitnesses when there were additional dissenters present. 
Mori and Mori (2008) produced similar findings: using the MORI technique (explained in 
Chapter 3), the researchers examined the effects of co-witness influence in one-versus-two 
situations - where a participant would discuss the event with two misleading co-witnesses, 
and in two-versus-two situations - where a participant would discuss the event with two 
misleading co-witnesses and one supporting co-witness. The study found that participants in 
the one-versus-two conditions were more likely to conform to the majority, whereas the 
participants in the two-versus-two conditions were more likely to stick to their own 
judgements. Both studies indicate that the presence of a dissenter would significantly 
reduce the risks of co-witness influence. This is because for informational influence to be 
effective, the target must believe that the information source is more likely to be correct 
than them (French et al., 2011; Williamson et al., 2013). Walther and colleagues (2012) 
suggested that a dissenter would provide the individual with an independent view of the 
event, which could resultantly increase the individual’s own confidence in their recollection 
and reduce their susceptibility to informational influence.  Additionally, research suggests 
that individuals favour supporting information from group members over contradicting 
information (Jonas et al., 2001). Therefore, it can be suggested that exposure to 
confirmatory information from an individual source may have more influence on an 
eyewitness than exposure to contradicting information from multiple sources (as 
demonstrated by Mori & Mori, 2008). The relationship between unanimity and group 
influence can also be explained by the frequency-validity principle, which submits that the 
consistent repetition of a statement can increase its perceived validity (Fiedler, 2000; 
Hertwig, Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1997). In relation to co-witness influence, the theory would 
suggest that eyewitnesses would be more likely to accept post-event information from a co-
witness, if the information was consistently suggested by all group members.  In contrast, a 
break in the unanimity of the misinformation would evoke an increase in doubt over the 
reliability of the misinformation (Festinger, 1945), which could resultantly encourage the 
target to reject it.   
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4.6. Co-witness familiarity 
 
Despite the previous literature concordantly stating that co-witness discussions can 
influence individual statements, most of these studies incorporated experimental designs 
where the participants were strangers to one another (e.g. Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert et 
al., 2004; Meade & Roediger, 2002). This is primarily due to the vast majority of eyewitness 
researchers incorporating an opportunity sampling approach within their own affiliated 
institutions, due to the on-demand availability of student participants (Loftus et al., 1992). 
Other studies have failed to control for the variable as a whole, with investigators failing to 
ask the participants if they had any pre-existing relationships with the fellow participants. 
Although the utilisation of heterogeneous groups can allow for a much easier sampling 
process (opportunity sampling), the ecological validity of such designs may be suspect due 
to the recurrent tendency for real eyewitnesses to have pre-existing relationships. A recent 
survey found that 77% of eyewitnesses are likely to have a previous acquaintance with their 
co-witnesses (Paterson, Chapman, and Kemp, 2007). 
As mentioned previously, research suggests that co-witness influence is highly 
dependent on the source from which the information comes from (Hope et al., 2008; Kwong 
See et al., 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Lampinen & Smith, 1995). Moreover, two 
research studies have suggested that eyewitnesses are more likely to conform to the 
memory reports of co-witnesses that they share a pre-existing relationship with, relative to 
unfamiliar co-witnesses (French et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008). French et al. (2008) 
attempted to identify if a pre-existing relationship between co-witnesses would facilitate an 
increase in memory conformity, by comparing the similarity in memory reports between 
romantic partners and strangers. Using the MORI technique (see Chapter 3), the 
researchers presented pairs of participants with slightly altered versions of an event. The 
pairs were then asked to discuss certain parts of the events with each other (i.e. ‘what 
colour was the car?’)-unbeknown to them, the pairs would have had contradicting 
recollections of the event. Later, participants were given a questionnaire concerning their 
memory of their movie (memory recall task). The questionnaire was used to determine 
whether participants would report seeing items from their respective videos, or instead 
report seeing unseen items that were suggested to them by their co-witness. The results 
indicated that the participants who had discussed the footage with a romantic partner were 
significantly more likely to report false memories (unwitnessed items) than participants who 
had discussed the footage with a stranger. The findings suggest that the risks of memory 
conformity amongst eyewitnesses would be greater if the witnesses are in a romantic 
relationship. Hope et al. (2008) provided further insight on the relationship between co-
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witness familiarity and memory conformity, by also looking at the effects of co-witness 
discussions between friends on memory recall. Participants were placed in pairs and shown 
slightly different videos to one another using two separate monitors and a screen to prevent 
them from seeing their partner’s monitor. Participants were either paired with a stranger, a 
romantic partner, or a friend. A similar procedure to French et al. (2008) was administrated, 
whereby the pairs would discuss the footage and, later, provide a memory recall report 
through answering a questionnaire. Similarly, to French et al. (2008), the study found that 
participants were more likely to incorporate false memories from their friends and romantic 
partners, than from a stranger. Additionally, the study found no significant difference in 
statement similarity between friends and romantic partners, suggesting that the type of 
pre-existing relationship did not have an effect on memory conformity. Although the 
aforementioned studies were based on general memory recall tasks rather than specific 
blame attribution tasks, they highlight the significance of pre-existing relationships in 
mediating co-witness influence. More importantly, the studies emphasise the importance of 
controlling for pre-existing relationships when attempting to reliably investigate the effects 
of co-witness discussions. Based on the observed relationship between co-witness 
familiarity and memory conformity rates, the present study argues that the vast majority of 
previous research which has failed to control for the variable of participant familiarity will 
have produced results which would not be representative of real eyewitnesses. 
Multiple explanations can be used to explain the relationship between co-witness 
familiarity and memory conformity. The relationship could be due to eyewitnesses having an 
increased level of trust towards familiar co-witnesses. Many relationships are built upon, 
and maintained through, a shared reality, where individuals will be more inclined to trust 
and agree with each other (Echterhoff et al., 2005; Sorrentino & Yamaguchi, 2008). 
Consequently, eyewitnesses may be more likely to accept information from such 
acquaintances as a result of a habitual interaction. Research on deception detection 
suggests that people are more likely to question the integrity of a statement from an 
individual that they share less of an emotional connection with (Anderson, DePaulo, & 
Ansfield, 2002). McCornack and Parks (1986) attributed this to individuals developing a 
truth bias towards people that they share a relationship with. The term ‘truth bias' refers to 
naivety of an individual in presuming that a specific speaker is telling the truth (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Levine, Park & McCornack, 1999; Vrij, 2008; Street & Masip, 2015). 
Consequently, the presence of an inherent truth bias would suggest that eyewitnesses 
would be more likely to accept misinformation about an event from familiar co-witnesses 
than by those unfamiliar to them. 
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Additionally, research has shown that eyewitnesses are more likely to accept 
contradicting information from a co-witness that they share a pre-existing relationship with, 
than from a stranger (Hope et al., 2008). This is because when an eyewitness is exposed to 
contradicting information from a stranger, the individual will have limited mental schemas 
to help assess the validity of the co-witness, and will therefore be more inclined to disregard 
their information; whereas when exposed to information from a familiar co-witness, the 
individual can use their pre-existing knowledge about the co-witness to gauge the reliability 
of their judgement (Festinger, 1954; Forgas & Williams, 2001; Gabbert et al., 2007; 
Kieckhaefer and Wright, 2014). In contrast, if the individual perceives a familiar co-witness 
as being incompetent or untrustworthy, this could motivate them to disregard their co-
witness’s report (Claes & Poirer, 1992; Skagerberg & Wright, 2009). 
The degree to which an individual identifies with another person can also have an 
effect on how likely they are to conform to them (Walker & Heyns, 1962). This can be 
accredited to a heightened level of likeability; research on social cognition suggests that the 
likeability of an information source can affect their level of influence (Burger et al., 2001; 
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Cialdini, 2001; Frenzen & Davis, 1990). Hope et al. 
(2008) explained that eyewitnesses are likely to spend less time evaluating the reliability of 
a co-witness’s judgement if they find the individual more likeable (unless the individual is 
deemed as being extraordinarily inaccurate in life). As a result, eyewitnesses could be more 
inclined to conform to acquaintances than strangers, as a result of a higher level of 
likeability towards them. However, the literature contains conflicting evidence with regards 
to this. Kieckhaefer and Wright (2014) found that strangers were more likely to conform to 
confederates that they disliked than to confederates that they deemed likable. This was 
attributed to a reduced risk of negative evaluation from confederates that were deemed as 
being more likable as a result of disagreement (Wright et al., 2010). It must be noted, 
however, that the participants from Kieckhaefer and Wright (2014) were asked to give their 
answers in the presence of their confederates, whereas during an eyewitness interview, the 
witnesses would give their statements privately. Therefore, the witness’s statement would 
bear no social repercussions and, thus, the level of normative influence would be 
significantly reduced. 
It is also worth considering that individuals with pre-existing relationships often 
develop a transactive memory system which allows for the sharing of knowledge, based on 
each person’s area of advanced knowledge (Wegner, 1986; Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 
1991). Wegner (1995) stated that individuals with pre-existing relationships will form an 
understanding of each person’s domain of expertise. As a result, groups of eyewitnesses will 
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be more likely to unanimously determine which co-witness is most likely to be correct, 
which could motivate the group members to conform to the same co-witness. 
Much like the majority of previous research on co-witness influence (e.g. French et 
al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008; Kieckhaefer & Wright, 2014), the two aforementioned studies 
on co-witness familiarity only observed the effects of co-witness influence on pairs. 
However, during most crimes there are often more than two eyewitnesses present (Memon 
et al., 2012; Paterson & Kemp, 2006; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008b), with one survey 
suggesting that, on average, there are over six co-witnesses present during an incident 
(Paterson & Kemp, 2006a). As mentioned previously, the level of co-witness influence 
exerted onto an individual is heavily dependent on the number of co-witnesses presenting 
the misinformation (Blank, 2009). This was supported by Walther and colleagues, who 
investigated the relationship between group size (five versus ten) and memory conformity 
and found that, when the memory recall task was relatively easy, co-witness misinformation 
was more influential when it was presented by the larger groups (Walther et al., 2002). On 
this basis, the present thesis postulated that there was a need for new research to 
investigate the effects of co-witness familiarity on blame conformity within larger 
eyewitness groups. However, to date, the effects of blame conformity have only been 
studied on eyewitness pairs. 
 
4.7. Co-witness characteristics 
 
So far, the literature discussed has investigated how eyewitnesses can differ from 
one-another in their susceptibility to co-witness influence. These differences were attributed 
to both individual differences (internal factors), which could make an individual more 
vulnerable to being influenced (age, gender and personality), as well as environmental 
differences (external factors) that could make the source of the misinformation more 
influential (group size and familiarity). Research suggests that co-witness influence is highly 
dependent on the source from which the information comes from (Hope et al., 2008; Kwong 
See, Hoffman, & Wood, 2001; Lampinen & Smith, 1995; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Thus, it 
is important to also consider whether the perceived characteristics of an eyewitness could 
increase their level of influence on other co-witnesses. 
Research indicates that the social characteristics of an information source have an 
effect on how influential they are on co-witnesses (Betz et al., 1996; Forgas & Williams, 
2001). More specifically, it is the way in which the information source is perceived by their 
co-witnesses that affects their level of informational influence (Echterhoff et al., 2005; 
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Skagberg & Wright, 2009; Williamson et al., 2013). Blank (2009) argued that informational 
influence heavily revolved around the credibility of the information source. This is supported 
through previous research; Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) found that participants would use 
the occupation of an individual to determine whether their information was reliable. For 
example, the study found that participants were less likely to accept information from 
defence lawyers, as they deemed them as being less truthful. 
Research has suggested that eyewitnesses are more likely to be influenced by co-
witnesses that they have a pre-existing relationship with rather than by strangers (French 
et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). This is mainly attributed to 
differences in the level of informational influence, such that individuals who have pre-
existing relationships with their co-witnesses can draw on their existing knowledge of that 
person to produce a better assessment on their probability of being correct (Bless et al., 
2001; Festinger, 1954; Gabbert et al., 2007). As a result, an eyewitness would be more 
likely to believe that their co-witness was correct, if there was pre-existing information to 
support their abilities. When faced with a co-witness who the individual has no pre-existing 
knowledge of, it is harder to produce an accurate assessment of their probability of being 
correct and therefore, they would be less inclined to accept information from them. 
However, there is evidence suggesting that not only can eyewitnesses make an attempt to 
assess the validity of an unknown co-witness, but that they can also act on these 
assessments and conform to the co-witness (Kwong See et al., 2001; Thorley, 2015). 
A large body of research on co-witness influence used experimental designs where 
the participants were strangers to each other and much of these studies demonstrated that 
participants would still conform to their unfamiliar co-witnesses (see Gabbert et al., 2003; 
Gabbert et al., 2004; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Thorley, 2015). It has been suggested that 
when an individual encounters misinformation from an unfamiliar individual, they will often 
use schema-guided information about the stranger to make stereotypical assumptions of 
them (Carver & Garza, 1984). Individuals automatically activate stereotypes when they 
confront strangers (Devine, 1989); the present thesis argues that eyewitnesses use any 
available social cues from a co-witness to form a stereotypical judgement of their abilities to 
recall information accurately. The current chapter proposes that this estimation may be the 
primary cause for co-witness conformity amongst strangers.  
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4.7.1. Perceived competence 
 
Studies show that young eyewitnesses are less likely to conform to unknown elderly 
co-witnesses, due to stereotyping them as having a poorer memory retrieval system 
relative to their own (Kwong See et al., 2001; Thorley, 2015). Thorley (2015) found that 
participants were susceptible to conforming to their co-witness’s false blame attribution, 
after reading their erroneous statement, but only when the unfamiliar co-witness was a 
young adult. The study found that when the co-witness was an elderly woman, participants 
were significantly more likely to reject her statement. Additionally, Thorley (2015) found 
that participants were more likely to conform to co-witnesses that were perceived as having 
better memory over co-witnesses that they deemed as being more reliable. This suggests 
that eyewitnesses will be more concerned with the competence of their co-witness rather 
than their reliability, when deliberating on whether or not to accept their information. Such 
studies suggest that eyewitnesses use negative stereotypes to assess the competence of 
their co-witnesses. Positive stereotyping can also be used by eyewitnesses when conforming 
to misinformation; research shows that the voice of an information source can have an 
effect on how influential they are to others through positive stereotyping between the voice 
of an individual and their predicted level competence (Vornik, Sharman, & Garry, 2013). 
Campbell-Kibler (2009) indicated that individuals will often use sociolinguistic cues to gauge 
the intelligence of others, indicating that as well as the characteristics of an information 
source (such as occupation), their behaviour can also be assessed by co-witnesses, who 
may then act on these assessments and conform to them. 
The concept of competence is multi-faceted, in that, a variety of different items can 
be used to demonstrate and manipulate the trait of perceived competence (Fouad et al., 
2009). This is because the term merely reflects an individual’s ability to complete a task 
successfully or efficiently, thus, the indicators of competency will be dependent on the task 
at hand. Interestingly, research suggests that people are likely to associate those that are 
more competent than them as having exceptionally high intelligence (Alicke, LoSchiavo, 
Zerbst, & Zhang, 1997). Based on this, it can be suggested that an individual’s intelligence 
could be used as a more generalisable indicator of competence. In relation to intelligence 
and eyewitness competence, Brigham and Wolfskeil (1983) found that individuals were 
likely to use the perceived intelligence of an eyewitness as an indicator of their competence 
in presenting an accurate memory report. 
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4.7.2. Perceived status and authority 
 
The effect of authority on co-witness influence is also a prominent area of focus 
within the literature, with various studies attempting to identify the effect an individual’s 
perceived status has on their level of influence. This stems from the earlier work of Milgram 
(1963) on obedience to authority, where participants were significantly more likely to 
adhere to the instructions of someone of higher status. In relation to misinformation 
acceptance; Vornick, Sharman, and Garry (2003) found that participants were significantly 
more likely to be misled by speakers that they scored as having a more powerful and 
authoritative voice 
The effects of police officers as misinformation sources have been used as a means 
of measuring the effect of authority and credibility on co-witness influence (e.g. Skagberg & 
Wright; 2009; Stanny & Johnson, 2000; Williamson et al., 2013); this is primarily due to 
the majority of the general public perceiving police officers as having a significantly high 
level of authority and credibility (Jackson, Bradford, Hough, Myhill, Quintin, & Tyler, 2012). 
The majority of the studies agree that eyewitnesses are significantly more likely to be 
misled by misinformation from a police officer than from an individual with a non-
authoritative occupation (such as a student, Skagerberg & Wright, 2009; or an electrician, 
Williamson et al., 2013) when providing a statement. The underlying cause for this 
‘authoritarian’ effect, however, can be disputed. From one perspective, people are more 
likely to perceive a police officer as being a more credible eyewitness than someone who is 
not an officer (Garrido, Masip, & Herrero, 2004), and such perceptions of credibility have 
previously been associated with an increase in social influence (Echterhoff et al., 2005; 
Hoffman et al., 2001; Kwong See et al., 2001; Smith and Ellsworth, 1987). Additionally, 
many individuals will be more likely to comply with an individual of higher authority 
(Bushman, 1984) and, thus, the relationship between the role of the co-witness and their 
co-witness influence can also be attributed to the normative pressures that are heightened 
as a result of their authority. On the other hand, Williamson et al. (2013) found that despite 
police officers being rated as more credible eyewitnesses than non-officers (electricians), 
there was no significant relationship between credibility of the misinformation source and 
co-witness conformity during memory recall. Instead, the study found that participants were 
more likely to conform to police officer confederates, due to perceiving them as having a 
better memory than their own. Therefore, it can be suggested that participants are more 
inclined to fixate on their co-witness’s cognitive abilities in memory retrieval rather than 
their status when attempting to validate their judgement. Similar studies lend further 
support to this theory; Skagerberg and Wright (2009) found that during a memory recall 
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task, eyewitnesses were significantly more likely to be influenced by police officers in 
comparison to children. When discussing their findings, the authors explained that the 
eyewitnesses were only affected by feedback from co-witnesses that they deemed to be 
more likely to be correct than themselves. A limitation of the study was the comparison 
between police officers and children as independent variables: due to a vast proportion of 
differences in social characteristics between the two sources of co-witnesses, there may 
have been additional confounding variables influencing the participants’ decisions. 
 
4.7.3. Informational and Normative pressures 
 
The relationship between the perceived competence of an eyewitness and their level 
of influence on other co-witnesses can be attributed to the fundamental constructs of 
informational influence - one of the primary causes of co-witness influence. It has been 
repeatedly mentioned within the present thesis that for informational influence to be 
effective the targeted individual would have to believe that the information source is more 
likely to be correct than them (French et al., 2011; Williamson et al., 2013). This would 
explain why eyewitnesses would be more likely to be influenced to co-witnesses deemed 
competent. Essentially, if an eyewitness perceives their co-witness as being highly likely to 
be correct, they would be more inclined to accept their information, even if it contradicts 
with their own memory report. 
Another process which can facilitate memory conformity is normative influence, a 
process where the individual will be motivated to conform as means for gaining approval 
and avoiding negative evaluation from other people (Wright et al., 2010). Gilbert (1993) 
proposed that individuals were more likely to be submissive to those that they perceived as 
having a higher status than them. In relation to co-witnesses, it can be deduced that if an 
eyewitness would be likely to perceive co-witnesses with higher levels of authority and 
competence as having a higher status/social rank to them, the eyewitnesses would be more 
likely to be socially submissive to their arguments. Additionally, research has suggested that 
individuals will exhibit a greater fear of negative evaluation if they perceive themselves as 
being less competent or of a lower social rank than others (Ridgers, Fazey, & Fairclough, 
2007; Weeks et al., 2005). Therefore, it can be suggested that when an eyewitness 
encounters misinformation from a co-witness who they deem as being more competent or 
of a higher status/authority than them, they will exhibit a greater fear of negative 
evaluation. Consequently, they will be more susceptible to normative influence. However, if 
police investigators are trained to collect statements privately, a witness’s statement would 
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bear far less social repercussions and, therefore, the level of normative influence would be 
significantly reduced. 
When discussing the effects of perceived competence and authority on co-witness 
influence, it is important to note that the relationship between these variables and co-
witness influence is relative to the targeted individual’s perceptions of their own level of 
competence and status. In other words; for a co-witness’s competence or authority to have 
a mediating effect on their level of influence, the targeted individual would have to perceive 
them as being more authoritative or competent than themselves. Therefore, an eyewitness 
may be more influential on one co-witness than on another. Based on the effects of 
competence and authority being dependent on the targeted individual’s perception of their 
self, it can be argued that these variables can be classified as both and internal and external 
factors. 
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Chapter 5: Introduction to the Experimental 
Chapters 
 
The present chapter introduces the empirical work that was carried out within the 
thesis. The chapter will outline the main aim of the research, and will discuss the general 
methodological considerations that were adopted within the experiments. The ethical 
considerations are also discussed. 
 
5.1. The empirical studies 
 
The main aim of present research was to investigate the effects of co-witness 
influence on eyewitness blame attribution (a process that requires individuals to recall and 
interpret central details to an incident). More specifically, the project attempted to identify 
the external and internal predictors of co-witness suggestibility in relation to blame 
conformity and eyewitness confidence (the two measures used throughout the research to 
measure co-witness suggestibility). To fulfil these aims, the thesis comprised of four 
studies, each with a sub-selection of aims and hypotheses (discussed in their respective 
empirical chapters) which were formulated to help identify accurate predictors of co-witness 
suggestibility.  
 
5.1.1. Study 1a: Gender & age effects on co-witness suggestibility 
 
Participants (N=608) viewed and discussed crime footage with co-witnesses 
(participants in the control condition were not permitted to discuss the event with co-
witnesses) and were then individually taken into a separate room where they were privately 
asked to recall which person from the incident they believed was to blame. Participants 
were also asked to indicate how confident they were in their response (measured on a 5-
point Likert scale). Confederates were used to expose the participants to misinformation 
about who was at fault during the discussion. The ages and genders of the participants were 
analysed to determine whether there were any age or gender-related differences in co-
witness suggestibility. The study also controlled for group size during the investigation and 
analysis. 
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5.1.2. Study 1b: Group size and co-witness influence 
 
The next empirical section was a continuation of analyses from study 1a, with 
different variables being analysed from the same data set. Therefore, this section was not a 
new or separate ‘study’, but rather an additional analysis from study one. This study aimed 
to gain a more accurate understanding of the risks of co-witness influence in relation to 
unanimity (whether the misinformation was presented by all of the co-witnesses) and 
misinformation size (the number of individuals presenting the misinformation). The same 
methodology and data set from study 1 was analysed for this study. Multiple independent 
conditions were used to manipulate the independent variables (misinformation size and 
unanimity of misinformation).  
 
5.1.3. Study 2: Personality and co-witness suggestibility 
 
The second study examined the relationship between co-witness suggestibility and 
individual differences in interpersonal characteristics. Participants (N=473) took part in an 
in a similar eyewitness simulation; five independent conditions were used to control for 
misinformation size. The participants then completed the Fundamental Interpersonal 
Relations Orientation-Behaviour assessment (FIRO-B; Schutz, 1958), a measure of 
expressed and wanted control, affection, and inclusion. The study analysed the participants 
FIRO-B scale scores to determine whether the interpersonal characteristics of an eyewitness 
could predict their susceptibility to co-witness influence. 
 
 
5.1.4. Study 3: Co-witness familiarity and co-witness influence 
 
The purpose of the third study was to examine the effects of pre-existing 
relationships between co-witnesses on statement similarity in blame attribution after a post-
event discussion.. Participants (N=420) took part in a similar eyewitness simulation 
experiment, where they viewed and discussed a crime in groups of five. Participants either 
viewed and discussed the event with familiar co-witnesses, unfamiliar co-witnesses, or were 
not permitted to discuss the event with their co-witnesses (control). The group similarity 
scores were compared between the three experimental conditions to determine whether 
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participants with pre-existing relationships were more likely to provide similar recollections. 
The individual blame attributions were also analysed to determine if there were any 
differences in blame attribution accuracy between the three conditions. 
 
5.1.5. Study 4: The impacts of perceived competence on co-witness 
influence 
 
The purpose of the final study was to determine whether the perceived competence 
or authority of a co-witness could have an effect on their level of influence. Undergraduate 
students (N=193) participated in an eyewitness simulation, where they viewed crime 
footage and later discussed the event with a co-witness before giving a private statement 
(blame attribution). Through the use of confederates, participants were exposed to 
misinformation about the witnessed event. The background characteristics of the 
confederates were manipulated to alter their perceived level of intelligence (confederate as 
PhD student vs no indication of education) and authority (confederate as police officer vs no 
indication of occupation). The blame attributions and confidence scores of participants were 
compared between the different conditions to determine whether the perceived authority 
and intelligence of a co-witness had a mediating effect on their level of influence over other 
witnesses. 
5.1.6. Multiple comparisons of data for studies one (a & b) and two 
 
It must be noted that multiple comparisons of some of the same data set were used 
for study one (a & b) and three. The same data set (N=608) was analysed for studies one-a 
and one-b. This data set also included some of the data that had been collected from study 
two (N=299; control condition not included). The data from study two was used for study 
one because the studies used identical procedures, with the only exception being that 
participants from study two were asked to complete an additional questionnaire (FIRO-B) at 
the end of the experiment. However, the data for the control condition in study two was not 
used in the data set for study one due to the control participants from study two watching 
the video footage individually, whereas in study one, control participants viewed the footage 
in groups but were instructed not to discuss the footage. By combining some of the data 
sets, study one was able to yield a larger sample of comparable data. Bonferroni correction 
tests were conducted for each study to counteract the issue with multiple comparisons. The 
data sets for studies three and four were based on independent data sets; thus, in total, 
four separate experiments were conducted. 
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5.2. Methodological Considerations 
5.2.1. Sampling  
5.2.1.1. Participants 
 
In total, the combined studies recruited one thousand six hundred and forty-six 
participants. Of these, two-hundred and fifty-one participants were randomly selected to 
play the role of a confederate (see below for confederate’s role). As a result, their data was 
not used for the analysis, leaving an experimental sample size of 1395 ‘true’ participants. 
However, three participants were removed from the experiment due to their inability to 
successfully complete the study, leaving a final sample of 1392 participants (666 males; 
721 females; and 5 undisclosed) of mixed ages (16-83; M = 30.07, SD = 14.01). All four 
studies recruited participants through opportunistic and snowball sampling. A request for 
participation was advertised through online media, as well as through the circulation of 
flyers and posters within multiple cities centres in the UK. Participation was voluntary and 
participants did not receive payment for their participation, although some undergraduate 
participants from the University of Huddersfield received course credit (recognition for 
contributing to experimental research, participants are required to collect a quota to pass 
their module) for participation. Preliminary measures were undertaken to ensure that no 
participants had any serious visual impairments that might affect their ability to watch the 
crime footage on a screen. The studies aimed to ensure that there was an even distribution 
of age and gender between the experimental conditions. Due to the studies focusing on the 
effects of different internal and external moderators of co-witness suggestibility, the 
recruitment sampling criteria varied between each study and, thus, the specific sampling 
criterions are discussed in more detail within the respective experimental chapters. 
Study three (Chapter 9) controlled for the variable of pre-existing relationships 
between the participants who were grouped together, with the participants in each 
experiment either having a pre-existing relationship with each other (for a minimum of 
three months) or being unfamiliar with one another. This variable was not controlled for in 
the other studies. 
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5.2.1.2. Confederates 
 
A limitation of the existing research on blame conformity (e.g. Thorley, 2015) is that 
the studies have typically presented participants with co-witness misinformation through 
artificial statements from co-witnesses. Whilst, this methodological design can allow for 
inferences to be made on how eyewitnesses interact with written witness statements, the 
findings cannot be reliably used to model the effects of co-witness discussions on blame 
attribution, due to the experiments failure to facilitate interpersonal interactions between 
the participants. Thus, additional studies used a paradigm where participants would 
encounter the misinformation from other participants, so that the project could accurately 
understand the effects of co-witness discussions on blame attribution.   
With the exception of study three, the research used confederates to expose the true 
participants to co-witness misinformation.  Two hundred and fifty-one different confederates 
were used within the experiments to decrease the possibility of the results being specific to 
distinct characteristics of one confederate. Prior to starting the experiment, all participants 
within each eyewitness group (excluding the control group) were handed individual 
instruction sheets. Despite being told by the experimenter that the instruction sheets were 
identical, participants were handed one of two copies: the participants would either get a 
standard instruction sheet, which contained basic information about the research and the 
institution (given to true participants; see Appendix 1.A), or they would receive a 
confederate instruction sheet, which informed the participant that they had been chosen to 
be a confederate and provided further instructions on their role (see Appendix 1.B). Due to 
the study including different confederates in each trial, confederates were given specific 
information to state during the experimental process, to avoid any individual differences in 
responses from having an extraneous effect on the true participants. Study four used one 
confederate per trial, and required the individual to present additional information. As a 
result, the confederates from study four were recruited beforehand and had received full 
instructions prior to the trials.  
All of the confederates were instructed to falsely suggest that the man in the yellow 
t-shirt had thrown the first hit during the discussion (when in reality, another man had 
thrown the first hit). They were given the option to provide the post-event information when 
they deemed it appropriate. They were advised to either present it before the participants 
(i.e. ‘I remember seeing the man in the yellow top throw the first hit.’); after another 
participant had provided a correct report (i.e. ‘No, I remember the man in the yellow top 
throwing the first hit.’); or after another participant had also provided the same incorrect 
report (i.e. ‘Yes, I agree. I also remember seeing the man in the yellow top throwing the 
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first hit.’). The latter was more frequently used by confederates in the conditions that 
contained a majority group of confederates. The confederates were explicitly instructed not 
to add any other details to the discussion. If they were questioned about their report, the 
confederates were instructed to say ‘well, that’s what I remember seeing from the video’. In 
conditions where multiple confederates were used within a trial they were instructed not to 
provide an identical response to the other group members (in order to prevent arousing the 
participant’s suspicions) and were permitted to adjust their response accordingly (i.e. ‘I 
remember seeing that from the video too’). The confederates were instructed to provide all 
of their statements in a confident manner, but were advised not to be assertive or to try to 
be purposefully persuasive. The discussion scripts were designed in accordance with the 
scripts used by Paterson and Kemp (2006b) in a similarly designed study. In order to 
generate a larger sample of true participants, some confederates were re-used in additional 
trials with new participants. Due to the use of a structured and consistent instruction list 
being provided to all confederates, it is unlikely that the recycling of confederates will have 
had any confounding effects on their level of influence. 
 
5.2.2. Stimulus materials  
 
Paterson and Kemp (2006a) identified incidents involving assault as the most 
frequently witnessed form of crime, with 30% of their eyewitness respondents reporting 
having witnessed such an event. Owing to its prevalence during real crimes, the present 
study used an incident involving assault as the witnessed event within the experiments. The 
same video footage was used for all four studies. Although some previous studies on co-
witness influence have used a series of images/slides, instead of a video, as the experiment 
stimuli (e.g. Allan, Midjord, Martin, & Gabbert, 2011; Schwartz & Wright, 2012; Skagerberg 
& Wright, 2008b) it was decided that a video would provide greater ecological validity, as 
the participants would be able to see the event as a whole (especially if they are required to 
attribute blame). The footage from the present studies was a genuine closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) recording of a fight taking place within a bar and was presented to the 
participants on a computer monitor screen. The footage lasted approximately one minute 
and thirty seconds, and did not have an audio output. The recording shows the inside of a 
retail establishment (bar) with approximately fifteen customers present. Initially, two men 
in distinctively different clothing (one man is wearing a yellow t-shirt, whilst the other is 
wearing a dark green t-shirt) can be seen engaging in a discussion (see Figure 5.1). 
Approximately 21 seconds into the video, the man in the dark green t-shirt stands up and 
assaults the man in the yellow t-shirt by punching him (see Figure 5.2). Immediately after, 
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both men engage in a physical confrontation that lasts for approximately 50 seconds, before 
the two men are separated by the other customers (see Figure 5.3). The main focal point of 
interest from the stimulus was identifying which person had thrown the first punch, 
consequently starting the fight (a central detail to the incident). In reality, the video shows 
the man in the dark green t-shirt throwing the first punch; the participants' ability to 
correctly identify this was observed under different conditions to establish the effects of 
blame conformity. 
 
Figure 5.1. Experimental stimulus, initial discussion between both men. 
Figure 5.2. Experimental stimulus, the man in the dark green t shirt attacking first. 
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Figure 5.3. Experimental stimulus, both men being separated after their fight. 
 
A pilot study was conducted to determine the accuracy of eyewitnesses when 
attempting to accurately recall which person had thrown the first punch. One hundred fifty-
seven participants (96 females and 61 males) of mixed ages (M = 29.02, SD = 11.32) were 
individually shown the video footage and were later asked to identify which man had thrown 
the first punch. Participants attributed blame by indicating the clothing of their chosen 
suspect (i.e. ‘the man in the dark green’ or ‘the man in the yellow’). The participants were 
also given the option to state that they were unsure, to reduce their tendency to guess. As 
Table 5.1 indicates, the results from the pilot study identified that despite the majority of 
participants producing the correct response. There was a clear distribution in eyewitness 
blame attribution, suggesting that participants within each group would be likely to hold 
different views as to who they believed had started the fight. 
 
Table 5.1 Percentage of participant’s (N= 157) blame attribution accuracy within 
pilot study 
 Correct Incorrect Unsure  
Count 62 59 36 
Percentage  40% 32% 28% 
 
 The significant level of variance in responses were to be expected due to the study 
purposely incorporating the footage within the experiment for its high level of ambiguity in 
relation to correctly attributing blame. The study aimed to create an ambiguous task for two 
reasons. Firstly, the study wanted the participants to want to engage in a co-witness 
discussion with other participants (within the empirical studies) in order to allow them to 
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encounter co-witness information. Paterson and Kemp (2006a) found that eyewitnesses 
were significantly more likely to engage in post-event discussions with their co-witnesses, if 
there was some uncertainty in correctly determining what happened during the incident. 
Therefore, the induced level of uncertainty (as seen in Table 5.1) would encourage the 
participants to engage in a group discussion with their co-witnesses. Secondly, the process 
of blame conformity is more relevant to incidents where it can be difficult to determine 
which person is at fault; theories on informational influence would suggest that individuals 
are significantly less likely to be influenced by another person when there is an obvious 
correct answer (Baron et al., 1996; Suls & Wheeler, 2000). Therefore, to emulate an 
environment where blame conformity could be an issue, the study had to increase the task 
difficulty of making a correct blame attribution. The findings would be interpreted in light of 
the ambiguous nature of the stimulus. 
 
5.2.3. General design and procedure 
 
All four studies incorporated a between-subjects design where participants were 
placed in independent conditions to determine if the manipulated independent variables had 
an effect on their responses. Due to the studies incorporating different aims and objectives, 
the design and procedures of each individual study are also discussed within their respective 
chapters (Chapters 6-10). All four studies did, however, incorporate a similar experimental 
procedure to observe the effects of co-witness influence. 
Participants were greeted upon arrival and handed an information sheet about the 
experiment as well as a consent form to sign (see Appendix 2), indicating their agreement 
with the study’s terms. All participants were asked to state if they had any visual 
impairments that would hinder their abilities to view images on a screen. Moreover, 
participants were asked if they had any difficulties in recognising colours, words or items on 
computer screens. They were then asked to identify if they could accurately see a series of 
un-related images that were present on the screen. Participants who identified any visual 
impairments or could not accurately see the images on the screen were omitted from the 
experiment. Due to the ethical considerations of exposing participants to violent footage, all 
participants were informed that they would be viewing a CCTV footage that contained 
violence, in order to gain consent from them. Other details with regards to the aims of the 
experiments were kept to a minimum. Participants were told that the main aim of the 
experiment was to identify the attitudes of individuals on watching violence. After giving 
consent, participants were either placed in a group, pair, or on their own (depending on the 
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study and experimental condition), and were asked to view the CCTV footage on a computer 
monitor. All participants were required to sit exactly one meter away from the screen to 
ensure that all participants throughout the studies viewed the footage from the same 
distance.  
After the footage had finished the second phase of the experiment, the group 
discussion, began. Based on research indicating that the majority (67%) of co-witnesses 
engage in post-event discussions immediately after witnessing the event (Paterson and 
Kemp, 2006a), the present study was designed so that a group discussion would commence 
shortly after the footage had finished. With the exception of the control group, participants 
were then allocated one minute to discuss in their groups (of two to six participants, 
depending on the experimental condition) who they believed had thrown the first hit. During 
this time, the experimenter would leave the room to eliminate their presence from affecting 
the participant’s behaviour. The group discussions were capped at one minute to ensure 
that no participant could question the confederates for a significantly longer period than 
another participant from a separate trial. Participants in the control groups were not 
permitted to discuss the footage; instead, they were asked to sit silently until they were 
called to leave the room for questioning— the researcher would stand outside the room and 
listen to ensure that participant groups from the control conditions would not discuss the 
event with each other. 
The final phase of the experiment was the eyewitness statement process. 
Participants were taken into a private room individually and asked to try and recall who they 
believed had thrown the first hit. Participants were instructed to only report information that 
they remembered seeing (see Appendix 4 for script). As mentioned previously, all 
participants provided their response by indicating the colour of the suspect's clothing 
(yellow top or dark green top). A limitation of this process was that some participants could 
have been at risk of identifying the incorrect colour of clothing on the correct suspect (or 
vice-versa), however, preliminary measures were taken to ensure that no participants with 
difficulties in visual and colour perception undertook the study – thus it can be contended 
that such risks will have been significantly reduced. Owing to the nature of this task, it can 
be acknowledged that the participants were tasked with recalling central details to the event 
(memory retrieval) and interpreting the incident to determine who was at fault for throwing 
the first hit (decision making). It can also be argued that the task required participants to 
correctly recall peripheral details about the event as well, due to participants identifying the 
guilty suspect through indicating what colour clothing he was wearing. A potential risk that 
the study had to avoid was the tendency for participants to make a guess when attributing 
blame. By doing so, the participants would have a 50% chance of being correct, and this 
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would significantly reduce the internal validity of the present study. As a result, all 
participants were directly advised by the interviewer to avoid making any responses through 
guessing. Instead, participants were given the option to state that they were uncertain if 
they were unable to answer the question. All participants produced one of three responses, 
when asked to identify which man had thrown the first hit. Eyewitnesses who blamed the 
man in the yellow top (misinformation) were scored as being incorrect, participants who 
blamed the man in the dark green top were scored as being correct, and participants who 
stated that they were uncertain were scored as being unsure. The participants from studies 
one, two, and four were also asked to indicate how confident they were in their blame 
attribution judgement. In line with previous research on eyewitness confidence (see Mudd & 
Govern, 2004), confidence judgements were measured using a five-point scale (five 
meaning maximum confidence). Participants who answered “unsure” were not asked to give 
a confidence rating due to their inability to identify an offender. With the exception of the 
second study (see chapter 8 for extended procedure), the rest of the studies ended at this 
point. Participants were thanked for their participation and were debriefed about the studies 
full aims. Confederates were also questioned after the experiment to determine whether 
they were able to correctly present the participants with misinformation — all confederates 
indicated that they had carried out their instructions correctly. 
A limitation of the procedure used in the present studies was that the group 
discussions of the participants were not recorded for inspection afterwards. This meant that 
the studies could not reliably guarantee that all confederates performed correctly and that 
all participants from the control conditions abstained from discussing the incident. However, 
the decision to not record the participant’s discussions can be justified. Due to the ethical 
implications of recording individuals without their consent, the experimenter will have had 
to inform participants that they would be getting recorded during the experiment. The 
participants’ awareness of being monitored may have influenced their behaviours and 
subsequent responses as a result. 
 
5.3. Ethical considerations 
 
The research was conducted in accordance with the American Psychological 
Association (APA) and British Psychological Society (BPS) research guidelines (APA Ethical 
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 2010; BPS Code of Human Research Ethics, 
2011). In addition, all four studies were approved by the University of Huddersfield’s School 
Research Ethics Panel (SREP) prior to data collection (see Appendix 3). Standard procedures 
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for gaining informed consent were used, with participants receiving an information sheet 
with their consent form (see Appendix 2) and having the option to ask any questions before 
providing consent. The study made sure to provide all participants with a clear disclaimer, 
within the information sheet, informing them that a video containing violence would be used 
in the experiment. Additionally, the studies maintained complete anonymity of participant 
information and all participants were given the option to withdraw from the study at any 
time during the experiment without the need to provide an explanation. Although the 
footage contained mild violence, there was no blood or serious harm shown within the 
footage. Further, a minimum age criteria of 16 years was set for participation, due to the 
video depicting mild violence. At the end of the experiment, the participants were debriefed 
about the study and had the opportunity to ask any questions they had. Contact details of 
the researcher and of relevant sources of support were also provided to the participants, 
should they have any further inquiries or issues later on. 
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Chapter 6 
Study 1a: Gender & Age Effects on Co-Witness 
Suggestibility 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The majority of research on co-witness influence has shown that some eyewitnesses 
are inherently more suggestible than others. Research indicates that the suggestibility of an 
individual can indeed be influenced by numerous different internal variables (Doughty et al., 
2017; Loftus, 2005). The literature on memory recall accuracy identifies age and gender as 
two variables that can have confounding effects on eyewitness statement accuracy (Areh, 
2011; Megreya, Bindermann, & Havard, 2011; Memon et al., 2003; Rehnman & Herlitz, 
2007; Yarmey, 2004). These findings have led many researchers to question whether 
similar gender and age-related differences may also exist in an eyewitness’s susceptibility of 
to co-witness influence (co-witness suggestibility). 
 
6.1.1. Gender-related differences in co-witness suggestibility 
 
When attempting to investigate gender differences in memory conformity, the 
existing research within the literature is contradictory. Multiple studies have produced 
evidence indicating that male eyewitnesses are more susceptible to memory conformity 
(Eck, Thoftne, Sponsor, & VanVoorhis, 2008; Loftus et al., 1992). Conflictingly, there is 
evidence which suggests that there are no gender-related differences in memory conformity 
(Butts, Mixon, Mulekar, & Bringmann, 1995; Schwarz, 2013). The differences in results 
between the studies can be attributed to each study incorporating varying memory recall 
tasks, as the process of social influence has been shown to be highly dependent on the task 
at hand (Baron, Vamdello, & Brunsman, 1996; Suls & Wheeler, 2000). With regard to 
research on blame conformity, there is a gap within the literature investigating the 
relationship between an eyewitness’s gender and their susceptibility to co-witness influence 
during blame attribution. 
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6.1.2. Age-related differences in co-witness suggestibility 
 
The age of eyewitnesses has been found to have a moderating effect on their 
suggestibility to misleading questions (Coxon & Valentine, 1997; Dodson & Krueger, 2006; 
Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2002). However, with regards to suggestibility to 
misinformation from co-witnesses the previous literature in incongruous. Gabbert et al. 
(2003) found no age-related differences in co-witness suggestibility, yet in a later study 
Gabbert, Memon, Allan, and Wright (2004) produced evidence suggesting that younger 
eyewitnesses were be more susceptible to memory conformity. With regards to blame 
attribution; there is a gap within the literature investigating the relationship between age 
and blame conformity. 
 
6.2. Present study 
 
Although a large body of research exists on the effects of co-witness influence in 
eyewitness recall, the majority of the literature looks at the effects of co-witness influence 
on eyewitness accuracy for recalling peripheral items and not the implicit attribution of 
blame. Research on co-witness influence has shown that eyewitnesses can mistakenly recall 
items from post-event discussions in their statements (e.g. Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert et 
al., 2004; Hope et al., 2008). However, such studies failed to determine whether 
eyewitnesses could be influenced by others when attempting to attribute blame correctly. 
Often within certain types of crimes (i.e. robbery & fighting), it can be difficult for 
eyewitnesses to ascertain who is at fault (Thorley & Rushton-Woods, 2013). For this reason, 
it is important to determine whether eyewitnesses are likely to draw on the judgement of 
others when attempting to attribute blame. Recent research has suggested that 
eyewitnesses can be influenced by their co-witnesses when attempting to attribute blame 
(Thorley, 2015; Thorley & Rushton-Woods, 2013). However, the relationship between blame 
conformity and the eyewitness’s age and gender remains unclear. Therefore, the purpose of 
the current research was to evaluate whether age and gender related differences exist in 
co-witness suggestibility when attempting to attribute blame. 
To achieve this, the study had three main objectives. The first objective was to 
establish if age and gender differences existed in the blame attribution of eyewitnesses, 
after being exposed to misinformation. It was theorised that eyewitnesses could be 
influenced by others, even if they had not conformed to their incorrect views. Eyewitnesses 
may instead lose confidence in their own judgements, rather than fully conforming to the 
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misinformation (Semmler et al., 2004; Wright & Skagerberg, 2007). Such effects could also 
have detrimental effects on an investigation, given that research shows that jurors will be 
less likely to believe statements from eyewitnesses who lack confidence (Skagerberg & 
Wright, 2009). Therefore, the second objective was to identify if there were any significant 
age and gender related differences in the confidence of eyewitnesses who were exposed to 
contradicting misinformation, but refrained from conforming. Additionally, in cases where 
the witness would already hold an incorrect recollection of the event prior to discussing the 
event with co-witnesses, research suggests that exposure to similar misinformation could 
cause the witness to gain more confidence in their erroneous memory report (Allwood et al., 
2006; Semmler et al., 2004). This can be problematic as research has demonstrated that a 
confident eyewitness will be more likely to influence both jurors and other co-witnesses 
(Goodwin et al., 2013). Owing to this, the third objective of the present study was to 
identify if there were any significant age and gender related differences in the confidence of 
participants who produced a false blame attribution. 
The study also aimed to incorporate an experimental design that would be 
impervious to the limitations of previous research. Unlike previous studies in the field, the 
present study controlled for extraneous variables that have been proven to have a 
significant effect on social influence. The extraneous variables controlled for were group size 
and the unanimity of this misinformation (whether the misinformation was provided by all of 
the co-witnesses). By including such controls, the study would boast a much stronger 
internal validity than the previous research within the literature. The present study 
measured age as a continuous variable rather than categorising individuals into subjective 
age groups. By doing so, the study measured the relationship between age and co-witness 
influence continuously and, thus, the results would enable inferences to be made for 
eyewitnesses of all age groups. The study also aimed to recruit a sample size larger than 
that of the previous studies, in order to improve the reliability and generalizability of the 
results. Finally, the present study observed multiple variables in an attempt to measure co-
witness influence. The majority of the previous studies only used the explicit statements of 
incorrect information as an indication of having been influenced. However, the present study 
argues that eyewitnesses can be influenced by others even if they do not conform to their 
incorrect views. Eyewitnesses may instead lose confidence in their own judgements, rather 
than fully conforming to the misinformation. Therefore, the present study observed 
confidence ratings in statements, as well as measuring the frequency of cases where 
eyewitnesses were not able to attribute blame due to uncertainty. 
To date, no research study has attempted to investigate the effects of age and 
gender on an eyewitness’s susceptibility to blame conformity. Instead the present study had 
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to rely on similar studies which had investigated the effects of age and gender on general 
memory conformity. However, even the literature on memory conformity was incongruous, 
with various studies producing contradicting results, making it difficult to confidently 
determine the likely direction of the relationships, if any. Therefore, no hypotheses were 
made. Instead, the study was exploratory in nature, attempting to determine whether 
gender and age-related differences in co-witness suggestibility during blame attribution 
existed. 
 
6.3. Methodology 
6.3.1. Participants 
 
Eight hundred and sixty participants (409 males; 451 females, aged between 18 and 
82 years (M = 28.33, SD = 12.64) were recruited through opportunistic sampling. Of these, 
two hundred and forty-nine participants (121 males; 128 females) were randomly selected 
to play the role of a confederate.  As a result, their answers were not included in the data 
analysed; additionally, the data from three of the remaining participants were not included 
in the analyses due to the participants failing to successfully complete the experiment; 
leaving a total sample size of six hundred and eight participants (288 males; 320 females), 
aged between18 and82 years (M = 28.95, SD = 13.04). The study aimed to get an evenly 
distributed number of participants in relation to age; however, due to the sample criteria 
requiring participants to have adequate vision to clearly observe the monitor, the size of 
elderly participants was limited in comparison to younger participants. The sampling 
procedure, along with details regarding the preliminary measures for participant suitability 
are presented in chapter 5.2.1.1. 
 
6.3.2. Design 
 
A between-subjects design was employed by the study, with gender acting as the 
independent variable and age acting as the continuous variable compared within the study. 
The participants were randomly allocated to one of six independent group conditions. The 
group conditions were used to manipulate the controlled variables of misinformation size 
(size of the group presenting the misinformation) and unanimity of misinformation, through 
altering the number of participants and confederates (misinformation source) present during 
the trials. Condition one was the control condition. Participants in this group viewed the 
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footage and later, provided a response without any prior discussion with other participants. 
Within condition two, each participant viewed and discussed the incident with one 
confederate before providing a response (total group size of two). In condition three, each 
participant viewed and discussed the incident with one additional participant and one 
confederate before providing a response (total group size of three). In condition four, each 
participant viewed and discussed the footage with four other participants and one 
confederate before giving a response (total group size of six). Within condition five, each 
participants viewed and discussed the footage with two confederates before providing a 
response (total group size of three). In condition six, participants viewed and discussed the 
incident with five confederates before providing a response (total group size of six). As 
Table 6.1 illustrates, the misinformation was guaranteed to be presented unanimously in 
conditions five and six due to the participant being placed into a confederate-only group. 
Whereas in conditions three and four, the presence of multiple true participants meant that 
the participants were likely to encounter other dissenters, breaking the chain of unanimity. 
However, a caveat of the present study’s design is that participants within conditions two 
and three may have still been subjected to misinformation from a unanimous group, if the 
remaining participants had all erroneously provided misleading responses. In spite of this 
risk, the researchers argued that statistically, it would have been highly likely for at least 
one dissenter to be present within the majority of the trials in conditions three and four. 
Within condition two, participants were paired up with one confederate. Resultantly, the 
misinformation was not provided by a majority group and there were also no other 
dissenters present. The first condition acted as the control group. Careful measures were 
undertaken to ensure a relatively even distribution of age and gender within all of the 
experimental conditions (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
 
Table 6.1 Frequencies for experimental conditions (N=608) 
Condition Group size True 
participants 
Confederates Age  
 M Std 
Dev. 
1 (Control) 
(N=174) 
1 1 0 35.06 17.58 
2 (N=38) 2 1 1 20.92 2.69 
3 (N=56) 3 2 1 26.64 8.94 
4 (N= 170) 6 5 1 28.52 10.98 
5 (N=94) 3 1 2 24.66 7.7 
6 (N=76) 6 1 5 26.91 10.29 
 
A recurrent limitation with the majority of studies investigating the relationship 
between age and eyewitness performance was that the independent variable of age was 
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dichotomized as a nominal variable. Participants were grouped as being either ‘young 
adults’ (often undergraduate students) or ‘elderly participants’ (often participants past the 
age of 60) through setting cut off points of age, which could be seen as being subjective. A 
limitation to this approach is that the categorisation of the participants does not allow us to 
identify if the relationship between age and co-witness suggestibility is linear and does not 
identify how middle aged eyewitnesses are likely to perform. The present study assessed 
the participants’ ages as continuous variables. 
Two dependent variables were observed to measure co-witness suggestibility. The 
first dependent variable measured was the participants blame attributions (after witnessing 
the crime). This variable was measured to determine whether the participants had 
conformed to their co-witness’s (confederate) erroneous judgement (blame conformity). 
The second dependent variable measured was the participants’ confidence scores in their 
blame attributions. This variable was measured to determine whether there were any 
gender or age-related differences in eyewitness confidence after a co-witness discussion. 
Keeping in line with previous research on eyewitness confidence (see Mudd & Govern, 
2004), confidence judgements were measured using a five-point scale (five meaning 
maximum confidence). Participants who answered ‘unsure’ were not asked to give a 
confidence rating due to their inability to identify an offender. 
 
6.3.3. Materials 
 
A closed circuit television (CCTV) footage of a bar fight erupting (described in 
chapter 5.2.2) was used as the study’s experimental stimulus. The main point of interest 
within the footage was the indication that the man in the dark green t-shirt had thrown the 
first punch and not the man in the yellow t-shirt. 
 
6.3.4. Procedure 
 
The main procedure which is discussed in chapter 5.2.3 was implemented within this 
study. During the private interview (after the group discussion had ended), the investigator 
recorded the age and gender of each participant, before questioning them about the 
witnessed incident. 
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6.4. Results 
 
The purpose of the present study was to identify if age and gender-related 
differences existed in eyewitness suggestibility when attempting to attribute blame. The 
main results are presented in two sections. First, evidence for the relationship between the 
age and gender of the participant with co-witness suggestibility is given through an analysis 
of eyewitness blame attribution (first dependent variable). The second section of the results 
investigates the relationship between the age and gender of the participant with co-witness 
suggestibility through analyses of eyewitness confidence (second dependent variable). 
Means and standard deviations for all variables are presented in Table 6.2-6.4. 
A preliminary one-way between groups analysis of variance was first conducted to 
determine whether the variable of participant age was similar across all experimental 
conditions. Participants were divided into six groups according to their allocated group 
conditions (see Table 6.1). There was a statistically significant difference at the p < .001 
level in the age of the participants across the six conditions [F (5, 602) = 14.81, p < .001]. 
The difference in mean ages between groups was medium. The effect size, calculated using 
eta squared, was .11. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
average age of participants within condition one (control condition) (M = 33.34, SD = 6.91) 
was significantly higher than the average ages of participants in the experimental conditions 
(see Table 6.1 for mean ages). There were no other significant differences in mean age 
between the remaining conditions. The observed differences were considered when 
interpreting and discussing the results within the discussion.  
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Table 6.2. Distribution of responses within all conditions. 
 N  Blame attribution (%)  
 Correct Incorrect Unsure  
Condition 1 (control) 174 78 (44.8%) 60 (34.5%) 36 (20.7%)  
Male 85  37 (43.5%) 29 (34.1%) 19 (22.4%)  
Female 
 
89  41 (46.1%) 31 (34.8%) 17 (19.1%)  
Condition 2 (1p/1c) 38 14 (36.8%) 16 (42.1%) 8 (21.1%)  
Male 19 7 (36.8%) 7 (36.8%) 5 (26.3%)  
Female 
 
19 7 (36.8%) 9 (47.4%) 3 (15.8%)  
Condition 3 (2p/1c) 56 19 (20.2%) 61 (64.9%) 14 (14.9%)  
Male 29 11 (37.9%) 12 (41.4%) 6 (20.7%)  
Female 
 
27 15 (55.6%) 8 (29.6%) 4 (14.8%)  
Condition 4 (5p/1c) 170 6 (7.9%) 61 (80.3%) 9 (11.8%)  
Male 84 42 (50%) 27 (32.1%) 15 (17.9%)  
Female 
 
86 38 (44.2%) 34 (39.5%) 14 (16.3%)  
Condition 5 (1p/2c) 94 26 (46.4%) 20 (35.7%) 10 (17.9%)  
Male 41 9 (22%) 27 (65.9%) 5 (12.2%)  
Female 
 
53 10 (18.9%) 34 (64.2%) 9 (17%)  
Condition 6 (1p/5c) 76 80 (47.1%) 61 (35.9%) 29 (17.1%)  
Male 30 3 (10%) 26 (86.7%) 1 (3.3%)  
Female 
 
46 3 (6.5%) 35 (76.1%) 8 (17.4%)  
Total 608 223 (36.7%) 279 (45.9%) 106 (17.4%)  
Male 288 109 (37.8%) 128 (44.4%) 51 (17.7%)  
Female 320 114 (35.6%) 151 (47.2%) 55 (17.2%)  
p= number of participants during each group discussion, c= number of confederates 
present during each group discussion. 
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Table 6.3 Means and standard deviations of age for all conditions and responses. 
 N (%) Mean Age (Std. Dev) 
Condition 1 174 35.06  (17.58) 
Correct 78 (44.8%) 33.23 (16.43) 
Incorrect 60 (34.5%) 36.15 (19.86) 
Unsure 36 (20.7%) 37.19 (15.97) 
Condition 2 38 20.92 (2.69) 
Correct 14 (36.8%) 21.07 (2.95) 
Incorrect 16 (42.1%) 21.69 (2.6) 
Unsure 8 (21.1%) 19.13 (1.55) 
Condition 3 56 26.624 (8.94) 
Correct 26 (46.4%) 26.77 (9.25) 
Incorrect 20 (35.7%) 25.45 (6.66) 
Unsure 10 (17.9%) 28.7 (12.22) 
Condition 4 170 28.52 (10.98) 
Correct 80 (47.1%) 28.15 (10.66) 
Incorrect 61 (35.9%) 27.15 (10.2) 
Unsure 29 (17.1%) 32.45 (12.78) 
Condition 5 94 24.66 (7.7) 
Correct 19 (20.2%) 25.79 (10.25) 
Incorrect 61 (64.9% 24.13 (5.75) 
Unsure 14 (14.9%) 25.43 (11.06) 
Condition 6 76 26.91 (10.29) 
Correct 6 (7.9%) 26.67 (4.8) 
Incorrect 61 (80.3%) 26.67 (9.88) 
Unsure 9 (11.8%) 28.67 (10.29) 
Total 608 28.95 (13.04) 
Correct 223 (36.7%) 29.08 (12.6) 
Incorrect 279 (45.9%) 27.89 (12.6) 
Unsure 106 (17.4%) 31.45 (14.3) 
 
  
 119 
 
Table 6.4. Means and standard deviations of confidence for all conditions and 
responses. 
 N  Mean confidence (Standard deviation) 
 Correct Incorrect Total 
Condition 1 138 3.09 (1.12) 2.98 (1.07) 3.04 (1.09) 
Male 66  3.14 (1.23) 3.24 (.99) 3.18 (1.12) 
Female 
 
72  3.05 (1.02) 2.74 (1.09) 2.92 (1.06) 
Condition 2 30 3.43 (.94) 3.31 (1.08) 3.37 (1) 
Male 14 3.71 (.76) 3.29 (1.25) 3.5 (1.02) 
Female 
 
16 3.14 (1.07) 3.33 (1) 3.09 (1.16) 
Condition 3 47 3.5 (1.03) 3.05 (1) 3.34 (1.05) 
Male 24 3.55 (.93) 3.5 (.8) 3.58 (.88) 
Female 
 
23 3.47 (1.13) 2.38 (.92) 3.09 (1.16) 
Condition 4 141 3.4 (1.11) 2.92 (1.11) 3.19 (1.13) 
Male 69 3.38 (1.03) 3 (1.18) 3.23 (1.1) 
Female 
 
72 3.42 (1.2) 2.85 (1.08) 3.15 (1.17) 
Condition 5 80 3.26 (.93) 3.38 (.97) 3.35 (.96) 
Male 36 3.22 (.83) 3.59 (.89) 3.5 (.88) 
Female 
 
44 3.3 (1.06) 3.21 (1.01) 3.23 (1.01) 
Condition 6 67 3.17 (.75) 3.41 (.96) 3.39 (.94) 
Male 29 2.67 (.58) 3.38 (.98) 3.31 (.97) 
Female 
 
38 3.67 (.58) 3.43 (.95) 3.45 (.92) 
Total 503 3.28 (1.07) 3.17 (1.04) 3.23 (1.06) 
Male 238 3.3 (1.06) 3.23 (1.01) 3.32 (1.03) 
Female 265 3.27 (1.09) 3.05 (1.05) 3.14 (1.07) 
 
 
6.4.1. Control group 
6.4.1.1. Age and gender-related differences in blame attribution 
accuracy 
 
The results from the control group (condition one) offer an indication of how well 
participants performed on the eyewitness task, when no misinformation was presented. As 
Illustrated in Table 6.2, a high proportion of the participants (34.5%) incorrectly blamed the 
wrong individual for starting the fight. This was anticipated by the researchers because the 
aim of the experimental design was to use a video footage that would naturally cause 
discrepancies to arise between different eyewitnesses. By administrating an ambiguous 
task, participants would be more likely to be uncertain about the task at hand and thus, 
would be more attentive to the reports of their co-witnesses (Suls & Wheeler, 2000; 
Walther et al., 2002). 
 120 
 
The responses of the participants from the control condition were analysed to 
determine whether their age and gender had any inherent relationship with general 
response accuracy. Multinomial Logistic regression was used to analyse the effects of age 
and gender on eyewitness blame attribution, when no post-event information was 
presented. The statements from participants were classified into three groups: those who 
blamed the man in the light yellow top for starting the fight (incorrect response), those who 
blamed the man in the dark green top as starting the fight (correct response), and those 
who had said they were unsure on who had started the fight (unsure). Due to the 
dependent variable consisting of three outcomes, two regressions were conducted: one with 
incorrect response (yellow top) as the reference category, and one with the correct 
response (dark green top) as the reference category. The main interest of current analysis 
was focused on the relationship between age and gender with blame attribution accuracy (3 
categories) while controlling for the group condition. The analysis shows that the model fit 
was not significant [χ² (4) = 1.99, p > .05], which indicated that the full models did not 
predict significantly better, or more accurately, than the null model. The results indicated 
that there were no relationships between age and gender with blame attribution accuracy, 
in participants who did not partake in a co-witness discussion. Therefore, any relationships 
observed between age and gender with blame attribution accuracy within the experimental 
conditions could be attributed to co-witness discussions. 
The first column in Table 6.5 has the outcome of ‘correct response’ compared to 
“incorrect response” (reference category). The results suggested that age and gender did 
not have any significant effects on eyewitness blame attribution accuracy (p > 0.05).  
The second Column in table 6.5 has the outcome of ‘unsure’ compared to ‘incorrect 
response’ (Reference category). The statistical analysis indicated that there was again no 
significant relationship between the variables of age and gender with eyewitness blame 
attribution accuracy (p > .05).  
The third Column in table 6.5 has the outcome of ‘unsure’ compared to ‘correct 
response’ (Reference category). The statistical analysis indicated that there was again no 
significant relationship between the variables of age and gender with eyewitness blame 
attribution accuracy. The results from the control group indicated that neither age nor 
gender were able to significantly predict the accuracy of the eyewitnesses’ blame 
attributions, therefore, any significant differences observed within the experimental groups 
could be confidently attributed as an effect of a post-event discussion. 
 
 121 
 
Table 6.5. Multinomial logistic regression predicting blame attribution. 
 Correct responsea (N=78)                    Unsurea (N=36)                           Unsureb (N=36) 
Variable OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE 
Age 1 (.97/1.01) .01 1 (.98/1.03) .01 1.01 (.99/1.04) .01 
Gender           
     Male .94 (.48/1.86) .35 1.21 (.53/2.76) .42  1.28 (.58/2.83) .41 
     Female 1   1  1  
Note. a= Reference group: ‘incorrect response’ (n=60); b= Reference group: ‘correct 
response’ (n=78). OR = Odds Ratio.  SE = Standard Error. 95% CI = Confidence Interval. * 
p<.05. ** p<0.005. *** p<0.001 
 
6.4.1.2. Age and gender-related difference in eyewitness confidence 
 
The self-reported confidence scores of the participants from the control condition 
were also analysed to determine whether their age and gender had any inherent 
relationship with general eyewitness confidence. Multiple regression was performed to 
investigate the ability of age and gender to predict eyewitness confidence in blame 
attribution. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions 
of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Since no priori hypotheses had been made to 
determine the order of entry of the predictor variables, a direct method was used for the 
multiple linear regression analysis. The two independent variables only explained 2.6% of 
variance in eyewitness confidence [F (2, 135) = 1.79, p > .05] (See Table 6.6). In the final 
model neither of the predictor variables were statistically significant, indicating that there 
were no age or gender-related differences in eyewitness confidence. Therefore, any 
significant differences observed within the experimental groups can be confidently 
attributed as an effect of a post-event discussion. 
Table 6.6. Linear Regression Model of eyewitness confidence. 
 R2 β B SE CI 95% (B) 
Model .03 
Age   .12 .01 .01 -.004 / .02 
Gender  -.13 -.27 .19 -.64 / .09 
Note. Statistical significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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6.4.2. Blame attribution 
 
The first objective was to establish if age and gender differences existed in the blame 
attribution of eyewitnesses, after being exposed to misinformation. Multinomial Logistic 
regression was used to analyse the effects of age and gender on eyewitness blame 
attribution, after a post-event discussion had occurred. The statements from participants 
were classified into three groups: those who blamed the man in the yellow top for starting 
the fight (incorrect response), those who blamed the man in the dark green top for starting 
the fight (correct response), and those who had said they were unsure on who had started 
the fight (unsure). Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. Due to the dependent variable 
consisting of three outcomes, two regressions were conducted: one with incorrect response 
(yellow top) as the reference category, and one with the correct response (dark green top) 
as the reference category. The main interest of current analysis was focused on the 
relationship between age and gender with blame attribution accuracy (3 categories) while 
controlling for the group condition. The analysis found that the model fit was significant [χ² 
(14) = 82.59, p < .001], which indicated that the full model predicted significantly better, 
or more accurately, than the null model. 
The first column in Table 6.7 has the outcome of ‘correct response’ compared to 
‘incorrect response’ (reference category). The results suggested that age and gender had no 
significant effect on eyewitness blame attribution accuracy (p > 0.05). In relation to the 
group condition, the results suggested that participants who were exposed to the 
misinformation from a unanimous majority group (condition 5, OR = .24; and condition 6, 
OR = .08), compared to participants from the control condition, were significant more likely 
to report the misinformation (incorrect response). The measures of association were 
medium to very large, in accordance to Cohen (1988) and Sawilowsky (2009). The effect 
sizes, calculated using Cohen’s d, were -.79 and -1.39, respectively.  
The second Column in Table 6.7 has the outcome of ‘unsure’ compared to ‘incorrect 
response’ (Reference category). The results suggested that age and gender had no 
significant effect on eyewitness blame attribution accuracy (p > 0.05). In relation to the 
group condition, the results suggested that participants who were exposed to the 
misinformation from a unanimous majority group (condition 5, OR = .45; and condition 6, 
OR = .28), compared to participants from the control condition, were significant more likely 
to report the misinformation (incorrect response). The measures of association were small 
to medium, in accordance to Cohen (1988). The effect sizes, calculated using Cohen’s d, 
were -.44 and -.7 
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The third Column in Table 6.7 has the outcome of ‘unsure’ compared to ‘correct 
response’ (Reference category). The statistical analysis indicated that there was again, no 
significant relationship between the variables age and gender with eyewitness blame 
attribution accuracy (p > .05). In relation to the group condition, the results suggested that 
participants who were exposed to the misinformation from a unanimous majority group of 
five confederates (condition 6, OR = 3.75), compared to participants from the control 
condition, were significant more likely to produce an unsure response. The measure of 
association was medium, in accordance to Cohen (1988). The effect size, calculated using 
Cohen’s d, was .73. 
 
Table 6.7. Multinomial logistic regression predicting blame attribution. 
   Correct responsea  (N=223)               Unsurea (N=106) Unsure b(N=106) 
Variable OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE 
Age 1 (.98/1.01) .01 1.01 (1/1.03) .01 1.02 (1/1.03) .01 
Gender           
     Male 1.01 (.7/1.47) .19 1.01 (.64/1.6) .23  1 (.63/1.6) .24  
     Female 1   1  1  
Condition           
     1 1  1  1  
     2 .66 (.29/1.48)  .42 1.04 (.39/2.79)  .5 1.58 (.59/4.28) .51  
     3  .99 (.5/1.95) .35 .95 (.39/2.3) .45 .97 (.41/2.26) .43 
     4 1 (.62/1.62) .25 .88 (.47/1.64) .32 .88 (.49/1.6) .31 
     5 .24 (.13/.44)*** .32 .45 (.21/.95)* .38 1.92 (.84/4.37) .42 
     6 .08 (.03/.19)*** .47 .28 (.12/.64)** .42 3.75 (1.22/11.48)* .57 
Note. a= Reference group: ‘incorrect response’ (N=279); b= Reference group: ‘correct 
response’ (N=223).      OR = Odds Ratio.  SE = Standard Error. 95% CI = Confidence 
Interval. * p<.05. ** p<0.005. *** p<0.001 
 
The researcher wanted to determine whether the strength of the predictor variables 
would differ after the removal of the conditions where the misinformation was not presented 
unanimously (conditions three and four). Therefore, a second test of multinomial logistic 
regression was conducted with the conditions that did not have a unanimous majority group 
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of confederates (Conditions three and four) omitted (adjusted N= 382) , to see if this would 
have an impact on the predictor variables’ abilities to predict blame attribution.  The 
analysis found that the model fit was significant [χ² (10) = 62.25, p < .001], which 
indicated that the full model predicted significantly better, or more accurately, than the null 
model. As shown in Table 6.8, there were no significant changes in the results — with 
regard to significant findings and general effect size strengths— after the removal of 
conditions three and four. 
 
 
Table 6.8. Multinomial logistic regression predicting blame attribution. 
 Correct responsea  
(N=117)               
 Unsurea (N=67) Unsure b(N=67) 
Variable OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE 
Age .99 (.98/1.01) .01 1.01 
(.99/1.03) 
.01 1.01 (.99/1.03) .01 
Gender           
     Male .98 (.56/1.6) .25 .91 
(.52/1.61) 
.29  .93 (.51/1.7) .31  
     Female 1   1  1  
Condition           
     1 (control) 1  1  1  
     2 (1p/1c) .62 (.27/1.42)  .42 .9 (.33/2.45)  .51 1.46 (.54/4) .51  
     5 (1p/2c) .22 (.12/.43)*** .33 .4 (.19/.86)* .38 1.8 (.78/4.13) .42 
     6 (1p/5c) .07 (.03/.18)*** .42 .26 
(.11/.59)** 
.43 3.56 (1.16/10.97)* .57 
Note. a= Reference group: ‘incorrect response’ (N=198); b= Reference group: ‘correct 
response’ (N=117).      OR = Odds Ratio.  SE = Standard Error. 95% CI = Confidence 
Interval. * p<.05. ** p<0.005. *** p<0.001 
 
6.4.3. Eyewitness confidence in blame attribution 
 
The second and third objectives of the study were to identify if there were any 
significant age and gender-related differences in the confidence of eyewitnesses who were 
exposed to contradicting misinformation (but provided correct responses) and to investigate 
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for possible age and gender differences in the confidence of participants who had made a 
false blame attribution, respectively. The descriptive data for the continuous variables are 
presented in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9. Descriptive statistics, reliability, and correlations for all continuous 
variables (N = 223). 
Variables Confidence Age 
Confidence  1  
Age .05 1 
Means 3.22 28.41 
Standard Deviations 1.06 12.71 
Range  1-5 18-82 
Note. No statistical significance measured between variables. 
 
A three-way between groups analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to 
explore the impact of gender (male; female), response (correct; incorrect) and group 
condition (conditions one-six) on eyewitness confidence, whilst also examining, and 
controlling for, the covariate of age. Preliminary observations indicated that the data 
satisfied the ANCOVA assumptions relating to independence of covariate and treatment 
effect, and homogeneity of regression slopes. 
The covariate, age, was not significantly related to the confidence scores of 
participants, [F (1,477) = 3.11, p > .05, r=.05]. There were also no significant main effects 
of gender, [F (1,477) = 1.28, p > .05]; group condition, [F (5,477) = 1.39, p > .05]; or 
response, [F (1,477) = .134, p > .05] — after controlling for the participant’s age. The 
interaction effect between gender and group conditions was not statistically significant [F 
(5, 477) = 1.07, p > .05]. The interaction effect between gender and response was also not 
statistically significant [F (1, 477) = 2.09, p > .05]. The interaction effect between group 
condition and response was also not statistically significant [F (5, 477) = 1.25, p > .05]. 
With regards to the interaction effect between all three independent variables (gender, 
group conditions, and response) the analysis did not find a statistically significant effect [F 
(5,477) = .64, p > .05].  
The researcher wanted to determine whether the relationship between the 
independent variables and confidence would differ after the removal of the conditions where 
the misinformation was not presented unanimously (conditions three and four). Therefore, a 
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second three-way ANCOVA was conducted with the conditions that did not have a 
unanimous majority group of confederates (Conditions three and four) omitted (adjusted 
N= 315), to see if this would have an impact on the relationship between the independent 
variables and eyewitness confidence. After the removal of conditions three and four, the 
analysis produced similarly non-significant results: The covariate, age, was not significantly 
related to the confidence scores of participants, [F (1,298) = 1.07, p > .05, r=.01]. There 
were also no significant main effects of gender, [F (1,298) = .09, p > .05]; group condition, 
[F (3,298) = 1.99, p > .05]; or response, [F (1,298) = .05, p > .05] — after controlling for 
the participant’s age. The interaction effect between gender and group conditions was not 
statistically significant [F (3, 298) = 1.04, p > .05]. The interaction effect between gender 
and response was also not statistically significant [F (1, 298) = .69, p > .05]. The 
interaction effect between group condition and response was also not statistically significant 
[F (3, 298) = .36, p > .05]. With regards to the interaction effect between all three 
independent variables (gender, group conditions, and response) the analysis did not find a 
statistically significant effect [F (3,298) = .67, p > .05].  
 
6.5. Discussion 
 
The purpose of the present study was to determine whether age and gender-related 
differences existed in eyewitness suggestibility when attempting to attribute blame. 
Specifically; the study was focused on identifying if the age and gender of an eyewitness 
could predict their level of suggestibility to misinformation from co-witnesses when 
attempting to attribute blame. Although some previous studies have attempted to 
investigate gender and age-related differences in eyewitness suggestibility, the majority of 
these studies (e.g. Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert et al., 2004; Hope et al., 2008) focused 
on line-up identification or item recall tasks rather than the implicit attribution of blame. 
Although eyewitness ability in memory recognition might be related to the process of 
identifying offenders through a line-up (Wright & Stroud, 2002), this does not provide any 
insight as to how witnesses may interact with misinformation when attempting to recall an 
event in their statements. Additionally, whilst other studies which looked at co-witness 
influence and general memory recall were able to indicate how witnesses could erroneously 
recall false details about an event in their statements (Hope et al., 2008), very little 
research had attempted to determine whether this misinformation could influence the way 
they interpret the event as a whole to attribute blame. Thus the present study attempted to 
build on the existing literature surrounding memory conformity and eyewtiness statements. 
The present study aimed to measure eyewitness suggestibility by observing the frequencies 
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of false blame attribution, as well as through the confidence judgements of participants 
after they had been exposed to misinformation from co-witnesses.  
Results indicated that a unanimous misinformation source was a significant predictor 
of false blame attribution (see Table 6.5). The findings imply that for misinformation to 
influence an eyewitness’s judgement in blame attribution, it must be unanimously presented 
by all other co-witnesses. Such findings are in agreement with the fundamental models of 
social conformity, which suggest that a break in the unanimity of misinformation can cause 
the target to doubt the credibility of the source (Allen & Levine, 1968; Hardy, 1957; Malof & 
Lott, 1962; and Morris & Miller, 1975).It was also found that participants who had discussed 
the event with co-witnesses were significantly less likely to be uncertain when making a 
blame attribution, in comparison to participants who had not engaged in a post-event 
discussion. Findings therefore suggest that eyewitnesses may seek out external information 
when uncertain. Additionally, the results imply that uncertain eyewitnesses may be more 
susceptible to co-witness influence - as suggested by theories on social conformity (Smith, 
Hogg, Martin, & Terry, 2007). The relationships between group size and blame conformity 
are investigated and discussed in further detail within Chapter 7. 
 
6.5.1. Gender and co-witness suggestibility in blame attribution 
 
The results showed no significant gender-related differences in blame attribution 
across all group conditions, with men and women producing similar statements to one 
another. When analysing the confidence scores of participants who did not conform to the 
confederate, no significant gender differences were found in the confidence scores of 
participants who gave correct statements. The results suggest that when controlling for 
group size and unanimity, men and women show no variation in their susceptibility to co-
witness influence during blame attribution. Findings therefore provide support for the 
previous studies, which argue that no gender-based differences exist within eyewitness 
suggestibility (Butts et al., 1995; Schwarz, 2013). 
The gender similarities in blame conformity could be due to male and female 
participants possessing similar source monitoring abilities in short term memory. Although 
some research indicates that women possess greater abilities in the retrieval of information 
(Seidlitz & Diener, 1998), these findings have mainly been observed for distant memories. 
Eyewitnesses will often give their statements shortly after witnessing the event. When 
looking at gender differences in short term source monitoring, research suggests that men 
and women are likely to perform similarly (Smeets et al., 2006). In the present study, male 
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and female participants will have been equally as likely to possess similar source monitoring 
abilities when attempting to reconstruct the event and, thus, would have been equally likely 
to misattribute the co-witness misinformation as witnessed information. However, this 
explanation carries an assumption that source monitoring errors would be an integral cause 
of blame conformity; however, research on blame conformity has suggested that it is 
actually predominately driven by informational influence (Thorley, 2015). 
The present study required participants to recall the event using memory retrieval, 
however, the findings contradict with multiple previous studies on memory recall which 
showed that male eyewitnesses were more suggestible than their female counterparts when 
attempting to recall items from a video (e.g. Eck et al., 2008; Loftus et al., 1992). These 
differences might suggest that gender differences in eyewitness suggestibility may only 
exist for tasks that involve general item recall and not for tasks that require participants to 
both recall an event and explicitly determine who is at fault.  This may be due to the 
different cognitive processes required to complete the differing tasks. When asked to recall 
items from an event, participants will rely on their memory retrieval abilities to produce the 
correct answer; a process in which females possess superior capabilities (Seidlitz & Diener, 
1998). However, when faced with the task of attributing blame to the correct suspect, 
participants will  also be reliant on their cognitive and moral reasoning abilities (Devine, 
2012; Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001). Research has shown that, on 
average, men and women perform similarly on such cognitive reasoning tasks (Blumenthal, 
2005). Therefore, gender similarities in susceptibility to informational influence might 
explain why male and female participants showed no differences in suggestibility to 
misinformation when attempting to attribute blame. 
Despite the present study’s findings, there is still evidence within the previous 
literature which suggests that female eyewitnesses may be more susceptible to co-witness 
influence. An artificial limitation of the present study’s methodology was that participants 
were instructed to discuss the event with co-witnesses prior to giving their statements. 
After real criminal incidents, not all of the witnesses will wish to discuss the event with their 
co-witnesses (Paterson and Kemp, 2006a). In fact, social psychologists have produced 
evidence indicating that females are significantly more likely to discuss emotionally-charged 
events with other people around them (Birditt & Fingerman, 2003; Harshman & Paivio, 
1987). Such findings would therefore suggest that, after a real incident, female 
eyewitnesses could be more likely to engage in a post-event discussion with other co-
witnesses, consequently putting them at a higher risk of exposure to misinformation. 
However, it can be argued that an individual's desire to discuss events with others around 
them could be different to their desires to discuss a crime with co-witnesses. 
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6.5.2. Age and co-witness suggestibility in blame attribution 
 
The results indicated that age was not an accurate predictor of co-witness 
suggestibility in blame attribution. This finding was further evidenced when the analysis 
showed no age differences in the confidence of participants who answered correctly (after 
exposure to misinformation). The results lie in agreement with the findings of Gabbert et al. 
(2003), who found no significant age-related differences in eyewitness suggestibility during 
memory recall tasks. However, the present study’s results contradict those of numerous 
previous studies which found a relationship between eyewitness age and suggestibility 
(Gabbert et al., 2004; Klein 1972). Gabbert et al. (2004) found that younger eyewitnesses 
were more suggestible than their older counterparts when attempting to recall items from a 
witnessed event. The discrepancies between the findings can be attributed to the different 
tasks that were incorporated to each study’s experimental design, with the present study 
using a blame conformity task and the other study used  a general memory recall task that 
did not require participants to evaluate the event. As mentioned previously; the additional 
cognitive functions required to correctly attribute blame (cognitive and moral reasoning) 
differ significantly to the processes used when recalling miscellaneous items from an event 
(memory retrieval). Research indicates that the age of an eyewitness can have a mediating 
effect on how accurately they can recall items from an event (Dodson et al., 2007; Memon 
et al., 2003), which in turn would suggest that age-related differences will exist in 
eyewitnesses’ susceptibility to informational influence when faced with such tasks. However, 
research also shows that, when attempting to attribute blame, the age of the individual 
does not have a significant effect on their reasoning skills (Kuhn, Weinstock, & Flaton, 
1994; Weinstock & Cronin, 2002). This would suggest that eyewitnesses of different ages 
would face the same levels of informational influence from their co-witnesses and, 
therefore, there would be no age-related differences in their suggestibility when attempting 
to attribute blame. 
The literature on eyewitness memory identifies two main causes for co-witness 
suggestibility. The first is informational influence; the process of intentionally accepting 
contradicting information from co-witnesses in an attempt to identify the correct information 
(French et al., 2011; Gabbert et al., 2003; Williamson et al., 2013). The second is from 
source monitoring errors; the process of mistakenly attributing post-event information from 
co-witnesses as witnessed information (Belli, 1989; Cann & Katz, 2005; Tousignant et al., 
1986; Patterson et al., 2012). These two causes for eyewitness suggestibility were observed 
in memory recall tasks; however, it was not clear if both processes had an effect on the 
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suggestibility of eyewitnesses when attributing blame. Previous research indicates that 
elderly eyewitnesses are significantly more likely to make source monitoring errors 
(Ferguson, Hashtroudi, & Johnson, 1992; Glisky, Rubin, & Davidson, 2001; Henkel, 
Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998; Memon, Bartlett, Rose, & Gray, 2003). However, the 
present study failed to find a significant relationship between eyewitness age and 
suggestibility when attempting to attribute blame. As a result, it can be inferred that 
eyewitness suggestibility in blame attribution will be predominantly caused by informational 
influence rather than by source monitoring errors - an assertion that has been supported by 
previous research on blame conformity (Thorley, 2015). 
It must be acknowledged that despite the study’s sample containing a significantly 
large age range (18-82), a review of the means and standard deviations (see Table 6.3) 
indicates that the majority of the participants will have been relatively young adults 
(M=29.95, SD= 13.04). Therefore, it could be argued that the age-related differences 
observed within the present study were more representative of the differences in 
eyewitness suggestibility between young adults and middle-aged adults, rather than 
between adults of all ages. As a result, it can be suggested that age-related differences in 
co-witness suggestibility between elderly and relatively younger eyewitnesses may still exist 
despite the present findings failing to identify any significant differences. Further research, 
incorporating a more diverse sample size, is therefore needed to determine whether elderly 
eyewitnesses could be more susceptible to co-witness influence during blame attribution. 
 
6.5.3. Misinformation and overconfidence 
 
The present study also examined the confidence scores of participants who 
incorrectly blamed the wrong suspect as the offender (as suggested by the confederates). 
This observation was made in order to identify whether participants could get a false sense 
of overconfidence in their erroneous judgements after encountering similar information from 
a co-witness. 
The results found no significant gender differences in the confidence scores of 
participants who gave incorrect eyewitness statements. Such findings suggest that men and 
women may share the same level of confidence when giving incorrect eyewitness 
statements. The findings are supported by Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar (1994). 
However, other studies — such as Areh (2011) — produced results that contradicts the 
present study’s findings. Areh’s study found that men were significantly more confident than 
women in an eyewitness setting, even when they were incorrect. Discrepancies between 
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these findings and those of the present study could be could be due to Areh (2011) using a 
sample entirely comprised of undergraduate students. Lundeberg et al. (1994) found that 
gender differences in overconfidence only existed within younger adults (of similar age as 
undergraduate students). Lirg (1991) discussed age as also having a confounding effect on 
the relationship between gender and confidence, demonstrating that older men were slightly 
more confident than women in self abilities. The present study controlled for the covariate 
of age when observing gender effects on over-confidence by using a more diverse sample, 
unlike Areh (2011). The insignificant results suggest that the previous findings of gender 
differences in over-confidence may have been caused by the factor of age acting as a 
confounding variable, as well as through the use of a biased sample. 
The results found no significant age-related differences in the confidence scores of 
participants who gave incorrect eyewitness statements. This suggests that adult eyewitness 
of different ages share the same level of confidence when giving incorrect eyewitness 
statements. The findings contradict with a large proportion of previous research on age and 
confidence (Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Crawford & Sankov, 1996; Hansson, Ronnlund, Juslin 
& Nilsson, 2008). As discussed earlier, one reason for the present study’s non-significant 
findings may be due to the lack of elderly participants within the sample. As a result, the 
findings are more representative of the age-related differences between young adults and 
middle-aged adults. Thus, further research, using a larger proportion of elderly participants, 
would be required to produce a more accurate indication of the relationship between age 
and eyewitness confidence. 
 
6.5.4. Limitations and directions for future research 
 
As well as the previously highlighted limitation of the age distribution within the 
present study’s sample, there are multiple additional issues that need addressing. Firstly, it 
must be acknowledged that preliminary analyses indicated that the average age of 
participants within the control condition was significantly higher in comparison to the other 
conditions. However, the overall results suggested that the age of participants did not seem 
to have a significant effect on their responses, thus it is unlikely that slightly higher age of 
the control participants will have had a confounding effect on the results.  
The study attempted to control for the confederates’ age and gender by using a 
diverse selection of confederates randomly assigned to different groups (see Chapter 5). 
However, the study did not aim to investigate the effects of confederate characteristics on 
social influence, as this would have required an even more complex sample which would 
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have incurred significant time constraints. Future research should aim to identify whether 
own-sex biases can also exist between co-witnesses during co-witness discussions (i.e. 
whether individuals are more likely to conform to co-witnesses of the same sex). Another 
variable that was not controlled for or investigated was eyewitness race. This factor could 
have acted as an extraneous variable, as multiple research studies have found that 
eyewitnesses are significantly more accurate in remembering faces of people of the same 
race (Johnson & Fredrickson, 2005; Meissner & Bingham, 2001; Wright, Boyd, and Tredoux, 
2003). This own-race bias could therefore affect the accuracy of an individual’s statement 
and the confidence they will have in their judgement; consequently, the race of an 
individual could have an effect on their level of susceptibility to co-witness influence. 
 
6.5.5. Summary 
 
In summary; the study failed to find any significant age or gender-related differences 
in co-witness suggestibility. This was attributed to the nature of the task at hand. Blame 
attribution requires the eyewitness to use cognitive and moral reasoning in order to identify 
which the guilty suspect. Such abilities have been found to be unrelated to an individual’s 
age or gender. As a result, the age or gender of the eyewitness would not have a mediating 
effect on their susceptibility to informational influence. In relation to eyewitness confidence; 
the present findings suggest that exposure to misinformation did not have a significant 
effect on the confidence of participants.
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Chapter 7: 
Study 1b: Group Size and Co-Witness Influence. 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The majority of previous research on co-witness influence have only studied the 
effects of post-event discussions on eyewitness pairs (e.g. Gabbert et al., 2003; French et 
al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008; Kieckhaefer & Wright, 2014; Paterson et al., 2009; Roediger et 
al., 2001). During real criminal events, there will often be more than two eyewitnesses 
present (Memon, Dalton, Horry, Milne, & Wright, 2016; Paterson & Kemp, 2006a; 
Skagerberg & Wright, 2008b) — one survey by Paterson and Kemp (2006a) calculated the 
mean number of eyewitnesses present during a witnessed criminal incident to be 6.77. 
Furthermore, Cardozo (2009) found that within 38% of 175 cases of misidentification, there 
were multiple eyewitnesses misidentifying the same innocent individual as the offender, 
suggesting that many eyewitnesses could encounter misinformation from more than just 
one co-witness. Failure to study co-witness influence in larger and more realistic group sizes 
could result in inaccurate inferences being made about the behaviour of real eyewitnesses. 
Moreover, the generalized findings could cause researchers to produce unrealistic 
estimations about the prevalence of co-witness influence within real investigations. This is 
because the theoretical models of social influence suggest that the size of an eyewitness 
group could have a mediating effect on the risks of co-witness influence (see Chapter 4.5 
for discussion of group size and social influence). In particular, Bond (2005) highlighted the 
significance of the unanimity of misinformation and misinformation size in moderating the 
level of social influence an individual will be subjected to. 
 
7.1.1. Misinformation size 
 
The risk of informational influence has been shown to be positively correlated with 
the size of the information source (Bond, 2005). Walther et al. (2002) investigated the 
relationship between group size (five versus ten) and memory conformity during memory 
recall tasks, using live confederates. The results suggested that misinformation was more 
influential when presented by the larger groups (ten). However, this difference was only 
observed when the task difficulty was low. When the task difficulty was increased 
(consequently increasing uncertainty), both group sizes had the same level of influence on 
the participants’ responses. The study only compared the effects of co-witness influence 
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from groups of five and ten witnesses, research suggests that within real criminal incidents 
it is relatively rare for ten co-witnesses to engage in a co-witness discussion; the number is 
often much smaller (Paterson & Kemp, 2006a). Therefore, the present study was more 
interested in comparing the levels of co-witness influence between groups of 2 (as typically 
measured within the majority of memory conformity studies) to 6 (rounded average 
eyewitness group size; Paterson & Kemp, 2006a) eyewitnesses. To date, no such research 
has attempted to make this observation. 
 
7.1.2. Unanimity of misinformation 
 
Theories on informational influence suggest that for misinformation to have a 
significant influence on the target it must also be unanimously held by the group (Asch, 
1955; Baron, et al., 1996). Walther et al. (2002) were able to demonstrate this effect 
amongst co-witnesses. As well as measuring the effects of misinformation size, the study 
also measured the effects that a dissenter would have on the majority group’s influence. 
Participants were either exposed to misinformation from a group of co-witnesses with no 
dissenters present (unanimous majority), or they were exposed to misinformation from a 
majority group with a dissenter (someone who disagreed with the majority) present. The 
study found that misinformation presented by a majority group was significantly less 
influential on an eyewitness's recollection when there were additional dissenters present— 
The findings were supported by similar results from Mori and Mori (2008). Both studies 
indicate that the presence of a dissenter would significantly reduce the risks of co-witness 
influence on eyewitness statements. Walther and colleagues (2012) suggested that a 
dissenter would provide the individual with an independent view of the event, which could 
resultantly increase the individual’s own confidence in their recollection and reduce their 
susceptibility to informational influence.  Additionally, research suggests that individuals 
favour supporting information from group members over contradicting information (Jonas et 
al., 2001). Therefore, it can be suggested that exposure to confirmatory information from 
an individual source may have more influence on an eyewitness than exposure to 
contradicting information from multiple sources (as demonstrated by Mori & Mori, 2008). 
The relationship between unanimity and group influence can also be explained by the 
frequency-validity principle, which submits that the consistent repetition of a statement can 
increase its perceived validity (Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig, Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1997). In 
relation to co-witness influence, the theory would suggest that eyewitnesses would be more 
likely to accept post-event information from a co-witness, if the information was 
consistently suggested by all group members.  In contrast, a break in the unanimity of the 
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misinformation would evoke an increase in doubt over the reliability of the misinformation 
(Festinger, 1945), which could resultantly encourage the target to reject it.   
 
7.2. Present study 
 
It was suggested that observations on co-witness influence measured through 
traditional two-person paradigms may provide an unrealistic estimation of the true risks of 
co-witness influence within real criminal investigations. Figures indicate that there are often 
more than two eyewitnesses present during a criminal event (Paterson & Kemp, 2006a). 
Theories on social influence suggest that the risk of co-witness influence may be 
significantly greater when the misinformation is presented by such larger groups (Asch, 
1955; Bond, 2005). Additionally, research indicates that if the misinformation is not 
unanimously held by all co-witnesses, the risk of co-witness influence would be significantly 
reduced (Walther et al., 2002). However, these inferences were based on general models of 
social psychology; therefore, a more direct observation is needed to accurately determine 
the relationship between group characteristics (misinformation size and unanimity of 
misinformation) and co-witness influence. Despite more recent research investigating the 
relationship between group size and memory recall (see Thorley & Dewhurst, 2009; Walther 
et al., 2002), no work has attempted to directly measure the effects of group characteristics 
on blame conformity (the central focus of the present thesis). Therefore, the present study 
attempted to examine whether the risk of co-witness influence on blame attribution was 
significantly mediated by misinformation size and group unanimity.  
Another measure of co-witness influence which has been neglected by the majority 
of previous research is the confidence of eyewitnesses in their recollections. Despite 
suggestions that eyewitness confidence can be influenced through co-witness discussions 
(both positively and negatively; see Allwood et al., 2006), no existing research has 
investigated the relationship between group size and eyewitness confidence. Thus, the 
present study also focused on the confidence of eyewitnesses as a second measure of co-
witness influence. 
It is suggested that by identifying the relationship between group size and co-
witness influence, investigators and practitioners within the legal system would be able to 
assess the reliability of eyewitness evidence more accurately, by gauging the potential risks 
of statement contamination.  
On the basis of the research findings discussed, it was hypothesised that:  
 136 
 
(H1) An increase in misinformation size (0 to 5) would increase the risk of blame 
conformity. 
(H2) The absence of a unanimous majority would significantly reduce the rates of 
blame conformity. 
(H3) There would be a negative correlation between misinformation size and 
eyewitness confidence in participants who produced correct responses. 
(H4) There would be a positive correlation between misinformation size and 
eyewitness confidence in participants who produced an incorrect response. 
 
7.3. Methodology 
7.3.1. Participants 
 
Data from the same sample used in study one-a (chapter 6) was used for the 
present study. Resultantly, the same participant details discussed in chapter 6.3.1 are 
applied to the present study’s analysis. 
 
7.3.2. Design & procedure 
 
A between-subjects design was employed, with participants being randomly allocated 
to one of six independent conditions. The conditions varied in relation to the number of true 
participants and confederates included within each trial (see Table 7.1). The conditions were 
used to allow the researchers to assess the impact of the two independent variables, 
majority size and unanimity of misinformation. Majority size was assessed through 
manipulating the number of confederates present within conditions which had one true 
participant per group. The majority sizes used within the conditions were none (control 
group/condition one), one (condition two), two (condition three) and five (condition four). 
The second independent variable, unanimity of misinformation, was also manipulated 
between the experimental conditions. With the exception of the control group, participants 
were either exposed to misinformation from a unanimous majority group of confederates 
(conditions three and four), one confederate with multiple true participants present 
(conditions five and six), or from one confederate with no other participants present 
(condition two). However — as mentioned previously— a caveat of the present study’s 
design is that participants within conditions two and three may have still been subjected to 
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misinformation from a unanimous group, if the remaining participants had all erroneously 
provided misleading responses. Despite this risk, statistically it would have been highly 
likely for at least one dissenter to be present within the majority of the trials in conditions 
two and three. The variables of participant age and gender were also controlled for 
throughout the analysis. 
As with the previous studies, the same two dependent variables were used to 
measure co-witness influence. The first dependent variable was the blame attribution of the 
participants. The second dependent variable used to measure co-witness influence was the 
confidence of participants in their responses, after encountering misleading information. The 
main procedure which is discussed in chapter 5.2.3 was implemented within this study 
 
7.3.3. Materials 
 
The closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of a bar fight (described in chapter 
5.2.2) was used as the study’s experimental stimulus. The main point of interest within the 
footage was the indication that the man in the dark green t-shirt had thrown the first punch 
and not the man in the yellow t-shirt. 
 
7.4. Results 
7.4.1. General descriptive data 
 
In the control group (condition one), 44.8% of participants produced a correct 
response, 34.5% produced an incorrect response, and 20.7% were uncertain. The variance 
in responses suggested that the experimental task was relatively ambiguous. The mean 
confidence scores across all conditions ranged from 2.98 to 3.5, suggesting that a large 
proportion of eyewitnesses faced some level of uncertainty when making their judgements. 
The high number of ‘unsure’ responses suggests that the participants will have been less 
likely to attribute blame through guessing. Means and standard deviations for all variables 
are presented in Table 7.1 and 7.2, and the correlations between continuous variables are 
presented in Table 7.3. It must be noted that —as discussed in chapter 6.4— preliminary 
analyses indicated that the mean age of participants within condition one (control) was 
significantly higher than the mean age of participants within the remaining conditions. 
However, study one-a found that the age of the participants was unlikely to have a 
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confounding effect on their responses. Nevertheless, this limitation was considered during 
the interpretation and discussion of the present chapter’s findings. 
 
Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics for participant responses (N=608) 
Condition True 
participants 
Confederates Total Blame attribution  Mean Confidence 
(S.D)  
Dark Top Yellow 
Top 
Uncertain Dark Top Yellow 
Top  
1(N=174) 1 0 1 78 
(44.8%) 
60 
(34.5%) 
36 
(20.7%) 
3.01 
(1.12) 
2.98 
(1.07) 
2(N=38) 1 1 2 14 
(36.8%) 
16 
(42.1%) 
8 (21.1%) 3.43 
(.94) 
3.31 
(1.08) 
3(N=94) 1 2 3 19 
(20.2%) 
61 
(64.9%) 
14 
(14.9%) 
3.47 
(.97) 
3.37 
(.97) 
4(N=76) 1 5 6 6 (7.9%) 61 
(80.3%) 
9 (11.8%) 3.17 
(.75) 
3.41 
(.96) 
5(N=56) 2 1 3 26 
(46.4%) 
20 
(35.7%) 
10 
(17.9%) 
3.5 
(1.03) 
3.05 (1) 
6(N=170) 5 1 6 80 
(47.1%) 
61 
(35.9%) 
29 
(17.1%) 
3.4 
(1.11) 
2.92 
(1.11) 
 
 
Table 7.2. Descriptive statistics for conditions in relation to confederate size 
(N=608). 
Confederate Size Blame attribution  Mean Confidence (S.D)  
Dark Top Yellow Top Uncertain Dark Top Yellow Top  
0 78 (44.8%) 60 (34.5%) 36 (20.7%) 3.03 (1.11) 2.98 (1.07) 
1 14 (36.8%) 16 (42.1%) 8 (21.1%) 3.43 (.94) 3.31 (1.08) 
2 19 (20.2%) 61 (64.9%) 14 (14.9%) 3.47 (.97) 3.24 (.92) 
5 6 (7.9%) 61 (80.3%) 9 (11.8%) 3.17 (.75) 3.41 (.96) 
 
 
Table 7.3. Descriptive statistics and correlations for all continuous variables (N 
=608). 
Variables C a CS Age 
Confidence a 1 .09 .04 
Confederate size (CS) .09 1 -.17*** 
Age .05 -.17*** 1 
Means 3.22 1.37 28.95 
Standard Deviations .96 1.52 13.04 
Range  1-5 0-5 18-82 
Note. . a= missing data for ‘unsure’ participants were replaced by confidence average score. 
Statistical significance Statistical significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .00.1 
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7.4.2. The effects of confederate size and unanimity on blame 
conformity 
 
A Multinomial Logistic Regression was used to analyse predictors for an unordered 
group classification of eyewitness responses: a correct response, an incorrect response, and 
a response of ‘unsure’. Due to the dependent variable consisting of three outcomes, two 
regressions were conducted: one with incorrect response as the reference category, and 
one with the correct response as the reference category. Preliminary analyses were 
conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity. The analysis shows that the model fit is significant, [χ² (14) = 82.59, p < 
.001], indicating that the full models predicted significantly better, or more accurately, than 
the null model. 
The first column in Table 7.4 has the outcome of ‘correct response’ compared to 
‘incorrect response’ (reference category). The results suggest that the age and gender of 
the participants had no significant effect on their response. With respect to the group 
conditions, participants from condition three (OR=.24) and four (OR=.08) were significantly 
more likely to produce an incorrect response than those in the control condition. The 
measures of association were medium to very large, in accordance with Cohen (1988). The 
effect sizes, calculated using Cohen’s d, were -.79 and -1.39, respectively.  
The second column in Table 7.4 has the outcome of ‘unsure’ compared to ‘incorrect 
response’ (reference category). The results suggest that the age and gender of the 
participants had no significant effect on their responses. With respect to the group 
conditions; participants from conditions three (OR=.45) and four (OR=.28) were 
significantly more likely to produce an incorrect response than an ‘uncertain’ response, 
when compared to the control group. The measures of association were small to medium, in 
accordance with Cohen (1988). The effect sizes, calculated using Cohen’s d, were -.44 and -
.7, respectively.  
The third column in Table 7.4 has the outcome of ‘unsure’ compared to ‘correct 
response’ (reference category). The results suggest that the age and gender of the 
participants had no significant effect on their statements. With respect to the group 
conditions; participants from condition four (OR=3.75), compared to participants in the 
control condition, were over three times more likely produce an ‘uncertain’ response than a 
correct response. The measure of association was medium, in accordance with Cohen 
(1988). The effect size, calculated using Cohen’s d, was .73. Figure 7.1 illustrates the 
distribution in participant responses in relation to the number of confederates present. 
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Table 7.4. Multinomial logistic regression predicting eyewitness response 
accuracy. 
Note. a= Reference group: ‘incorrect response’ (n=279); b= Reference group: ‘correct 
response’ (n=223).      OR = Odds Ratio.  SE = Standard Error. 95% CI = Confidence 
Interval. * p<.05. ** p<0.005. *** p<0.001 
 
Within study one-a, the same data set was analysed with the conditions that did not 
have a unanimous majority group of confederates omitted, to see if it would have an impact 
on the predictor variables’ abilities to predict blame attribution. The results indicated that 
there were no significant changes in the results — with regard to significant findings and 
general effect size strengths— after the removal of these conditions (see Table 6.8). Thus, 
the present analysis did not choose to re-analyse the data sets for the unanimous 
confederate conditions. 
 Correct response a 
(N=223) 
  Unsure a (N=106) Unsure b (N=106) 
Variable SE OR (95% CI)  SE OR (95% CI)  SE OR (95% 
CI) 
 
Age .01 1 (.98/1.01) .01 1.01(.99/1.03) .02 1.02(1/1.03) 
Gender           
     Female   1  1  1 
     Male .19 1.01 (.7/1.47) .27
  
1.33 (.78/2.27) .24  1 (.63/1.6) 
Condition       
      1  1  1  1 
      2 .42 .66 (.29/1.49) .5 1.04 (.39/2.79) .51 1.58 (.59/4.28) 
      3 .32 .24 (.13/.44)*** .38 .45 (.21/.95)* .42 1.92 (.84/4.37) 
      4 .47 .08 (.03/.19)*** .42 .28 (.12/.64)** .57 3.75 (1.22/11.48)* 
      5 .35 .99 (.5/1.95) .45 .95 (.39/2.3) .24 1 (.63/1.6) 
      6 .25 1 (.62/1.62) .32 .88 (.47/1.64) .31 .88 (.49/1.6) 
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Figure 7.1. Percentage count of participant responses between confederate sizes (N=608). 
 
The percentage of correct, incorrect and uncertain responses (dependent variable) 
for participants who were exposed to misinformation from two and five confederates 
(independent variable) were compared to determine whether the change in misinformation 
size influenced response accuracy.  A 2 (two or five confederates) X 3 (correct, incorrect or 
‘unsure’ response) chi-square analysis was performed. A weak, significant association was 
found between the two different groups and eyewitness response accuracy [χ2 (2, N = 170) 
= 6.01, p <.05, φc = .19]. However, an examination of the standardized residuals revealed 
that the critical values did not correspond to an alpha of 0.05, suggesting that the 
difference in responses between the conditions was small.  
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7.4.3. The effects of confederate size and unanimity on confidence 
 
The confidence judgements of participants who answered correctly and incorrectly 
were analysed in order to determine whether the group condition influenced the level of 
confidence that participants placed in their responses (participants who answered ‘unsure’ 
were omitted from this analysis, due to their inability to attribute blame).  A two-way 
between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to explore the impact of group 
condition (6) and the participant’s response (2) on their confidence. The interaction between 
group conditions and response accuracy was not found to be statistically significant [F (5, 
490) = 1.14, p > .05]. There was no statistically significant main effect for group condition 
[F (5, 490) = 1.04, p > .05]. The main effect for participant response did not reach 
statistical significance [F (1, 490) = 1.09, p > .05]. The results therefore suggest that 
neither the group condition nor response had any mediating effects on the level of 
confidence participants placed in their responses.  
A second two-way ANOVA was conducted with the conditions that did not have a 
unanimous majority group of confederates (Conditions five and six) omitted (adjusted N= 
315) omitted, to see if this would have an impact on the relationship between the 
independent variables and eyewitness confidence. After the removal of conditions five and 
six, the analysis produced similarly nonsignificant results: The interaction between group 
conditions and response accuracy was not found to be statistically significant; [F (3, 307) = 
.31, p > .05]. There was no statistically significant main effect for group condition; [F (3, 
307) = 1.66, p > .05]. The main effect for participant response did not reach statistical 
significance; [F (1, 307) = .04, p > .05]. The results suggest that after removal of 
conditions five and six, neither the group condition nor response had any effect on the level 
of confidence participants placed in their responses. 
 
7.5. Discussion 
 
The main purpose of the present study was to determine whether the risk of co-
witness influence on blame attribution was significantly mediated by misinformation size 
and group unanimity. Although the study was not the first to examine the effects of group 
processes on memory recall (Thorley & Dewhurst, 2007; Walther et al., 2002), very little 
research had attempted to measure this relationship within a forensic setting. Moreover, the 
study sought to determine whether the risks of blame conformity were dependent on the 
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misinformation size and majority consensus, an un-researched area within the eyewitness 
literature. 
 
7.5.1. Misinformation size and blame conformity 
 
Previous research on social influence indicated that participants would be 
significantly more vulnerable to being influenced by a majority size of three than by a single 
individual (Asch, 1955; Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Gerard et al., 1968; Rosenberg, 1961; 
Stang, 1976), suggesting a positive relationship between majority size and social influence. 
In relation to memory recall; Walther et al. (2002) found that a majority size of five was as 
influential as a majority size of ten when the task was ambiguous. The findings suggest that 
the relationship between majority size and co-witness influence plateaus after a majority 
size of five was reached. Based on these findings, it was hypothesised in the present study 
that an increase in misinformation size (0 to 5) would increase the risk of blame conformity 
to the confederates (H1).  
The present study found that an increase in misinformation size supplemented a 
higher rate of false responses and a decrease in the rate of correct responses, supporting 
the first hypothesis. More specifically; results indicated that participants who were exposed 
to misinformation from a majority group of two or five confederates were significantly more 
likely to produce an incorrect response (misinformation) than a correct or ‘unsure‘ response, 
when compared with participants from the control conditions (see Table 7.2). As illustrated 
in Figure 7.1; an increase in misinformation size resulted in fewer ‘unsure’ responses. An 
inspection of the odds ratios in Table 7.4 suggests that as the majority size increased, 
participants who would have been uncertain about the event would have been more inclined 
to conform and give a false statement. It was also found that participants who were 
exposed to misinformation from a group of five confederates were over three times more 
likely (OR= 3.75) to give an uncertain response than a correct response, compared to the 
participants from the control condition. This suggests that some participants were 
influenced by the confederates, despite not fully conforming to them. Overall, the findings 
suggest that individuals are more likely to have their memory recollections and subsequent 
interpretations of the event influenced by co-witnesses, when the information is provided by 
a larger group 
The results concur with earlier research on social influence which showed a greater 
effect of social influence when the misinformation size was increased (e.g. Asch, 1955; 
Bond, 2005; Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Gerard et al., 1968; Rosenberg, 1961; Stang, 1976). 
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These observations can best be explained through the frequency-validity principle, which 
proposes that an individual would be more likely to perceive information from an external 
source as being valid, with regards to both reliability and accuracy, if it is expressed by 
multiple different sources (Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig et al., 1997). The theory would suggest 
that within the experiments, eyewitnesses who encountered the misinformation from 
additional co-witnesses (two and five) will have been more likely to accept the 
misinformation as being correct. Consequently, through informational influence, these 
participants would have been more inclined to conform to their co-witness’s misinformation 
when attributing blame. 
The results also suggested that the rate of false responses was higher when 
participants were exposed to misinformation from five confederates than by two; however, 
additional analysis indicated that this difference was small (φc = .19). This suggests that 
the relationship between majority size and blame conformity starts to plateau before 
reaching a misinformation size of five (see Figure 7.1). This corresponds with the findings of 
Walther et al. (2002), who showed that when uncertainty was high, an increase in majority 
size beyond five sources had no additional significant impact on co-witness influence 
(Walther et al., 2000). This relationship can be attributed to the way in which the 
participants perceive majority groups; Asch (1952) proposed that after the addition of the 
third information source, the target would view the group as a collective source of 
information rather than as individual sources; subsequently the impact of any additional 
sources would be made redundant.   
Interestingly, the results suggested that in the one-versus-one condition, 
misinformation from an individual confederate did not seem to have a significant influence 
on the participants’ blame attribution. This finding contradicts the majority of previous 
research on memory conformity, which has typically found that participants can be 
influenced by a misleading co-witness (Foster et al., 2012; Thorley and Rushton-Woods, 
2013). This could be attributed to the ambiguity of the present study. Within the present 
study, participants will have been aware of the difficulty in attributing blame to the correct 
person from the footage, due to how suddenly the fight erupted. As a result, the 
participants will have been more likely to perceive misinformation from an individual source 
as an erroneous recollection. However, when presented with misinformation from multiple 
co-witnesses, participants would have been less likely to deem the information as being 
idiosyncratic and would have been more likely to consider the misinformation as being 
correct (Asch, 1955). 
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7.5.2. Unanimity of misinformation and blame conformity 
 
The literature on social influence also identified the unanimity of misinformation as a 
mediating factor for social influence (Asch, 1955; Bond, 2005; Vandello & Brunsma, 1996). 
Moreover, Walther et al. (2002) also demonstrated that when attempting to recall an 
incident, an individual’s vulnerability to memory conformity was significantly reduced when 
the misinformation was not unanimously held by the group. Based on these findings, the 
present study predicted that the absence of a unanimous majority would significantly 
reduce the rate of blame conformity (H2). 
Within three of the experimental conditions, participants were exposed to 
misinformation from an individual confederate: in condition two, participants were grouped 
with one confederate; in condition five, participants were grouped with one confederate and 
another participant; and in condition six, participants were grouped with one confederate 
and five other participants. The groups were used to assess the level of influence one 
confederate had on participants, as either the sole information source or a group minority. 
Results indicated that in all three conditions the confederate had no effect on the 
participants’ responses. The findings suggest that the misinformation was only influential 
when presented by a unanimous majority group, somewhat supporting the second 
hypothesis. Self-attention theory (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1981) can be used to 
explain the lack of influence from an individual confederate; Mullen (1987) suggested that 
the more self-attention was focused on the self, the more an individual would attempt to 
match their attitudes with majority consensus. However, self-attention would only be 
evoked when the individual was against a majority norm; thus, misinformation from an 
individual confederate may have failed to evoke enough self-focus to influence the 
participant into conforming.  
With respect to the literature on group unanimity; the present findings support the 
propositions of Walther et al. (2002), to an extent. They found that the level of co-witness 
influence was significantly reduced when there were multiple dissenters present within the 
eyewitness group. Although the present study did not use dissenters, the results indicated 
that when multiple true participants were present misinformation from confederates had no 
influence on the participants. However, the present study did not measure the effects of co-
witness influence from majority groups who were not unanimous (multiple true participants 
present). Consequently, the present findings cannot determine whether eyewitnesses would 
be vulnerable to co-witness influence from a majority group if the misinformation was not 
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unanimous. As such, it is suggested that further research is needed in order to fully address 
the second hypothesis. 
 
7.5.3. Misinformation size, unanimity and confidence 
 
It was predicted that there would be a negative correlation between misinformation 
size and eyewitness confidence in participants who produced correct responses (H3). 
Additionally, it was anticipated that there would be a positive correlation between 
misinformation size and eyewitness confidence in participants who produced an incorrect 
response (H4). However, the results failed to support either of these hypotheses. Neither 
group size nor the unanimity of misinformation had a mediating effect on the impact of 
misinformation to the confidence of participants, contradicting the findings of Allwood et al. 
(2006). A key difference between the present study and the majority of the previous studies 
into co-witness influence was that the current study purposely used an ambiguous task, 
with only 44.8 % of the control group blaming the correct offender and 20.7% answering 
‘unsure’, suggesting that the task was reasonably ambiguous (see Table 7.1). It is 
suggested that the ambiguity of the task may have significantly affected the confidence of 
most participants, resulting in the majority of participants displaying some level of doubt in 
their responses, regardless of their condition or answer. This can be seen in Table 7.1, 
where the mean confidence scores within all conditions ranges from 2.98 to 3.5. 
 
7.5.4. Implications 
 
The main findings of the present study suggested that for blame conformity to be 
effective, the eyewitness would have to encounter the misinformation from the majority of 
co-witnesses. This suggests that the real risks of blame conformity during an investigation 
might be lower than originally predicted by one-versus-one memory conformity studies. 
However, research on previous cases of misidentification indicates that in 38% of cases 
there are more than one eyewitnesses giving the same incorrect statement (The Innocence 
Project, 2009). As a result, it could be that misinformation from one individual can lead to a 
snowballing effect on a group of eyewitnesses. Another implication of the findings is that 
misinformation from co-witnesses might create a notion of uncertainty amongst those who 
are able to accurately recall the event, leading them to refrain from recalling correct 
information. This can be seen through the analysis which found that participants were more 
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likely to state that they were uncertain than give a correct statement as the confederate 
size increased. This is to be expected, as when giving an eyewitness statement the 
eyewitnesses are aware of the importance of their statements, and, consequently, there 
would be a high pressure to perform accurately. The eyewitness would be aware of the 
negative repercussions of giving misleading information and, as a result, they may only 
choose report details that they are confident about. Exposure to contradicting information 
from other co-witnesses could evoke a sense of uncertainty in eyewitnesses and, as a 
result, could deter them from mentioning certain details (Goodwin et al., 2013). A possible 
implication for police intervention could be to instruct officers to explicitly encourage 
eyewitnesses to report any information that they remember seeing, regardless of whether 
their co-witnesses agreed or disagreed with the recollection. Police officers could specifically 
ask the witnesses if they remembered witnessing any details that their co-witnesses 
disagreed with. This would allow the police officers to recover potentially accurate details 
about the incident that would have otherwise been disregarded by the witness before giving 
evidence. However, a potential risk with this approach would be that eyewitnesses may be 
more inclined to report post-event information that may have been misattributed as 
witnessed information, through source monitoring errors. 
 
7.5.5. Limitations and directions for future research 
 
Although the current paper provided some empirical insight into the social and 
cognitive processes of co-witness influence, the study bore multiple limitations. The 
unanimity of misinformation was manipulated by varying the number of confederates and 
participants within each condition. Multiple participants were used in conditions five and six 
to cause a divide in judgement during the post-event discussions and break the unanimity 
of the misinformation. However, based on the response rates in the control condition, there 
is a small possibility that participants in conditions four and five may have still been 
exposed to misinformation from a unanimous group of co-witnesses. The unanimity of 
misinformation could perhaps have been manipulated more effectively using the 
experimental design outlined by Walther et al. (2002), who manipulated the unanimity of 
misinformation using dissenters (confederates used to purposely suggest correct 
information). Further research is therefore needed to reliably determine the importance of 
group unanimity on co-witness influence. The study failed to measure the effects of co-
witness influence from majority group that were not unanimous (i.e. five confederates and 
two true participants/dissenters); therefore, the present study cannot determine whether 
misinformation size would still have a mediating effect on co-witness influence if multiple 
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dissenters were present.  Through such observations, future research should seek to 
determine whether the size or the unanimity of misinformation has a greater moderating 
effect on co-witness influence.   
 
7.5.6. Summary 
 
Overall, the findings of the present study suggest that the risk of blame conformity 
amongst eyewitnesses is dependent on the size of the information source. Moreover, results 
suggest that misinformation from an individual co-witness will most likely be rejected, and 
that for an eyewitness to be influenced by their co-witnesses the information would have to 
be presented by the majority of co-witnesses. Based on these observations, it is proposed 
that the true risks of blame conformity during real criminal investigations may be lower than 
originally predicted by previous research based on two-person observations. The present 
study suggests that the risk of possible co-witness contamination is less of a concern if 
there is clear deviation between the statements of co-witnesses; however, further research 
is required to allow researchers and practitioners to make accurate predictions about the 
risks of co-witness contamination within an investigation, based on the group 
characteristics. 
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Chapter 8: 
Study 2: Personality and Co-witness Suggestibility 
 
8.1. Introduction 
8.1.1. Personality correlates of eyewitness suggestibility 
 
Research suggests that an individual’s vulnerability to co-witness influence (co-
witness suggestibility) may be related to individual differences in personality. Doughty, 
Paterson, MacCann, and Monds (2017) demonstrated that participants who scored lower on 
measures of openness, extraversion and neuroticism were significantly more susceptible to 
memory conformity – when providing a memory report – relative to higher scoring 
participants. Furthermore, Liebman et al. (2002) displayed a range of personality 
inventories (NEO OI- Revised; the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire; Locus of 
Control; and Memory Efficacy) which could reliably predict the suggestibility of eyewitnesses 
to misleading questions. More specifically, the study found that eyewitnesses with a high 
external locus of control, low memory efficacy and neuroticism were significantly more 
vulnerable to interrogative suggestibility. As discussed earlier (see chapter 4.4), Loftus 
(2005) identified numerous personality traits that have been frequently found to co-exist 
with memory suggestibility. These traits include empathy (Tomes & Katz, 1997), self-
monitoring (Mullen, 1987), absorption (Platt et al., 1998), and dissociative personality 
(Eisen & Lynn, 2001; Winograd, Peluso, & Glover, 1998; Qin, Ogle, & Goodman, 2008).  
Researchers have also been able to use the interpersonal characteristics of 
participants to predict their susceptibility to memory conformity. Zhu and colleagues (2010) 
found that individuals who possessed cooperative and reward dependent personalities were 
significantly more vulnerable to being influenced by post-event information. Additionally, 
Wright et al. (2009) found that individuals with high levels of social anxiety were 
significantly more vulnerable to being influenced by group members during memory recall 
tasks. The researchers attributed this to increased levels of normative influence exhibited by 
these individuals, due to their heightened fear of negative evaluation. Wright and colleagues 
also found that individuals with higher levels of social anxiety were more vulnerable to being 
influenced by other participant’s during memory recall, due to a greater fear of negative 
evaluation. The present study proposed that the interpersonal characteristics of an 
eyewitness could be a strong predictor for their susceptibility to co-witness influence, due to 
previous research indicating that the informational and normative pressures of conformity 
were heavily mediated by the interpersonal characteristics of the targeted individual 
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(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Glomb & Liao, 2003; Heerdink, van Kleef, Homan, & Fischer, 
2013). 
The present study identified the Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-
Behaviour (FIRO-B) as a potentially suitable scale for predicting an individual’s susceptibility 
to co-witness influence during blame attribution (see Chapter 4.4). This was primarily due 
to the scale’s repeated use within research on social conformity (see Huertas & Powell, 
1986; Willcoxson & Chatam, 2006). However, to date, no research study has attempted to 
use the FIRO-B scale to predict an eyewitness’s susceptibility to co-witness influence. The 
ability to identify vulnerable eyewitnesses can have significant benefits within a legal 
context. Through identifying witnesses who would be at a higher risk of reporting non-
witnessed information, jurors and legal professionals would be able to assess the reliability 
of their statements more accurately. This, in turn, may help reduce the risks of false 
convictions. In addition, through identifying the underlying causes for co-witness 
suggestibility, investigators may be able to work on implementing interventions to prevent 
vulnerable eyewitnesses from reporting unwitnessed information. 
 
8.2. Present study 
 
Although previous research has attempted to identify the relationship between 
general personality traits and co-witness suggestibility in memory recall, a systematic 
observation on interpersonal characteristics would provide more reliable predictors of co-
witness suggestibility. To date, most research studies on co-witness influence have only 
considered a singular measure for co-witness influence memory conformity. Whilst 
observation on memory conformity can allow researchers to clearly determine whether an 
individual has been influenced by their co-witnesses, such an approach would assume that 
any participant who did not conform to the misinformation will not have been influenced. 
However, research has found that eyewitnesses who do not conform to their co-witnesses 
may still be influenced by the misinformation through a loss of confidence in their reports 
(Allwood et al., 2005; Luus & Well, 1994). Based on this evidence, it can be argued that by 
solely relying on a single measure for co-witness influence, such as blame conformity, 
researchers may underestimate the true prevalence of co-witness influence. Therefore, 
keeping in line with the present thesis’ methodological design, the present study also 
measured the confidence of eyewitnesses after encountering misleading co-witness 
information. 
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The purpose of the present study was to explore the association between an 
eyewitness’s interpersonal characteristics and their susceptibility to co-witness influence 
(co-witness suggestibility) when attributing blame, whilst controlling for age, gender, and 
group characteristics (misinformation size and unanimity). The FIRO-B assessment was 
selected as an appropriate tool for measuring the interpersonal characteristics of the 
participants due to its extensive use in previous research for identifying interpersonal 
predictors of group behaviour (see Jones et al., 1981; Naydenova, 2007; Poorman & 
Seelau, 2001). Additionally, previous research findings suggest that both misinformation 
size and unanimity of misinformation may have a mediating effect on an individual’s 
vulnerability to co-witness influence, yet very few studies have attempted to control for 
these variables. Therefore, this effect was controlled for in the present study by conducting 
trials under multiple different conditions where the number of confederates and true 
participants present was manipulated. 
To date, no research study has attempted to investigate the relationship between the 
FIRO-B personality traits and co-witness suggestibility, making it difficult to confidently 
determine the likely direction of the relationships, if any. However; based on the available 
findings from general research on group conformity (see Huertas &Powell, 1986), the study 
predicted that: 
(H1) participants who scored high on wanted control would be more vulnerable to 
co-witness influence. 
 Although Huertas and Powell (date) identified multiple other FIRO-B scales as 
predictors of conforming behaviour (expressed control, wanted affect and expressed 
affection), these associations were likely to have been specific to the study’s procedure, 
which is significantly different from the present study’s design. Therefore, no additional 
hypotheses were made with regards to the relationship between the FIRO-B scales and co-
witness suggestibility. 
 
8.3. Methodology 
8.3.1. Participants 
 
The study recruited five hundred and ninety-nine participants, of which, one hundred 
and twenty-six participants were randomly selected to play the role of a confederate. As a 
result, their answers were not included in the data analysis. The remaining experimental 
sample consisted of 473 participants. Two hundred twenty-four were male (M age= 29.3; 
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range= 16-70; SD = 11.91) and two hundred forty-nine were female (M age= 28.58; 
range= 16-80; SD = 11.77). The sampling procedure, along with details regarding the 
preliminary measures for participant suitability are presented in chapter 5.2.1.1.  After 
gaining confirmation for participation, participants were randomly assigned to one of five 
experimental conditions, whilst ensuring a relatively even distribution of male and female 
participants within each experimental group. Additional descriptive tests were conducted to 
ensure that there was a relatively equal distribution of age within all conditions (See Table 
8.1).  
 
8.3.2. Measures and Materials 
8.3.2.1. Visual Stimulus 
 
The closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of a bar fight (described in chapter 
5.2.2) was used as the study’s experimental stimulus. The main point of interest within the 
footage was the indication that the man in the dark green t-shirt had thrown the first punch 
and not the man in the yellow t-shirt. 
 
8.3.2.2. Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-Behaviour 
(FIRO-B; Schutz, 1958) 
 
The FIRO-B assessment was used as a measure for the participant’s interpersonal 
characteristics. The items are presented as statements about the individual’s interpersonal 
needs (e.g. “people control my actions”), the participant then scored their level of 
agreement with each statement through a six-point scale (six indicating maximum 
agreement). Each item is scored dichotomously (zero or one), depending on the 
participant’s level of agreement with the statement (see Appendix 5). The scoring criteria is 
set out by the FIRO-B Manual and varies between each item. The scores are then totalled to 
produce six overall scores, ranging from zero and nine (with nine indicating the strongest 
presence of the interpersonal trait) for each scale. 
The six FIRO-B scales were constructed using the Guttman scaling design, which 
suggests that the scales would possess high levels of reproducibility (Babbie, 2013). Schutz 
(1978) demonstrated the reliability of the assessment through testing the reproducibility of 
the scales. As predicted, the results reported suitable reproducibility coefficients for all 
scales, ranging between .93 and .94. The FIRO-B has also been shown to have adequate 
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test-retest reliability (Gluck, 1983; Hutcherson, 1965; Schutz, 1978). Schutz (1978) found 
that after a one-month duration, the test-retest coefficients were as follows: .82 for 
expressed inclusion, .75 for wanted inclusion, .80 for expressed affection, .73 for wanted 
affection, .74 for expressed control, and .71 for wanted control. In light of the 
aforementioned research surrounding the validity of the FIRO-B assessment, despite some 
of the criticisms received the assessment remains as a reliable predictor for interpersonal 
characteristics. Based on the primary aim of the present study focusing on the interpersonal 
correlates of co-witness influence, it was the FIRO-B assessment was determined to be the 
most appropriate scale for the present study. The validity of the FIRO-B scale has been 
further evidenced through its repeated — and successful— use on UK-based samples by 
previous research (see Ditchburn & Brook, 2015; Macrosson & Semple, 2001; Willcoxson & 
Chatam, 2006), demonstrating its appropriateness for measuring the interpersonal 
characteristics of the present project's sample. Moreover, Macrosson and Semple (2001) 
reported good reliability coefficients (Cronbach CI .66, split-half .55) of the scale and also 
demonstrated minimal to no interscale correlations between the dimensions. 
Using the present study’s data, preliminary tests were conducted by the researchers 
to assess the internal validity of the assessment. A one-way multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the mean scores of the FIRO-B scales within each 
experimental condition. The analysis did produce significant results, F (24, 1616.42) = 2.21, 
p <.05; Wilk’s Λ = .89, partial η2 = .03; however, post-hoc observations found that other 
than the wanted affection scale, the other five scales remained consistent between all 
experimental conditions— suggesting that five out of the six scales possessed good internal 
validity. 
 
8.3.3. Design 
 
A mixed design was employed, with participants being randomly allocated to one of 
five independent conditions. The group conditions were used to manipulate the independent 
variables of misinformation size (size of the group presenting the misinformation) and 
unanimity of misinformation, through altering the number of participants and confederates 
(misinformation source) present during the trials. As Table 8.1 illustrates, the 
misinformation was guaranteed to be presented unanimously in conditions four and five due 
to the participant being placed into a confederate-only group. In conditions two and three, 
the presence of multiple true participants meant that the participants were likely to 
encounter other dissenters, breaking the chain of unanimity. However, a caveat of the 
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present study’s design is that participants within conditions two and three may have still 
been subjected to misinformation from a unanimous group, if the remaining participants 
had all erroneously provided misleading responses. In spite of this risk, statistically it would 
have been highly likely for at least one dissenter to be present within the majority of the 
trials in conditions two and three.  
 
Table 8.1. Participant information for each experimental condition. 
Condition  N Group size True participants Confederates Age  
     M S.D 
1 (Control) 171 1 1 0 31.22  13.48 
2 56 3 2 1 26.64 8.94 
3 170 6 5 1 28.52 10.98 
4 38 3 1 2 21.84 3.87 
5 38 6 1 5 31.97 12.13 
 
The FIRO-B scores for each six scales were used as predictor variables of co-witness 
suggestibility. Co-witness suggestibility was measured through two dependent variables: 
the response given by the participants when asked to identify which man had thrown the 
first hit (blame attribution), and the level of confidence the participants placed in their 
response (eyewitness confidence). In line with previous research on eyewitness confidence 
(see Mudd and Govern, 2004), confidence judgements were measured using a five-point 
scale (five meaning maximum confidence). Participants who answered “unsure” were not 
asked to give a confidence rating due to their inability to determine who was to blame. 
 
8.3.4. Procedure 
 
The main procedure which is discussed in chapter 5.2.3 was implemented within this 
study. However, for this study, participants were asked to complete an additional 
questionnaire: After being interviewed by the investigator, the participants were instructed 
to complete a copy of the FIRO-B assessment privately. The participants were asked to 
complete the assessment after giving their reports about the incident to prevent their 
awareness of the assessment’s questions from affecting their blame attribution responses. 
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Participants in the control condition watched the footage individually and did not discuss the 
footage with any co-witnesses. After completing the assessment, participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
 
8.4. Results 
 
The main results are presented in two sections. First, evidence for the relationship 
between interpersonal characteristics and co-witness suggestibility is given through an 
analysis of eyewitness blame attribution (the first dependent variable). The second section 
of the results investigates the relationship between interpersonal characteristics and co-
witness suggestibility through analyses of eyewitness confidence (second dependent 
variable). Means and standard deviations for all variables are presented in Table 8.2, and 
the correlations between predictor variables are presented in Table 8.3.  
 Prior to the main analyses, a preliminary one-way between groups analysis of 
variance was first conducted to determine whether the variable of participant age was 
similar across all experimental conditions. Participants were divided into five groups 
according to their allocated group conditions (see Table 8.1). There was a statistically 
significant difference at the p < .001 level in the age of the participants across the five 
conditions [F (4, 468) = 6.66, p < .001]. The difference in mean ages between groups was 
small. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was .05. Post-hoc comparisons using 
the Tukey HSD test indicated that there was a significant different in mean age between 
participants from the condition one (control) (M=31.22, SD= 13.48) and participants in 
condition four (1p/2c)(M= 21.84, SD= 3.87; d=.76); and between participants from 
condition three (5p/1c)(M= 28.32, SD= 11.17) and condition four (d=.63). No other 
significant differences in mean age were observed between the remaining conditions. The 
observed differences were considered when interpreting and discussing the results within 
the discussion.  
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Table 8.2. Means and standard deviations of FIRO-B scales for all conditions 
 N (%) M Confidence WC EC WA EA WI EI 
  (Std. Dev) M S.D M S.D M S.D M S.D M S.D M S.D 
Condition 
1 
171 2.95 (1.1) 4.71 2.58 3.2 2.69 4.91 2.78 4.2 2.11 4.82 3.06 4.86 2.19 
Correct 73 (42.7%) 2.9 (1.19) 4.56 2.71 3.52 2.83 4.59 2.71 3.92 1.99 4.97 3.24 5 2.18 
Incorrect 58 (33.9%) 3 (1.08) 4.89 2.25 2.86 2.38 5.17 2.87 4.52 2.02 4.69 2.84 4.95 1.99 
Unsure 40 (23.4%) a 4.7 2.85 3.13 2.9 5.1 2.8 4.28 2.43 4.73 3.11 4.48 2.47 
Condition 
2 
56 3.3 (1.03) 4.09 2.6 2.25 2.61 5.77 2.48 4.16 2.33 5.13 3.09 4.96 2.22 
Correct 26 (46.4%) 3.5 (1.03) 4.04 2.54 2.38 2.62 5.58 2.76 4.23 1.88 5.04 3.09 5.31 2.35 
Incorrect 20 (35.7%) 3.05 (1) 4.1 2.88 2.8 2.95 5.65 2.48 4.3 2.85 5.3 3.03 4.95 2.14 
Unsure 10 (17.9%) a 4.2 2.44 .8 1.03 6.5 1.65 3.7 2.41 5 3.5 4.1 2.02 
Condition 
3 
170 3.19 (1.13) 4.8 2.68 3.16 3.83 5.45 2.54 4.09 2.28 4.92 3.01 4.91 2.36 
Correct 80 (47.1%) 3.4 (1.11) 4.24 2.7 3.52 2.83 5.86 2.4 4.29 2.17 5.25 2.91 5.15 2.57 
Incorrect 61 (35.9%) 2.92 (1.11) 5.61 2.64 2.61 2.8 5.26 2.5 3.72 2.48 4.64 3.01 4.75 2.05 
Unsure 29 (17.1%) a 4.66 2.41 2.64 2.66 4.61 2.82 4.31 2.12 4.62 3.28 4.58 2.37 
Condition 
4 
38 3.36 (.82) 4.29 2.43 3.95 2.52 5.55 1.88 4.76 1.92 5.92 2.17 5.55 2.27 
Correct 4 (10.5%) 3.25 (.5) 3.25 1.5 7 2.16 5.75 2.06 3.25 .96 6.5 2.38 5.25 2.63 
Incorrect 29 (76.3%) 3.38 (.86) 4.83 2.11 3.17 2.05 5.48 2.03 5 2.07 5.79 2.29 5.62 2.31 
Unsure 5 (13.2%) a 2 3.46 6 2.65 5.8 .84 4.6 .89 6.2 1.48 5.4 2.3 
Condition 
5 
38 3.41 (1.05) 4.18 2.14 3.55 2.18 4.76 2.2 4.3 2.17 5.55 1.88 5.76 1.68 
Correct 2 (5.3%) 3 (1.41) 4.56 2.71 5.5 2.12 4.5 .71 6 1.41 6.5 .71 6.5 .7 
Incorrect 32 (84.2%) 3.44 (1.04) 4.09 2.2 3.47 2.14 4.75 2.27 5.28 1.73 5.63 2 5.81 1.64 
Unsure 4 (10.5%) a 5.25 2.06 3.25 2.63 5 2.45 5.75 .5 4.5 .58 5 2.45 
Note. a= No confidence scores was recorded for participants who answered “unsure” due to their 
inability to attribute blame. 
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Table 8.3. Descriptive statistics, and correlations for all continuous variables (N = 
473). 
Variables C a Age WC EC WA EA WI EI 
Confidence a 1 .05 -.14** .09* .01 -.04 .01 .004 
Age .05 1 -.12** .01 .04 .01 -.03 -.08* 
Wanted 
Control 
-.14** -.12** 1 -.26*** -.09* .07 -.1* .06 
Expressed 
Control 
.09* .01 -.26*** 1 .07 .05 .19*** .11** 
Wanted 
Affection 
.01 .04 -.09* .07 1 .39*** .42*** .29*** 
Expressed 
Affection 
-.04 .01 .07 .05 .39*** 1 .18*** .28*** 
Wanted 
Inclusion 
.01 -.03 -.1* .19*** .42*** .18*** 1 .59*** 
Expressed 
Inclusion 
.004 -.08* .06 .11** .29*** .28*** .59*** 1 
Means 3.12 28.92 4.59 3.16 5.25 4.3 5.04 5.02 
Standard 
Deviations 
1.19 11.83 2.58 3.11 2.57 2.17 2.91 2.24 
Range  1-5 16-80 0-9 0-9 0-9 0-9 0-9 0-9 
Note. a= missing data for “unsure” participants were replaced by confidence average score. 
Statistical significance Statistical significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
8.4.1. Predicting eyewitness suggestibility through response 
accuracy. 
8.4.1.1. Control group 
 
The results from the control group (condition one) offer an indication of how well 
participants performed on the eyewitness task, when no misinformation was presented. 
Although most participants were able to produce a correct response (42.7%), a large 
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proportion of the participants blamed the wrong man for throwing the first hit (33.9%), and 
an additional 23.4% of the participants stated that they were uncertain (See Table 8.2); 
suggesting that the task difficulty was moderately high. The study purposely used an 
ambiguous task, due to research suggesting that informational influence is more effective in 
the presence of uncertainty (Walther et al., 2002). 
The results from participants in the control condition were analysed to ensure that 
the FIRO-B scales had no inherent relationship with general response accuracy. A series of 
multinomial logistic regressions were used to analyse the relationship between FIRO-B 
scores and eyewitness blame attribution when no group discussion was permitted. The 
analysis found that the model fit was not significant, [χ² (12, N=171) = 8.32, p > .05]. The 
results indicated that there was no relationship between the FIRO-B scales and report 
accuracy in participants who did not partake in a co-witness discussion. Therefore, any 
relationships observed between the FIRO-B scales and report accuracy within the 
experimental conditions could be attributed to co-witness discussions. 
 
8.4.1.2. Investigating the relationship between FIRO-B scores and 
eyewitness blame attribution. 
 
First, the study wanted to establish whether there were any relationships between 
the interpersonal characteristics of an eyewitness and their susceptibility to blame 
conformity, whilst controlling for age, gender and group condition. To investigate these 
relationships, multinomial logistic regression was used to analyse the effects of the FIRO-B 
scores and group conditions on the participant’s blame attribution. Preliminary analyses 
were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity.  Due to the dependent variable consisting of three outcomes, two 
regressions were conducted: one with the incorrect response (yellow top; misinformation) 
as the reference category, and one with the correct response (dark green top) as the 
reference category. The analysis found that the model fit was significant, [χ² (24, N=473) = 
85.28, p < .001], indicating that both full models predicted significantly better, or more 
accurately, than the null model. 
The first column in Table 8.4 has the outcome of “correct response” compared to 
“incorrect response” (reference category). In relation to the experimental conditions; the 
results suggested that participants who were exposed to misinformation from a unanimous 
majority group (conditions 4, OR= .09; and 5, OR= .04) were significantly more likely to 
report the misinformation (incorrect response) than those in the control condition. The 
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measures of association were large, in accordance with Cohen (1988). The effect sizes, 
calculated using Cohen’s d, were -1.33 and - 1.77, respectively. The data suggested that 
exposure to misinformation that was not unanimous (conditions 2 and 3) did not have any 
effect on the participants’ reports. In relation to the FIRO-B scales; the results suggested 
that participants who scored higher on the wanted control scale (OR=.89) were significantly 
more likely to report the misinformation (incorrect response). However, the measure of 
association was small, in accordance with Cohen (1988). The effect size, calculated using 
Cohen’s d, was -.06. The data suggested that the remaining FIRO-B scales could not reliably 
predict the eyewitness’s blame attribution.  
The second column in Table 8.4 compares the outcome of “unsure” to “incorrect 
response” (reference category). In relation to the experimental conditions; the results 
suggested that participants who were exposed to misinformation from a unanimous 
majority group (conditions 4, OR= .27; and 5, OR= .17) were significantly more likely to 
report the misinformation (incorrect response) than those in the control group. The 
measures of association were medium to large, in accordance with Cohen (1988). The effect 
sizes, calculated using Cohen’s d, were -.72 and - .98, respectively. The data suggested 
that exposure to misinformation that was not unanimous (conditions 2 and 3) did not seem 
to have any effect on the participants’ responses. The data also suggested that none of the 
FIRO-B scales could reliably predict the eyewitness’s blame attribution. 
The third column in Table 8.4 has the outcome of “unsure” compared with “correct 
response” (reference category). The results suggest that the experimental condition was not 
a reliable predictor of eyewitness response accuracy. Participants who scored higher on 
expressed inclusion (OR=.85) were significantly more likely to produce a correct response. 
However; the measure of association was very small, in accordance with Cohen (1988). The 
effect size, calculated using Cohen’s d, was -.09. The data suggested that none of the other 
scales could reliably predict the eyewitness’s blame attribution. 
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Table 8.4. Multinomial logistic regression predicting eyewitness response 
accuracy. 
Note. a= Reference group: ‘incorrect response’ (n=200); b= Reference group: 
‘correct response’ (n=185). OR = Odds Ratio.  SE = Standard Error. 95% CI = Confidence 
Interval. * p<.05. ** p<0.005. *** p<0.001 
A second test of multinomial logistic regression was conducted with the conditions 
that did not have a unanimous majority group of confederates (Conditions two and three) 
omitted (adjusted N= 247), to see if this would have an impact on the predictor variables’ 
abilities to predict blame attribution.  The analysis found that the model fit was significant 
[χ² (20) = 70, p < .001], which indicated that the full model predicted significantly better, 
or more accurately, than the null model. As shown in Table 8.5, the new analysis suggested 
   Correct response 
(N=185) 
  Unsurea (N=88) Unsureb (N=88) 
Variable SE OR (95% CI)  SE OR (95% CI)  SE OR (95% CI)  
Age .01 .99 (.97/1.01) .01 1.01(.99/1.03) .01 1.02(1/1.04) 
Gender           
     Male .23 1 (.64/1.56) .27
  
1.33 (.78/2.27) .27  1.33 (.78/2.27) 
     Female   1  1  1 
Condition       
      1  1  1  1 
      2 .36 .98 (.49/2) .45 .77 (.32/1.33) .44 .79 (.33/1.85) 
      3 .25 1.05 (.64/1.72) .31 .72 (.39/1.33) .3 .69 (.38/1.24) 
      4 .58 .09 (.03/.27)*** .55 .27 (.09/.8)* .72 3.21 (.78/13.12) 
      5 .76 .04 (.01/.19)*** .56 .17 (.05/.53)*** .9 3.94 (.68/22.97) 
Wanted 
Control 
.05 .89 (.81/98)* .06 .95 (.85/1.05) .06 1.06 (.95/1.18) 
Expressed 
Control 
.04 1.05 (.97/1.14) .05
  
1.05 (.95/1.15) .04 1 (.91/1.09) 
Wanted 
Inclusion 
.05
  
1.01 (.91/1.11) .06 1.03 (.92/ 1.16) .06 1.03 (.91/1.16) 
Expressed 
Inclusion 
.07
  
 1.06 (.93/1.2) .08 .9 (.78/1.04) .07 .85 (.73/.99)* 
Wanted 
Affection 
.05
  
.98 (.88/1.08) .06  .99 (.87/ 1.12) .06 1.01 (.89/1.15) 
Expressed 
Affection 
.06 .99 (.88/1.11) .07 1.05(.92/1.2) .07 1.06 (.93/1.21) 
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that the wanted control and expressed inclusion scales were no longer significant predictors 
of blame attribution, after the removal of conditions two and three (p>.05). With regard to 
the remaining predictor variables, the new analysis found no significant changes in the 
results — in relation to significant p-values and general effect size strengths— after the 
removal of conditions two and three. 
 
Table 8.5. Multinomial logistic regression predicting eyewitness response 
accuracy. 
Note. a= Reference group: ‘incorrect response’ (n=119); b= Reference group: ‘correct response’ (n=79). 
OR = Odds Ratio.  SE = Standard Error. 95% CI = Confidence Interval. * p<.05. ** p<0.005. *** p<0.001 
 
 
   Correct response (N=79)   Unsurea (N=49) Unsureb (N=49) 
Variable SE OR (95% CI)  SE OR (95% CI)  SE OR (95% CI)  
Age .01 .98 (.96/1.01) .01 1(.97/1.03) .02 1.02(.99/1.05) 
Gender           
     Male .35 .86 (.44/1.7) .37  1.49 (.72/3.08) .39  1.73 (.8/3.7) 
     Female   1  1  1 
Condition       
      1 (control)  1  1  1 
      4 (1p/2c) .6 .08 (.02/.25)*** .57 .24 (.08/.7)* .73 3.1 (.73/13.05) 
      5 (1p/5c) .77 .05 (.01/.22)*** .59 .18 (.06/.58)** .91 3.79 (.64/22.937) 
Wanted Control .07 .95 (.83/1.09) .08 .96 (.83/1.11) .08 1.01 (.87/1.18) 
Expressed 
Control 
.07 1.14 (1/1.3) .05  1.05 (.95/1.15) .07 .97 (.84/1.12) 
Wanted 
Inclusion 
.07  1.05 (.91/1.21) .08 1.03 (.88/ 1.2) .08 .98 (.84/1.15) 
Expressed 
Inclusion 
.09   1.01 (.84/1.21) .1 .88 (.72/1.07) .11 .87 (.71/1.07) 
Wanted 
Affection 
.08  .95 (.82/1.1) .08  1.04 (.88/ 1.21) .09 1.09 (.92/1.28) 
Expressed 
Affection 
.09 .88 (.73/1.05) .1 .97 (.8/1.18) .1 1.11 (.9/1.35) 
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8.4.2. Predicting eyewitness suggestibility, through eyewitness 
confidence 
 
For the second part of the results, the confidence judgements of participants who 
answered correctly and incorrectly were analysed to determine whether exposure to co-
witness misinformation influenced the level of confidence that participants placed in their 
responses. In addition, whether the relationship between co-witness misinformation and 
eyewitness confidence could be predicted by the interpersonal characteristics of the 
individual was assessed. No significant correlations were observed between the FIRO-B 
scores and eyewitness confidence within the control condition. Therefore, any observed 
relationships between the variables within the experimental conditions could be attributed 
as an effect of the co-witness discussion. 
 
8.4.2.1. Eyewitness confidence in correct responses 
 
Hierarchical multiple regression was performed to investigate the ability of the FIRO-
B scales as predictors of eyewitness confidence (dependent variable) in participants who did 
not conform to the confederates. The variables of group condition, as well as participant age 
and gender, were also controlled for. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no 
violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity.  
In the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, the controlled variables (group 
condition, age and gender) were entered. This model was not statistically significant [F (3, 
108) = .81; p > .05], and explained 2.2% of variance in confidence scores (see Table 8.6), 
suggesting that none of the variables were related to confidence scores. After entry of 
FIRO-B scores at step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 19% [F 
(9, 102) = 2.66; p < .01]. The introduction of the FIRO-B scores explained an additional 
17% of variance in confidence [R2 Change = .17; F (6, 102) = 3.52; p < .005]. In the final 
adjusted model, one out of six predictor variables were statistically significant (wanted 
control; r=-.36), with a Beta value of (β = -.27, p < .05). The measure of association was 
medium, in accordance with Cohen (1988). The effect size, calculated using Cohen’s d, was 
-.56. 
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Table 8.6. Hierarchical Regression Model of eyewitness confidence for correct 
responses. 
 R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
Step 1 .15 .02      
Age    .01 .01 .13 1.35 
Gender    .04 .2 .02 .22 
Condition     -.13 .18 -.07 -.73 
        
Step 2 .44 .19 .17**     
Age    .01 .01 .05 .55 
Gender    .17 .2 .08 .85 
Condition    -2.3 .18 -.12 -.29 
Wanted Control    -.11 .04 -.27* -2.58 
Expressed Control    .08 .04 .22 2 
Wanted Affection    .03 .05 .07 .62 
Expressed Affection     -.02 .05 -.04 -.42 
Wanted Inclusion    -.03 .05 -.09 -.64 
Expressed Inclusion    .06 .06 .15 1.14 
Note. Statistical significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
A second test of hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with the conditions 
that did not have a unanimous majority group of confederates (Conditions two and three) 
omitted (adjusted N= 79), to see if this would have an impact on the predictor variables’ 
abilities to predict eyewitness confidence in correct responses.  
In the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, the controlled variables (group 
condition, age and gender) were entered. This model was not statistically significant [F (3, 
78) = .13; p > .05], and explained .5% of variance in confidence scores (see Table 8.7), 
suggesting that none of the variables were related to confidence scores. After entry of 
FIRO-B scores at step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 2.4% [F 
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(9, 78) = .19; p > .05]. The introduction of the FIRO-B scores explained an additional 1.9% 
of variance in confidence [R2 Change = .19; F (6, 69) = .23; p > .05]. In the final adjusted 
model, none of the variables were statistically significant. 
 
Table 8.7. Hierarchical Regression Model of eyewitness confidence for correct 
responses. 
 R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
Step 1 .07 .01      
Age    .001 .01 .03 .28 
Gender    .06 .28 .02 .2 
Condition     .08 .15 .06 .5 
        
Step 2 .16 .03 .02     
Age    .01 .01 .06 .48 
Gender    .13 .31 .06 .42 
Condition    .05 .16 .04 .34 
Wanted Control    .01 .06 .01 .09 
Expressed Control    .02 .06 .05 .36 
Wanted Affection    -.04 .06 -.09 -.62 
Expressed Affection     .01 .08 .02 .13 
Wanted Inclusion    .01 .05 .02 .13 
Expressed Inclusion    .05 .08 .09 .65 
 
 
8.4.2.2. Eyewitness confidence in incorrect responses 
 
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was then conducted on participants who 
produced incorrect responses, to investigate the ability of the FIRO-B scales as predictors of 
eyewitness statement confidence in participants who reported the misinformation (false 
blame attribution).  
In the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, the controlled variables (group 
condition, age and gender) were entered. This model was not statistically significant [F (3, 
138) = 2.21; p > .05], and explained less than 4.6% of variance in confidence scores (see 
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Table 8.8), suggesting that none of the variables were related to confidence scores. After 
entry of FIRO-B scores at step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 
11.7% [F (9, 132) = 1.94; p > .05]. The introduction of interpersonal characteristic scores 
explained an additional 7% of variance in confidence [R2 Change = .07; F (6, 132) = 1.77; 
p > .05]. In the final adjusted model, one out of six predictor variables were statistically 
significant (wanted control; r=-.24), with a Beta value of (β = -.24, p < .05). The measure 
of association was small, in accordance with Cohen (1988). The effect size, calculated using 
Cohen’s d, was -.49. 
 
Table 8.8. Hierarchical Regression Model of eyewitness confidence for incorrect 
responses. 
 R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
Step 1 .21 .05      
Age    .01 .01 .05 .64 
Gender    -.19 .18 -.09 -1.09 
Condition    .19 .09 .18* 2.16 
        
Step 2 .34 .12 .07     
Age    .001 .01 -.002 -.02 
Gender    -.15 .18 -.07 -.83 
Condition    .16 .09 .15 1.66 
Wanted Control    -.1 .04 -.24** -2.65 
Expressed Control    .04 .04 .09 1.04 
Wanted Affection    -.05 .04 -.12 -1.2 
Expressed Affection     -.003 .04 -.01 -.08 
Wanted Inclusion    -.02 .04 -.05 -.43 
Expressed Inclusion    -.001 .05 .001 .01 
Note. Statistical significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
A second test of hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with the conditions 
that did not have a unanimous majority group of confederates (Conditions two and three) 
omitted (adjusted N= 119), to see if this would have an impact on the predictor variables’ 
abilities to predict eyewitness confidence in incorrect responses.  
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In the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, the controlled variables (group 
condition, age and gender) were entered. This model was not statistically significant F (3, 
118) = 1.62; p > .05, and explained 4% of variance in confidence scores (see Table 8.9), 
suggesting that none of the variables were related to confidence scores. After entry of 
FIRO-B scores at step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 6.1% [F 
(9, 118) = .78; p > .05]. The introduction of the FIRO-B scores explained an additional 
2.1% of variance in confidence [R2 Change = .21; F (6, 109) = .39; p > .05]. In the final 
adjusted model, none of the variables were statistically significant. 
 
Table 8.9. Hierarchical Regression Model of eyewitness confidence for incorrect 
responses. 
 R R2 R2 Change B SE β t 
Step 1 .2 .04      
Age    -.002 .01 -.03 -.29 
Gender    -.01 .01 -.01 -.05 
Condition    .11 .05 .19* 2.1 
        
Step 2 .24 .06 .21     
Age    -.004 .01 -.05 -.47 
Gender    -.01 .2 -.01 -.01 
Condition    .11 .06 .19 1.85 
Wanted Control    -.04 .05 -.08 -.8 
Expressed Control    -.01 .05 -.03 -.27 
Wanted Affection    -.04 .04 -.09 -.9 
Expressed Affection     .01 .05 .02 .23 
Wanted Inclusion    -.01 .04 -.04 -.33 
Expressed Inclusion    -.02 .05 -.03 -.3 
Note. Statistical significance: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
8.5. Discussion 
 
The purpose of the present study was to explore the association between an 
eyewitness’s interpersonal characteristics and their susceptibility to co-witness influence 
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(co-witness suggestibility) when attributing blame, whilst controlling for age, gender, and 
group characteristics (misinformation size and unanimity). The FIRO-B scales of wanted and 
expressed control, affection, and inclusion were examined to determine their abilities to 
predict blame conformity and eyewitness confidence (measures of co-witness 
suggestibility). When observing both measures in the control group (no group discussion), 
there were no significant relationship between the personality scale scores and conforming 
behaviour; therefore, any differences in the experimental groups could be attributed to the 
group discussion. The analysis indicated that only two out of the six, FIRO-B scales were 
significantly related to co-witness suggestibility; wanted control and express inclusion. 
 
8.5.1. FIRO-B and blame conformity 
8.5.1.1. Wanted control 
 
Based on the findings of Huertas and Powell (1986), the present study predicted that 
participants who scored highly on the wanted control scale would be more vulnerable to co-
witness influence (H1). The results indicated that, after encountering co-witness 
misinformation, participants who scored higher on the wanted control scale were more likely 
to report the misinformation in their statements (see Table 8.4). In contrast, no such 
relationship between wanted control scores and incorrect responses existed within the 
control condition, suggesting that individuals who scored higher on the wanted control scale 
were more likely to be influenced by their co-witnesses into producing an erroneous blame 
attribution, thereby supporting the first hypothesis. 
Although the present study was the first to use the FIRO-B assessment in predicting 
co-witness suggestibility, previous studies have identified strong relationships between 
eyewitness suggestibility and other personality traits related to wanted control. A similar 
experiment by Liebman and colleagues (2002) found that participants with a high external 
locus of control were more vulnerable to being misled by their co-witnesses when recalling 
the event (Liebman et al., 2002). Concurrently, individuals who score highly on the wanted 
control scale were shown by Stimpson and Maughan (1978) to be more likely to exhibit a 
significantly higher external locus of control. Based on the co-existing relationship between 
these two traits, the present research postulated that eyewitnesses with high wanted 
control may have been more susceptible to accepting misinformation from co-witnesses, 
due to their persistent reliance to external forces in determining their decisions. Further, 
Doughty et al. (2017) found that introverted participants were more susceptible to 
incorporating misinformation from co-witnesses into their memory reports. Although the 
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FIRO-B assessment does not directly measure an individual’s level of introversion, 
individuals with high wanted control display similar personality traits to introverts - namely; 
both introverts and individuals with a high level of wanted control tend to be submissive in 
nature (Gilbert & Allan, 1994; Schutz, 1958). Submissive individuals can be at a higher risk 
of conforming due to being more susceptible to both informational and normative influence. 
The relationship between submissive personality and informational influence can be 
explained by behaviours synonymous with submissiveness. Submissive behaviour can be 
indirectly linked to low levels of self-confidence, through its strong association with 
introversion (Gilbert & Allan, 1994; Pulford & Sohal, 2006). This relationship is evident in 
the present study, with wanted control being negatively correlated with low self-confidence 
(see Table 8.3). An individual’s acceptance of the judgement of others is highly dependent 
on their self-confidence in the task at hand, due to informational influence being more 
affective on uncertain individuals (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Di Vesta, 1959; Kaplan, 1987). 
Therefore, individuals who score higher on the wanted control dimension are more likely to 
lack self-confidence in their judgements and, as a result, they will be more susceptible to 
conforming to co-witnesses through informational influence. In relation to normative 
influence; individuals with submissive personalities are more likely to exhibit perceptions of 
inferior social rank or status and thus are more likely to conform to those that they perceive 
as being more powerful (Gilbert, 1993). Moreover, submissive behaviour can be used by 
individuals as a form of fight or flight defence (Bailey, 1987; Harper, 1985; MacLean, 1990). 
When in conflict with another person, a submissive individual may choose to conform to the 
views of others in an attempt to avoid the escalation of conflict (Allan & Gilbert, 1987). 
Therefore, individuals who score highly on the wanted control scale would be more likely to 
conform to the judgements of co-witnesses to prevent the eruption of any conflict. 
However, due to the present study interviewing the eyewitnesses individually and privately, 
eyewitnesses would have been unaware of each other’s statements and, thus, there would 
have been no threat of group conflict. Due to the reduction of normative influence within 
the experimental paradigm, it is suggested that the relationship between co-witness 
suggestibility and wanted control was predominantly due to participants exhibiting low 
levels of confidence, which -in effect - would have increased their susceptibility to 
informational influence. Additionally, it can also be inferred that rebellious individuals (those 
who score low on wanted control, in accordance to Schutz, 1958) would therefore be 
significantly less susceptible to blame conformity. 
Although previous research can offer some explanation for the relationship between 
wanted control and co-witness suggestibility, it must be acknowledged that the relationship 
between wanted control and co-witness suggestibility within the present study was weak (in 
accordance with Cohen, 1988). Given the very small effect size measured between wanted 
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control and co-witness suggestibility, the implications of the observed relationship between 
wanted control and co-witness suggestibility should be interpreted cautiously. 
 
8.5.1.2. Expressed inclusion 
 
The results also suggested that eyewitnesses with higher needs for expressed 
inclusion were more likely to be correct in their reports than to be unsure, after exposure to 
co-witness misinformation (see Table 8.4). However, once again, the effect size for this 
relationship was very small and the relationship was not found when comparing uncertain 
responses to incorrect responses. Therefore, it is suggested that this unexpected finding 
may have been a statistical artefact.  
However, it is proposed that a high wanted inclusion score could still increase an 
eyewitness’s chance of being influenced by co-witnesses, despite the results failing to 
indicate this. This is because an artificial limitation of the present study’s methodology was 
that participants were instructed to discuss the event with co-witnesses prior to giving their 
statements. In reality, there is no guarantee that all eyewitnesses will wish to discuss the 
event with co-witnesses. Paterson and Kemp (2006a) found that 44% of previous 
eyewitnesses had chosen to engage in a post-event discussion with co-witnesses in an 
attempt to inform them about their knowledge of the event. Research indicates that 
individuals with a higher need for expressed inclusion would be more motivated to engage 
in such interpersonal communication (Rubin, Perse, & Barbato, 1988). Therefore, 
eyewitnesses with a higher need for expressed inclusion would be more likely to engage in 
post-event discussions. Such findings would therefore suggest that, in a natural eyewitness 
setting, eyewitnesses with higher needs for expressed inclusion may be more susceptible to 
co-witness influence due to being at a higher risk of encountering co-witness 
misinformation. Additionally, it can also be argued that these individuals may also be more 
likely to expose their co-witnesses to post-event information. 
8.5.1.3. Analysis the data for unanimous confederate conditions 
 
The relationship between the predictor variables and participant responses were re-
analysed with the conditions that did not have a unanimous majority group of confederates 
(Conditions two and three) omitted (adjusted N= 247). The reanalysis suggested that the 
wanted control and expressed inclusion scales were no longer significant predictors of blame 
attributions when exclusively looking at participants who had been subjected to the 
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misinformation from all of their co-witnesses. This change in results could be due to the 
increased level of informational influence (as a result of the misinformation being presented 
unanimously) causing the majority of the participants within the unanimous confederate 
conditions to make a false blame attribution (76.3% in condition four & 84.2% in condition 
five). As demonstrated in Table 8.4., the group condition had a stronger effect on 
participant responses than any of the FIRO-B scales. Thus, it is proposed that the effect a 
unanimous majority will have made the effects of wanted control and expressed inclusion 
redundant— with the majority of participants producing a false blame attribution, regardless 
of their need for wanted control or expressed inclusion. 
 
8.5.1.4. Insignificant relationships between co-witness suggestibility 
and the remaining scales 
 
The results indicated that expressed control scores could not reliably predict the 
participants’ blame attributions (blame conformity). The inability to find a significant 
relationship between these variables suggested that expressed control was not related to 
conforming behaviour, contradicting the results of Huertas and Powell (1986). The 
contradiction between the results can be attributed to the differences between the studies’ 
methodologies. As mentioned previously, the experiment of Huertas and Powell (1986) used 
an experimental paradigm where there was an appointed leader. The role of the leader was 
to be assertive and instruct the other group members on what decisions to make. Such 
behaviours are synonymous with the descriptive schema of individuals who score highly on 
expressed control (Shutz, 1958). Essentially, individuals who scored high on the expressed 
control dimension would have been attracted to gaining the position of leader. With 
normative influence being significantly stronger on individuals with a higher need for group 
acceptance, it can be theorized that individuals with high levels of expressed control were 
more likely to conform to group members as a way of gaining their approval to become the 
group leader (Louis, Taylor & Douglas, 2005). However, within the confines of an 
eyewitness paradigm, there is no role of leadership available, thus no reason for 
participants with high levels of expressed control to want to conform other co-witnesses.  
The findings of the present study also indicated that wanted affection and expressed 
affection were not significantly related to co-witness suggestibility, once again contradicting 
the findings of Huertas and Powell (1986). These differences can again be attributed to the 
different methodologies utilised by the studies. Huertas and Powell’s experimental paradigm 
made participants state their answers within the presence of other group members. As a 
result, an individual with higher scores on both wanted affection and expressed affection 
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dimensions could give a conforming answer in order to get closer to the group members.  In 
contrast, the present study made participants give their answers privately, preventing 
participants from displaying their affection to group members or attempting to gain 
affection from them through their answers. As a result, wanted affection and expressed 
affection scores were unable to successfully predict for co-witness influence in an 
eyewitness setting. The study also failed to find any significant relationship between wanted 
inclusion scores and blame conformity. This was perhaps unsurprising, as there were no 
existing studies suggesting that the two variables would be related. 
 
8.5.2. FIRO-B and eyewitness confidence 
 
The analysis of eyewitness confidence identified a negative relationship between 
wanted control scores and eyewitness confidence in eyewitnesses who produced both 
incorrect and correct responses. However, this relationship was not present for participants 
within the control condition, suggesting that exposure to co-witness discussions had a 
negative impact on the confidence of eyewitnesses with high wanted control— suggesting 
that participants with higher levels of wanted control were more susceptible to having their 
confidence influenced by co-witnesses, adding further support to the study’s hypothesis. 
The results suggest that eyewitnesses with high wanted control scores were more 
influenced by disconfirming statements than by conforming statements. Again, this 
behaviour can be attributed to the submissive nature of participants with high wanted 
control.  Witnesses with submissive personalities tend to exhibit low levels of self-esteem 
(Gilbert & Allan, 1994; Pulford & Sohal, 2006). Consequently, individuals with low self-
esteem would have more difficulty in gaining confidence through confirmatory feedback 
(McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981), but would still be more vulnerable to losing confidence from 
disconfirmatory feedback compared to individuals with higher self-esteem (Young, 2000). 
However, it is suggested that further, more direct, research is needed to support the 
proposed relationship between wanted control and confirmatory/disconfirmatory feedback. 
Interestingly, when the confidence scores were reanalysed with the conditions that 
did not have a unanimous majority group of confederates (Conditions two and three) 
omitted, the results found no significant relationship between wanted control scores and 
eyewitness confidence. The findings suggested that wanted control scores could not predict 
the confidence scores of participants who were placed in confederate-only groups. One 
explanation for this insignificant finding could be that submissive participants (with high 
levels of wanted control) in the confederate-only groups will have been less likely to have 
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their responses questioned and criticised by their co-witnesses because the confederates 
were not instructed to challenge the participants or criticise them— they were only 
instructed to present an incorrect judgement. However, in the conditions where multiple 
participants were included in each group, participants will have been likely to challenge each 
other as well the confederates and thus, certain individuals may have been more likely to 
lose confidence in their own judgements. 
 
8.5.3. Group size 
 
The results also suggested that misinformation size had a moderating effect on 
blame conformity, with the results indicating that participants who were exposed to 
misinformation by a larger group were more likely to produce the same erroneous response. 
The analyses also suggested that exposure to misinformation that was not unanimously 
held by all co-witnesses (conditions 2 and 3) did not seem to have any significant effect on 
memory conformity. However, the rates of incorrect responses were significantly higher 
when participants were exposed to misinformation from a unanimous majority (conditions 
four and five), suggesting the unanimity of misinformation also had a significant effect on 
blame conformity. The relationship between group size and co-witness suggestibility is 
investigated and discussed in chapter 7. 
 
8.5.4. Implications of results 
 
Overall, the results indicated that certain personality factors (high need for wanted 
control) could leave eyewitnesses pre-disposed to having their memory recollections and 
blame attributions for an event influenced by others. The findings highlight the need for 
interventions for raising awareness of the individual differences that can have a negative 
influence on eyewitness statements. Certain situational factors, such as intoxication, 
intellectual disabilities and personal biases, are often made aware to investigators and 
jurors, and these factors can influence how the statements are evaluated with regards to 
their accuracy and reliability (Evans & Compo, 2010; Schmechel, O’Toole, Easterly, & 
Loftus; Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003). However, the remaining eyewitnesses who do not fall 
under such criterion are assumed to be relatively equal with regards to memory recall 
accuracy and reliability. By raising awareness of the significant effects of personality 
differences on eyewitness statements, both jurors and investigators would be provided with 
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an additional tool for evaluating the reliability of eyewitness evidence. Again, that Wanted 
Control scores should not act as definitive measure of eyewitness statement reliability is 
stressed, as by doing so jurors and investigators would be at risk of discarding vital 
accurate evidence. Instead, it is argued that such personality characteristics can offer 
additional detail for consideration when assessing a crime. 
It is concluded that eyewitnesses with high wanted control will be more susceptible 
to co-witness influence because of their increased level of self-consciousness and lack of 
self-confidence, making them more prone to informational influence. Self-attention theory 
states that self-consciousness in escalated when an individual perceives their self as 
standing out from a group of individuals (Mullen, 1983). This perceived differentiation from 
a group could be due to differing judgements of a witnessed event, and the heightened level 
of self-focus can influence an individual to conform to the group (Bond, 2004). Therefore, it 
is suggested that by ensuring that an eyewitness is completely separated from the other co-
witnesses when giving a statement, police investigators could potentially reduce the risk of 
co-witness conformity and false statements. These methods of police intervention have yet 
to be scientifically tested and validated, and thus - at this present time - act as informed 
suggestions for policing professionals. Such implications have been made on the 
presumption that the eyewitness would be conforming to a co-witness through social 
influence. However, as discussed in Chapter 3; eyewitnesses can incorporate co-witness 
information through source monitoring errors as well. In such situations, the 
aforementioned intervention techniques would likely be ineffective. 
Research indicates that jurors would be less likely to perceive an eyewitness’s 
testimony as being reliable if the witness lacked confidence (Brewer and Burke, 2009). 
However, the present study demonstrated that participants with high levels of wanted 
control could display low levels of confidence after engaging in a post-event discussion, 
regardless of whether their report was accurate or not. Consequently, a risk within legal 
investigations is that accurate eyewitness testimonies could be disregarded by jurors, if the 
eyewitness possess high levels of wanted control. Resultantly, legal practitioners should 
attempt to inform jurors on the risks of using eyewitness confidence as a measure of 
accuracy, especially if the eyewitness had been exposed to co-witness information. 
The contradictions between the present study’s results and previous research that 
incorporated differing methodologies highlight the importance of the need for context 
specific research experiments in the field of eyewitness influence. Previous research had 
attempted to identify personality characteristics related to conforming behaviour using the 
FIRO-B assessment (see Huertas & Powell, 1986). However, the study observed conforming 
behaviour in an occupational setting rather than an eyewitness setting and, therefore, the 
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results could not be used to make confident inferences about conformity in an eyewitness 
setting. As predicted, contradictory findings suggest that the causes of conforming 
behaviour are depend on the situational context. 
 
8.5.5. Limitations and directions for future research. 
 
The study is the first in the literature to examine the interpersonal correlates of co-
witness suggestibility, but – indubitably - there were limitations. The FIRO-B questionnaire 
has come under criticism for its supposed lack of construct validity (Ryan et al., 1970). More 
specifically; Mahoney and Stasson (2005) emphasised the assessment’s inability to 
distinctly differentiate between the affection and inclusion dimensions. Failure to distinguish 
between the two dimensions suggests that the FIRO-B assessment may have failed to 
accurately measure the characteristics of affection and inclusion; however, a test of 
mullticollinearity on the present data indicated that the two different dimensions did not 
measure the same variable. Furnham (1990) investigated the feasibility of faking the FIRO-
B assessment to gain a desirable personality score. He found that participants could 
manipulate their answers to score highly on desirable personality traits and score lower on 
undesirable personality traits. The findings indicate that some participants within the 
present study may have answered the assessment untruthfully, due to an inherent social 
desirability effect. Such criticisms of the FIRO-B assessment suggest that a more validated 
assessment may help produce a more accurate measurement for the relationship between 
salient personality traits and co-witness suggestibility.  
The relationship between wanted control and co-witness suggestibility suggests that 
self-confidence and perceived social rank may be key mediators for this form of 
informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Di Vesta, 1959; Gilbert, 1993; Kaplan & 
Miller, 1987). It can be inferred that by observing these characteristics directly, researchers 
may be able to develop a more reliable measure for predicting co-witness suggestibility. The 
Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) has been validated as a reliable measure 
(McKay, Boduszek, & Harvey, 2014). A fruitful direction for future research would therefore 
be to utilise such scales in conjunction with the wanted control dimension, to compose a 
more appropriate assessment for predicting co-witness suggestibility. 
In relation to the experimental design; there were some limitations with the way that 
the unanimity of misinformation was manipulated. The inclusion of multiple participants, 
against one confederate, was used in conditions two and three to break the unanimity of the 
misinformation. However, based on the response rates in the control condition (i.e. 33.9% 
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producing a false response); it is likely that some of the participants in the group 
discussions will have also reported misinformation. Therefore, there will have been a small 
possibility that participants in these conditions may have still been exposed to 
misinformation from a unanimous group of co-witnesses. Future research could manipulate 
the unanimity of misinformation more reliably by adopting the experimental design used by 
Walther et al. (2002). In their study, Walther and colleagues manipulated the unanimity of 
misinformation by using confederate dissenters (confederates used to purposely suggest 
correct information). The preliminary analyses also suggested that the mean age of 
participants from condition four was significantly lower than the mean ages of participants 
from conditions one (control) and three. However, as identified in study one-a (chapter 6), 
the age of the participants did not seem to have a confounding effect on their responses 
and the present study controlled for the covariate of age. Thus, the variance in mean age 
between the conditions will have been unlikely to have a moderating effect on the results. 
 
8.5.6. Conclusion 
 
The FIRO-B assessment, on the whole was not an accurate predictor for co-witness 
suggestibility, with only one of the dimensions demonstrating consistent accuracy. 
Nevertheless, alone, the wanted control dimension was accurate in predicting co-witness 
suggestibility through memory conformity and eyewitness confidence. This relationship is 
attributed to the submissive nature of eyewitnesses with higher needs of wanted control, 
rendering them more susceptible to informational influence. The findings demonstrate that 
co-witness suggestibility can be predicted through interpersonal characteristics; however, it 
is proposed that a more accurate measure of interpersonal characteristics could allow 
researchers to make more reliable predictions of an eyewitness’s vulnerability to co-witness 
influence. 
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Chapter 9:  
Study 3: The Effects of Co-Witness Familiarity on 
Blame Conformity 
9.1. Introduction 
 
Despite the previous literature concordantly stating that co-witness discussions can 
influence individual statements, most of these studies incorporated experimental designs 
where the participants were strangers to one another, or failed to control for the variable as 
a whole, with investigators failing to ask the participants if they had any pre-existing 
relationships with the fellow participants (e.g. Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert et al., 2004; 
Meade & Roediger, 2002). Although the utilisation of heterogeneous groups can allow for a 
much easier sampling process (opportunity sampling), the ecological validity of such 
designs may be suspect due to the recurrent tendency for real eyewitnesses to have pre-
existing relationships— with one survey indicating that 77% of eyewitnesses are likely to 
have a previous acquaintance with their co-witnesses (Paterson, Chapman, and Kemp, 
2007). 
To date, two research studies have suggested that eyewitnesses are more likely to 
conform to the memory recollections of co-witnesses that they share a pre-existing 
relationship with, relative to unfamiliar co-witnesses (French et al., 2008; Hope et al., 
2008). French et al. (2008) attempted to identify if a pre-existing relationship between co-
witnesses would facilitate an increase in memory conformity rates when giving a statement, 
by comparing the similarity in memory reports between romantic partners and strangers. 
The results indicated that the participants who had discussed the footage with a romantic 
partner were significantly more likely to recall false memories (unwitnessed items) than 
participants who had discussed the footage with a stranger. The findings suggest that the 
risks of memory conformity amongst eyewitnesses would be greater if the witnesses are in 
a romantic relationship. Hope et al. (2008) provided further insight on the relationship 
between co-witness familiarity and memory conformity, by also looking at the effects of co-
witness discussions between friends on memory recall. Similarly, to French et al. (2008), 
the study found that participants were more likely to incorporate false memories from their 
friends and romantic partners, than from a stranger. Additionally, the study found no 
significant difference in statement similarity between friends and romantic partners, 
suggesting that the type of pre-existing relationship did not have an effect on memory 
conformity. Although the aforementioned studies were based on general memory recall 
tasks rather than specific blame attribution tasks, they highlight the significance of pre-
existing relationships in mediating co-witness influence. More importantly, the studies 
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emphasise the importance of controlling for pre-existing relationships when attempting to 
reliably investigate the effects of co-witness discussions. Based on the observed relationship 
between co-witness familiarity and memory conformity rates, the present study argues that 
the vast majority of previous research which has failed to control for the variable of 
participant familiarity will have produced results which would not be representative of real 
eyewitnesses.  
 
9.1.2. Building on the existing research on co-witness familiarity 
 
9.1.2.1. Pair versus group studies 
 
The two aforementioned studies on co-witness familiarity only observed the effects 
of co-witness influence on pairs. However, during most crimes there are often more than 
two eyewitnesses present (Memon et al., 2012; Paterson & Kemp, 2006; Skagerberg & 
Wright, 2008b), with one survey suggesting that, on average, there are over six co-
witnesses present during an incident (Paterson & Kemp, 2006a). As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, the level of co-witness influence exerted onto an individual is heavily 
dependent on the number of co-witnesses presenting the misinformation. On this basis, the 
present study postulated that there was a need for new research to investigate the effects 
of co-witness familiarity on blame conformity within larger eyewitness groups. However, to 
date, the effects of blame conformity have only been studied on eyewitness pairs. 
 
9.1.2.2. Use of confederates and alternate videos 
 
Many studies investigating the effects of memory conformity have exposed 
participants to misinformation with the use of confederates (e.g. Kieckhaefer & Wright, 
2014; Mckelvey & Kerr, 1988). Up until now, the empirical studies in the present thesis 
have also used confederates to present the participants with misinformation. However, for 
the present study, the use of confederates could have reduced the internal validity of the 
study. This is because, within the familiar co-witness condition, the role of confederate 
would have to be randomly allocated to one of the participants within each group. However, 
it is more than likely that the familiar individuals will possess different statuses amongst the 
group members with regards to competence and authority. Based on these characteristics, 
it could be suggested that the rate of memory conformity will be heavily influenced by the 
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participants who are allocated the role of confederate, rather than by the fact that the 
participants hold a pre-exiting relationship with each other (Ost et al., 2008).  
An alternative procedure, used by Hope et al., (2008) and French et al., (2008), was 
to show the participants slightly different videos to each other, in order to evoke 
discrepancies between their memories. Such a procedure has proven to be successful in 
studies that have measured the effects of co-witness influence amongst eyewitness pairs. 
However, the present study was concerned with studying the effects of co-witness 
familiarity in larger groups (of five). Therefore, it would have been highly impractical to 
create and present several different videos. Another limitation of showing participants 
alternative videos is that the participants may have been made aware that they would have 
viewed varying videos to other participants, which could have consequently affected their 
responses. Despite multiple studies carrying out post-test manipulation checks on the 
participants’ suspicions, many participants may have been biased in their responses due to 
a response /observer-expectancy bias. 
 
9.2. Present study 
 
The present study was concerned with observing the effects of a post-event 
discussion between groups of co-witnesses. Specifically, the research aimed to examine 
whether the relationship between co-witnesses had an impact on the similarity of their 
statements, with regards to blame attribution. To achieve this, the study comprised three 
main objectives. The first objective was to establish whether a post-event discussion 
between co-witnesses could increase the level of group similarity in blame attribution. 
Although the previous empirical chapters have looked at the effects of co-witness 
information on an individual’s blame attribution, the present study wanted to observe the 
effects of post-event discussions on the similarity of eyewitness statements when no 
confederates were planted. Based on the previous literature surrounding co-witness 
influence, the study predicted that eyewitness groups who engaged in a group discussion 
would produce a higher level of similarity in blame attribution, in comparison to eyewitness 
groups who did not discuss the event (H1). The second objective was to determine whether 
a pre-existing relationship between co-witnesses would significantly increase the level of 
group similarity in blame attribution, after a post-event discussion. Previous research on 
eyewitness pairs has shown that familiar co-witnesses are more likely to produce similar 
statements than non-familiar pairs (French et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008). The present 
study predicted that similar findings would be present in larger groups during blame 
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attribution. Therefore, the second hypothesis predicted that familiar co-witness groups 
would produce the highest similarity score in blame attribution, relative to the unfamiliar co-
witness groups and control groups (no group discussion) (H2). The final objective was to 
determine whether there was a significant difference in blame attribution accuracy between 
the experimental conditions. Despite the previous empirical studies identifying a link 
between co-witness discussions and false blame attributions, these observations were only 
made in conditions were participants were purposely exposed to misinformation (e.g. 
Thorley, 2015). It can be argued that when no misinformation is deliberately planted, the 
process of a co-witness discussion may not have a negative effect on the accuracy of the 
eyewitnesses’ blame attributions. No hypotheses were made for the final objective, as the 
final objective was of an exploratory nature. 
The study attempted to build on previous research into co-witness familiarity by 
investigating the effect of post-event discussions between groups rather than pairs. 
Although previous research has shown that an eyewitness can be influenced by 
misinformation provided by an unfamiliar co-witness, it was the contention of the present 
research that the inclusion of multiple co-witnesses would reduce the level of informational 
influence exerted by an individual. The present study also eliminated the need for 
confederates by incorporating an ambiguous blame attribution task, where co-witnesses 
were likely to have contradicting views regarding which suspect was guilty (as 
demonstrated within the previous empirical chapters). 
 
9.3. Methodology  
9.3.1. Participants 
 
Four hundred and twenty participants (203 males; 212 females; 5 undisclosed) of 
mixed ages (18–83 years; M = 33.04, SD = 15.62) were recruited through opportunity 
sampling. The sampling procedure, along with details regarding the preliminary measures 
for participant suitability are presented in chapter 5.2.1.1. 
In line with previous research (e.g. Wegner et al., 1991; Hope et al., 2008), 
participants in groups with pre-existing relationships were required to have known all other 
group members for a minimum of three months. The study recruited groups of individuals 
with both familial and friendship based relations for this condition. 
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9.3.2. Design & procedure 
 
A one-way between-subjects design was employed, with three conditions. In all 
three conditions, participants were placed into groups of five, to represent a group of co-
witnesses, giving a total of 84 groups. In the first condition, participants viewed the footage 
with strangers; however, no group discussion was permitted throughout the experiment 
(Control condition, N= 32 groups). In the second condition, participants viewed the footage 
and then discussed the witnessed event with unfamiliar co-witnesses (Stranger condition, 
N= 16 groups). In the final condition, participants viewed and discussed the witnessed 
event with individuals that they had a pre-existing relationship with (relationship condition, 
N= 36 groups). Type of relationship was not controlled for, as previous research identified 
no differences in co-witness conformity rates between individuals with different forms of 
pre-existing relationships (Hope et al., 2008). There were some discrepancies in sample size 
between the three conditions, with condition two consisting of significantly fewer eyewitness 
groups (16), relative to conditions one and three (32 and 36, respectively). The discrepancy 
was primarily due to the condition’s requirement for participants to be completely unfamiliar 
with their co-witnesses. There were multiple cases where a participant from condition two 
(stranger condition) recognised one of their co-witnesses. Consequently, these groups had 
to be omitted from the study, reducing the overall number of groups within condition two. 
Despite this level of variance, all experimental conditions were still of sufficient size for 
statistical comparisons to be made (in accordance with Stevens, 2009). 
Two dependent variables were measured. The first dependent variable measured 
was the similarity score in blame attribution within each co-witness group (see below for 
coding criteria); this variable is referred to as statement similarity. Secondly, the blame 
attribution accuracy (correct, incorrect, or uncertain) for each individual participant was 
measured, to determine whether co-witness discussions had an effect on blame attribution 
accuracy. Participants took part in the study in a group (either with strangers or 
acquaintances, depending on the experimental condition). The main procedure which is 
discussed in chapter 5.2.3 was implemented within this study 
 
9.3.3. Materials 
 
The closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of a bar fight (described in chapter 
5.2.2) was used as the study’s experimental stimulus. The main point of interest within the 
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footage was the indication that the man in the dark green t-shirt had thrown the first punch 
and not the man in the yellow t-shirt. 
9.3.4. Coding 
 
Eyewitness’s blame attributions were used as a measure for statement similarity. For 
this variable, the data was clustered, with each eyewitness group representing an individual 
data set. Each group was scored on the percentage of the most common answer given 
within the group (i.e. if four out of five group members blamed the suspect in the yellow for 
starting the fight, the group would have a similarity score of 80% etc.). 
The second outcome variable was eyewitness accuracy. If the participant blamed the 
man in the dark green top for starting the fight they were scored as being correct. If the 
participant blamed the man in the yellow top as starting the fight they were scored as being 
incorrect. If the participant was uncertain about who had started the fight they were scored 
as being unsure. Within the study, three participants blamed a third party (a bystander who 
separated the fight) for starting the fight. Although this answer was incorrect, these 
participants were scored as “other” to differentiate them from participants who blamed the 
man in the yellow for starting the fight (also incorrect). 
 
9.4. Results 
9.4.1. Descriptive data 
 
The control group was used to establish the baseline accuracy of eyewitness blame 
attributions. As shown in Table 9.1, there was a similar level of correct and incorrect 
statements (38.8% and 36.9%, respectively); an additional 22.5% of the participants 
stated that they were unsure as to who had started the fight. The variation of statements 
within the control group indicated that there would be conflicting judgements between 
group members in the experimental co-witness groups (post-event discussion). The data 
therefore supports the proposition that the footage used within the experiment was 
ambiguous as to who had started the fight. 
The average similarity scores in blame attribution for the control condition were also 
compared in order to establish the a priori rate of statement similarity. There was a mean 
statement similarity score of 60% (SD = 15.86%) within the control group (see Table 9.2). 
This indicates that, on average, three out of five co-witnesses made the same blame 
attribution. 
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Table 9.1. Percentage of blame attribution accuracy between conditions. 
 Correct Incorrect Unsure  
Relationship 53.3.% 41.7% 10.6% 
Stranger 40% 36.3% 23.8% 
Control 38.8% 36.9% 22.5% 
 
 
Table 9.2. Descriptive data for average statement similarity within eyewitness 
groups. 
 N M  S.D  
Relationship 36 71.11% 19.39% 
Stranger 16 65% 21.29% 
Control 32 60% 16.06% 
 
9.4.2. Unanimity of group statements 
 
The first objective was to establish whether post-event discussion between co-
witnesses could increase the level of group similarity in blame attribution. The second 
objective was to determine whether a pre-existing relationship between co-witnesses would 
significantly increase the level of group similarity in blame attribution after a post-event 
discussion. In fulfilment of the first and second objectives, the mean scores in statement 
similarity were compared between the three experimental conditions (control, strangers, 
and relationship), to identify if a post-event discussion influenced the participant’s blame 
attribution and to determine whether there was a difference in the level of statement 
similarity between familiar and unfamiliar eyewitness groups. 
A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to explore 
the impact of the group condition (control = no group discussion permitted; strangers= 
post-event discussion with unfamiliar co-witnesses; and relationship = post-event 
discussion with familiar co-witnesses) on statement similarity. The homogeneity of variance 
was violated (p < .05), and therefore a robust test of equality of means (Welch’s ANOVA) 
was used. There was a significant effect of co-witness familiarity on statement similarity at 
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the p < .05 level for the three conditions, [F(2, 38.12) = 3.3, p = .048] (see Figure 9.1). 
The difference in mean scores between the groups was medium (eta squared =.07).  
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that there was a significant 
difference (p < .05) in mean scores of statement similarity between co-witnesses with pre-
existing relationships (M = 71.11, SD = 19.39) and co-witnesses in the control group (M = 
60, SD = 16.06). The difference in mean scores was medium (Cohen’s d =.62). There was 
no significant difference (p < .05) in mean scores of statement similarity between co-
witness groups with pre-existing relationships and co-witness groups with no pre-existing 
relationships (M = 65.71, SD = 19.03). There was also no statistically significant difference 
in mean scores of statement similarity between co-witnesses with no pre-existing 
relationships and co-witnesses in the control group. 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Mean percentage of group statement similarity. 
 
9.4.3. Eyewitness blame attribution accuracy 
 
The final objective was to determine whether there was a significant difference in 
blame attribution accuracy between the experimental conditions. A chi-squared test was 
carried out to see if there was an association between group condition and eyewitness 
blame attribution. The analysis found that there was a weak significant association between 
the experimental conditions and eyewitness blame attribution; [χ2 (6, N = 420) = 19.63, p 
< .01, φc = .15]. An examination of the standardized residuals revealed that among 
 184 
 
participants who had a pre-existing relationship with their co-witnesses there were 
significantly fewer participants stating that they were unsure than expected. Participants in 
this group were significantly more likely to be influenced by their co-witnesses (see Figure 
9.1), suggesting that participants who were uncertain about the event were more likely to 
conform to co-witnesses. No significant differences were found in the rates of correct or 
incorrect blame attributions between the experimental conditions (p > .05).  
 
 
9.5. Discussion 
 
The purpose of the present study was to establish the effects of post-event 
discussion between groups of co-witnesses. Specifically, the study aimed to determine 
whether the relationship between co-witnesses had an impact on the similarity of their 
statements, with regard to blame attribution (blame conformity). The first hypothesis 
predicted that eyewitness groups who engaged in a group discussion would produce a 
higher level of similarity in blame attribution, in comparison to eyewitness groups who did 
not discuss the event (H1). The overall results suggest that eyewitness groups that engage 
in post-event discussions would be more likely to produce similar blame attributions than 
witnesses who refrain from discussing the event with others; but only if the co-witnesses 
have a pre-existing relationship with each other— partially supporting the first hypothesis. 
It must be noted that despite the present study identifying some significant 
differences in blame conformity rates between the experimental conditions, the study was 
unable to determine the cause of blame conformity during the trials. However, as discussed 
previously, Thorley (2015) suggested that the blame conformity was predominantly driven 
by informational influence. Therefore, the following discussion primarily draws on the 
theoretical construct of informational influence when explaining the observations of the 
present study. 
 
 
9.5.1. Co-witness influence between strangers 
 
Results suggest that post-event discussion with strangers did not have a significant 
effect on statement similarity. Although the descriptive data indicated that there was a 
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slightly higher percentage of statement similarity, in comparison to the control group (see 
Figure 9.1), the ANOVA showed that this difference was not significant. This finding is 
contrary to a large proportion of the memory conformity literature (see Gabbert et al., 
2003; Gabbert et al., 2004; Kieckhafer & Wright, 2014; Meade & Roediger, 2002). For 
example; Kieckhafer and Wright (2014) found that eyewitnesses were susceptible to 
conforming to strangers when placed in co-witness groups of two. The discrepancies 
between the findings of the present study and previous research findings can be attributed 
to the difference in group size. Firstly, Kieckhafer and Wright (2014) argued that many 
eyewitnesses would be inclined to conform to strangers in an attempt to avoid receiving any 
form of negative evaluation from them. In the present study, multiple co-witnesses were 
present and the control condition data indicates that a mixed collection of responses could 
be expected within each group (Table 10.1). Therefore, it would be likely that the 
participant would not be disagreeing with a co-witness alone. Social impact theory states 
that social impact is divided between the individuals being targeted (Latane, 1981); 
therefore, the impact of any negative evaluation would be reduced and, consequently, 
participants in bigger groups would be less pressured to conform to the unfamiliar co-
witness. Secondly, participants who are placed in a pair will only be exposed to their co-
witness’s misinformation. In such an environment, many participants will be susceptible to 
conforming to an unfamiliar co-witness if they lack confidence in their own memory reports 
(Wright et al., 2000). Within the present study, however, participants were exposed to the 
memory reports of four other co-witnesses rather than just one. In contrast to the previous 
research, participants will have therefore been likely to encounter co-witness information 
that supported their memory reports as well information that contradicted it. With research 
indicating that eyewitness confidence is more greatly affected by confirmatory feedback 
than by disconformatory feedback (Allwood et al., 2006), it can be argued that participants 
within the present study will have been less likely to conform to unfamiliar co-witness’s due 
to also encountering confirmatory co-witness information.  
Additional research on general social conformity suggests that individuals can 
conform to a group of strangers (Asch, 1952; McKelvey and Kerr, 1988); however, such 
studies have tested the effects of group pressure using unanimous confederates. In such 
situations, participants were placed in an environment where they were against a 
unanimous group with an opposing recollection. The unanimity of misinformation has been 
proven to be an essential factor for eliciting group conformity (Allen and Levine, 1968; 
Asch, 1955; Hardy, 1957; Malof and Lott, 1962; Morris and Miller, 1975). This is primarily 
due to its effects on the level of informational influence: if a group unanimously hold the 
same judgement, the target is more inclined to gauge their view as being more accurate 
(Baron et al., 1996). In the present study, co-witnesses were likely to have differing views, 
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therefore the break in unanimity will have reduced the level on informational influence. 
Based on the differences in the experimental designs and variations in the findings of the 
present study and previous research on memory conformity, it is suggested that the risks of 
conformity to unfamiliar co-witnesses may only emerge when the targeted eyewitness is 
exposed to co-witness information from either one co-witness or a group of co-witnesses 
who are unanimous in their reports.  
 
9.5.2. Co-witness influence between familiar eyewitnesses. 
 
The second hypothesis predicted that familiar co-witness groups would produce the 
highest similarity score in blame attribution, relative to the unfamiliar co-witness groups 
and control groups (H2). Results suggested that the risks of statement similarity were 
highest in groups of eyewitnesses who engaged in a post-event discussion with familiar co-
witnesses, with the eyewitness groups within this condition producing the highest average 
similarity score in blame attribution, thus supporting the second hypothesis. The finding is 
concordant with the previous literature (e.g. French et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008).   
As mentioned previously; many relationships are maintained through a shared reality 
(Echterhoff et al., 2005; Sorrentino & Yamaguchi, 2008). As a result, many eyewitnesses 
may have been inclined to habitually accept the judgement of a co-witness they were close 
with as part of their behavioural routine. Hope et al. (2008) indicated that individuals are 
more likely to believe that they are more accurate than strangers, in comparison to their 
friends and family. This is primarily due to the fact that an individual will have more 
information about their peers from which to gauge the accuracy of their judgments 
(Festinger, 1954; Forgas & Williams, 2001; Gabbert et al., 2007). This would suggest that, 
during an eyewitness interview, the witness would be more likely to believe that a co-
witness was correct if they had a pre-existing knowledge of their cognitive skills. 
Additionally, if a transactive memory system exists between co-witnesses, this would 
increase the chances of multiple group members accepting the information from the same 
co-witness whilst rejecting information from another (Wegner, 1986; Wegner et al., 1991). 
These explanations are supported by additional research: Thorley (2015) found that co-
witness conformity was dependent on the eyewitness’s ability to gauge the accuracy of their 
co-witness. Hope et al. (2008) also explained that eyewitnesses are likely to spend less time 
evaluating the reliability of a co-witness’s judgement if they find the individual more 
likeable. Consequently, co-witnesses may be less aware of the inaccuracies of their 
acquaintances and therefore more likely to accept their information as reality. 
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The importance of a pre-existing relationship on blame conformity can also be 
attributed to an increased level of normative influence brought on by familiar co-witnesses. 
Walker and Heyns (1962) argued that individuals were more likely to conform to people that 
they self-identified with. This would suggest that the similarity between two individuals may 
mediate the likelihood of conformity between them. Previous research on self-attention 
suggests that this could be due to the individual evoking a matching to standard process, 
where they would interpret the judgement of a similar co-witness as the norm and attempt 
to conform to it (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Mullen, 1983). Co-witnesses with pre-existing 
relationships could be more inclined to share similarities with each other, therefore they 
may be more likely to attempt to match each other’s behaviours.  
Post-hoc tests indicated that the differences in statement similarity between 
participants who discussed the event with strangers and participants who discussed the 
event with familiar-co-witnesses did not reach statistical significance. It is proposed that, 
despite familiar co-witnesses being more inclined to conform to the reports of their peers, a 
discrepancy between some of the co-witnesses meant that participants within the same 
group may have chosen to conform to different co-witnesses; or may have just maintained 
their views that were concordant with another co-witness. 
 
9.5.3. Post-event discussion and eyewitness accuracy 
 
Participants’ individual statements were also compared across all conditions to 
investigate the effect of post-event discussion on blame attribution accuracy. Despite the 
data suggesting that eyewitnesses can be influenced by familiar co-witnesses, there was no 
evidence suggesting that this would result in an increase in false eyewitness statements. 
The distribution between correct and incorrect statements remained relatively constant 
across all conditions (see Table 9.2), with no significant differences found. Findings did, 
however, suggest that eyewitnesses were significantly more likely to be certain after 
discussing the event with familiar co-witnesses. This suggests that eyewitnesses who are 
more uncertain about an event will be significantly more susceptible to being influenced by 
others around them. This proposition is supported by previous research that has identified a 
positive relationship between uncertainty and susceptibility to informational influence 
(Smith et al., 2007; Walther et al., 2002; Zajac & Henderson, 2009). Despite the results 
finding no evidence to suggest that post-event discussions could have a negative effect on 
eyewitness statement accuracy, the results do suggest that eyewitnesses who discuss the 
event with others would be more likely to make a blame attribution, in comparison to those 
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who do not engage in a post-event discussion; and this attribution could be through peer 
influence rather than personal memory— a behaviour that might consequently create 
unreliable courtroom evidence. 
This observation can be explained through drawing on the fundamental principles of 
transactive memory systems and group relations. Individuals will develop interpersonal 
schemas about the knowledge and abilities of their acquaintances relative to themselves 
and others, through the learning of previous interactions (Wegner, 1986; Wegner et al., 
1991). The development of this transactive memory will allow them to identify which person 
would be most likely to be correct (Wegner, 1995). As Table 9.1 indicates, the descriptive 
data from the control groups suggest that there will have been discrepancies between co-
witnesses in all experimental conditions during the post-event discussion. Uncertain 
eyewitnesses who were familiar with their co-witnesses will have been able to draw on their 
previous knowledge to make a confident judgment as to which co-witness would be most 
likely to be correct; whereas eyewitnesses who were not familiar with their co-witnesses will 
not have been able to draw on such resources, thus they will have remained uncertain as to 
who had started the offence. 
 
9.5.4. Limitations and directions for future research 
 
Whilst the present study extends the previous literature by investigating the 
relationship between co-witness familiarity and statement similarity within large eyewitness 
groups, there are a number of limitations which need to be acknowledged and which future 
research should seek to address, in order to understand the relationships between co-
witness familiarity and blame conformity further. 
The results suggest that possible interaction effects may exist between co-witness 
familiarity and post-event discussions; however, only unfamiliar eyewitness groups were 
included in the control condition in the present study. Through incorporating a 2x2 design, 
where both familiarity and group discussion could be manipulated, future research should 
aim to identify if statement similarity is predominately caused by informational influence or 
similarities in the way familiar co-witnesses remember events. 
Further, although a distinct criterion was set for recruiting eyewitness groups with 
pre-existing relationships, the nature of each relationship, as well as duration, was not 
considered in the analyses. Focusing on these variables would allow future research to 
measure the moderating effects relationship characteristics may have on statement 
similarity.  
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The present study incorporated a single blame attribution task to measure statement 
similarity. Although the task was able to accurately simulate the process of eyewitness 
blame attribution, there were only three potential responses, meaning that there was not 
much room for variability in both response accuracy and statement similarity. By including 
additional information from the participants’ memory reports when assessing response 
accuracy and statement similarity, richer data with greater levels of variation could be 
obtained. This would allow the researchers to make more detailed comparisons between 
familiar and unfamiliar co-witnessed during post-event discussions. 
 
9.5.5. Conclusion 
 
In summary; the present findings suggest that co-witnesses with pre-existing 
relationships are at a higher risk of producing similar blame attributions after a co-witness 
discussion, in comparison to unfamiliar co-witnesses. This could have detrimental effects on 
the investigation process if one of the co-witnesses were to relay inaccurate information 
about the event. The following suggestions are made for counteracting such effects: 
Kieckhaefer and Wright (2014) emphasised the importance of police officers identifying 
whether eyewitnesses had discussed the event with others prior to giving their statements. 
The present study supports this proposal; by establishing if any post-event discussion has 
occurred, officers will be able to form a better assessment of the statements given. 
Additionally, in agreement with French et al. (2008) - it is suggested that police officers 
should attempt to identify whether co-witnesses who discussed the event had a pre-existing 
relationship and for this information to be taken into consideration by both investigators and 
those within the judicial system. It must be noted that, although inferred, there is no 
evidence indicating an effective intervention technique for helping eyewitnesses improve 
their source attribution skills when giving an eyewitness statement. Therefore, a more 
practical implication of the present findings, and the next direction for future research to 
take, would be to identify effective intervention techniques in reducing the rate of 
misinformation recall from co-witnesses. 
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Chapter 10:  
Study 4: Perceived Competence and Co-witness 
Influence 
10.1. Introduction 
 
Research indicates that the social characteristics of an information source have an 
effect on how influential they are on co-witnesses (Betz et al., 1996; Forgas & Williams, 
2001). More specifically, it is the way in which the information source is perceived by their 
co-witnesses that affects their level of informational influence (Echterhoff et al., 2005; 
Skagberg & Wright, 2009; Williamson et al., 2013). Blank (2009) argued that informational 
influence heavily revolved around the credibility of the information source. It has been 
suggested that when an individual encounters misinformation from an unfamiliar individual, 
they will often use schema-guided information about the stranger to make stereotypical 
assumptions of them (Carver & Garza, 1984). Individuals automatically activate stereotypes 
when they confront strangers (Devine, 1989); the present study argues that eyewitnesses 
use any available social cues from a co-witness to form a stereotypical judgement of their 
abilities to recall information accurately. The current chapter proposes that this estimation 
may be the primary cause for co-witness conformity amongst strangers.  
 
10.1.1. Perceived competence 
 
Thorley (2015) found that participants were selective on who they chose to conform 
to when attempting to recall an event and attribute blame. Participants were more likely to 
conform to co-witnesses that were perceived as having better memory over co-witnesses 
that they deemed as being more reliable. This suggests that eyewitnesses will be more 
concerned with the competence of their co-witness rather than their reliability, when 
deliberating on whether to accept their information. Such studies suggest that eyewitnesses 
use negative stereotypes to assess the competence of their co-witnesses. Positive 
stereotyping can also be used by eyewitnesses when conforming to misinformation; 
research shows that the voice of an information source can have an effect on how influential 
they are to others through positive stereotyping between the voice of an individual and their 
predicted level competence (Vornik, Sharman, & Garry, 2013). Research suggests that 
people are likely to associate those who are more competent than them as having 
exceptionally high intelligence (Alicke, LoSchiavo, Zerbst, & Zhang, 1997). Based on this, it 
can be suggested that an individual’s intelligence could be used as a more generalisable 
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indicator of competence. In relation to intelligence and eyewitness competence, Brigham 
and Wolfskeil (1983) found that individuals were likely to use the perceived intelligence of 
an eyewitness as an indicator of their competence in presenting an accurate memory report. 
As discussed in Chapter 4.7, the relationship between perceived competence and co-witness 
influence can be attributed to the theoretical model of informational influence, which 
postulates that an individual will be more likely to conform to an information source, if they 
perceived the source to be more likely to be correct than them (French et al., 2011).  
 
10.1.2. Perceived status and authority 
 
Research also suggests that the perceived authority of a co-witness may also have a 
moderating effect on their level of influence over other co-witnesses (Vornick et al., 2003). 
The effects of police officers as misinformation sources have been used as a means of 
measuring the effect of authority and credibility on co-witness influence (e.g. Skagberg & 
Wright; 2009; Stanny & Johnson, 2000; Williamson et al., 2013); due to the majority of the 
general public perceiving police officers as having a significantly high level of authority and 
credibility (Jackson, Bradford, Hough, Myhill, Quintin, & Tyler, 2012). The majority of the 
studies agree that eyewitnesses are significantly more likely to be misled by misinformation 
from a police officer than from an individual with a non-authoritative occupation (such as a 
student, Skagerberg & Wright, 2009; or an electrician, Williamson et al., 2013). However, 
Williamson et al. (2013) found that despite police officers being rated as more credible 
eyewitnesses than non-officers (electricians), there was no significant relationship between 
credibility of the misinformation source and co-witness conformity. Instead, the study found 
that participants were more likely to conform to the recollections of police officer 
confederates, due to perceiving them as having a better memory than their own. Therefore, 
it can be suggested that participants are more inclined to fixate on their co-witness’s 
cognitive abilities in memory retrieval rather than their status when attempting to validate 
their judgement.  
 
10.2. Present study 
 
The present study aimed to examine whether the perceived level of authority and 
intelligence of an eyewitness (confederate) would have an effect on their level of influence 
over their co-witness. Previous research shows that for informational influence to be 
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effective within an eyewitness setting, the targeted individual must consciously believe that 
the source of misinformation is more likely to be correct than them (French et al., 2011). In 
order to make such an assessment, the target actively uses any social cue indicative of their 
co-witness’s ability to make this judgement (Williamson et al., 2013). Multiple research 
studies indicate that intelligence can predict eyewitness accuracy (Dent and Flin, 1992; 
Roebers & Schneider, 2010). Research also shows that the perceived intelligence of an 
eyewitness can be used by others to determine their recall accuracy (Brigham & WolfsKeil, 
1983). These findings would suggest that the perceived intelligence of an information 
source could have an effect on their level of informational influence; however, to date, very 
little research has been carried out to investigate this relationship. Based on the existing 
literature, the study predicted that there would be a significant relationship between the 
perceived intelligence of the misinformation source and co-witness influence (H1).  
With regards to previous research employing police officers as the misinformation 
source; the current study argues that increased conformity rates to confederates is 
primarily due to their perceived cognitive skills and not their perceived level of credibility or 
authority. Consequently, the second hypothesis of the study predicted that an increase in 
the perceived authority of a misinformation source would not have a significant effect on co-
witness influence, after controlling for perceived intelligence (H2). 
To carry out these aims, the present study measured and compared the blame 
conformity rates of participants who had viewed and discussed the criminal event with a 
confederate who was either shown as having a) high intelligence and high authority; b) high 
intelligence and no indication of authority; c) no indication of authority or intelligence; or d) 
the participant was not permitted to discuss the event with the confederate (control). If the 
results indicated a relationship between an indication of high intelligence and blame 
conformity, we could deduce that an eyewitness’s perceived level of intelligence can have a 
significant effect on how influential they are to co-witnesses. In addition, if the results would 
indicate no significant relationship between indications of high of authority and blame 
conformity, we could deduce that perceived intelligence would be a stronger predictor of co-
witness influence.   
Research also shows that post-event discussions can have both positive and negative 
effects on the confidence that eyewitnesses place in their judgments (Semmler et al., 2004; 
Wright & Skagerberg, 2007). Eyewitnesses who choose not to conform to misinformation 
can still lose confidence in their statements which, in turn, could weaken the validity of their 
statements to jurors (Brewer & Burke, 2009). Conversely, research also indicates that 
misinformation can elicit a false sense of overconfidence in eyewitnesses holding a similarly 
false recollection of the event (Goodwin et al., 2013). Therefore, the confidence scores of 
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eyewitness statements were also assessed as an alternative way of measuring for co-
witness influence. Based on the previous empirical chapters’ observations on eyewitness 
confidence being incongruous, no direct hypotheses were made on the relationship between 
the confederate’s characteristics and eyewitness confidence.  
As mentioned previously, the majority of studies measuring the effects of authority 
on co-witness influence used an experimental design where the influence of police officers 
was compared to the influence of individuals with low authority (such as a child, Skagerberg 
& Wright, 2009; or electricians, Williamson et al., 2013). A problem with such a design is 
that both negative and positive stereotyping would be affecting the participants. On one 
hand, participants may be more inclined to conform to police officers because they would 
deem them as having an exceptionally higher than average level of credibility or cognitive 
ability in recalling the event. On the other hand, results could have been due to the 
participants deeming the other confederates (especially children) as having a below-average 
level of credibility or cognitive ability, and consequently being deterred from conforming to 
them. Therefore, within the present study participants were either paired with a confederate 
who was identified as a police officer, a PhD student, both, or a confederate who did not 
disclose their occupation. This design was implemented so that any significant differences in 
co-witness conformity rates between the two conditions could be confidently attributed to 
the co-witness’s increased level of authority and credibility. 
 
10.3. Methodology 
10.3.1. Participants 
 
The study recruited 193 students (94 males; 99 females). The age of the participants 
ranged 18 to 30 (M= 21.63, SD= 2.61). The sampling criterion excluded any post graduate 
students or police officers (past or present) from participating in the study. As a result, 
participants from this study were all relatively younger than participants from the previous 
studies within the thesis. However, as the previous studies within the thesis demonstrated, 
age did not seem to have an influence on participant response— thus the findings of the 
present study should still be generalizable for individuals of a wider age range. Participants 
were awarded course credit for their participation. Preliminary tests were undertaken to 
ensure that no participants had any serious visual impairments that would affect their ability 
to watch the crime footage on a computer screen.  
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10.3.2. Design 
 
In a four-way between-subjects design, participants viewed a closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) footage of a fight breaking out inside of a bar. With the exception of the 
control group, participants would then discuss the event with a confederate before giving an 
individual statement. The independent variable within the study was the amount of 
information provided to the participants about their co-witness (three experimental 
conditions and a control condition). More specifically, the confederate’s occupation and level 
of education was used as an indicator of their level of authority and intelligence, 
respectively.  
 The first condition acted as the control group (N = 83), participants were not given 
permission to discuss the event with their co-witness. The second condition (‘No IQ/No 
Authority’, N = 38) allowed participants to discuss the event with their co-witness, however 
no information about the co-witness’s credentials were provided. The third condition (‘High 
IQ/No Authority’, N = 32) allowed participants to discuss the event with their co-witness. In 
this condition, the experimenter would ask the participants to state their highest level of 
education; the confederate would state that she was a PhD researcher (indicating high 
intelligence). The researcher decided to use education as an accurate indicator of 
intelligence due to research indicating that the two variables are frequently associated with 
each other by individuals (Fouad et al., 2009). The fourth condition (‘High IQ/High 
Authority’, N = 37) allowed participants to discuss the event with their co-witness. In this 
condition, the experimenter would ask the participants to state their highest level of 
education and their occupation; the confederate would state that she was a PhD student 
(indicating high intelligence) and a police officer (indicating high authority). The occupation 
of police officer was used due to the general public’s perceptions of police officers as highly 
authoritative individuals (Garrido et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2012; Williamson et al., 
2013). Due to the researcher’s affiliated institution specialisation in policing research 
(International Research Centre for Investigative Psychology), the prevalence of police 
researchers was common and less likely to be questioned by the student participants. The 
design did not include an experimental condition where the confederate was only presented 
as a police officer. This was to reduce the risk of participants doubting the authenticity of 
the confederate. The study was advertised for University students only, therefore the 
inclusion of a non-student participant who was coincidently a police officer ran the risk of 
arousing suspicion from the participants.  The study only recruited undergraduate students 
and ensured that none of the participants had post-graduate qualifications or any 
experience of working/volunteering for any policing organisations. As a result, participants 
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would be likely to perceive the PhD confederates as being more intelligent than them and 
the police officer confederates as being more authoritative than them (although this could 
not be guaranteed). 
Two dependent variables were observed as measures of co-witness influence. The 
first variable was the false blame attribution rates of the participants (blame conformity). 
There were two potential suspects within the footage, with the confederates being 
instructed to state that the wrong suspect had started the fight. Therefore, a significant 
change in false blame attribution rates between the experimental conditions would suggest 
that there was a significant difference in co-witness influence between the different 
conditions. Participants were also asked to give a confidence score on their judgement, the 
level of confidence for participants who answered both correctly and incorrectly were 
compared between the experimental conditions to identify if the confederate’s 
misinformation would influence the level confidence participants would place in their 
judgement. The participant’s confidence judgements were measured on a five-point Likert 
scale, with five indicating the maximum level of confidence. 
 
10.3.3. Confederates 
 
The study used confederates as a method of exposing the true participants to co-
witness misinformation. The experiments took place in two different locations as a result, 
two volunteers were recruited to act as the confederate. To prevent the individual 
differences of one confederate from having a mediating effect on their level of influence, the 
study recruited two volunteers with similar identities: both were Caucasian females, aged 
23. The researchers were aware that the participant’s respective age and gender may have 
had an effect on their perception of the confederates. Therefore, the analyses of the present 
study controlled for the variables of participant age and gender.  
 
10.3.4. Materials 
 
The closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of a bar fight (described in chapter 
5.2.2) was used as the study’s experimental stimulus. The main point of interest within the 
footage was the indication that the man in the dark green t-shirt had thrown the first punch 
and not the man in the yellow t-shirt. 
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10.3.5. Procedure 
 
Participants took part in the study in pairs of two (one participant and one 
confederate). Due to the ethical considerations of exposing participants to violent footage, 
participants had to be informed that they would be viewing a CCTV footage that contained 
violence, in order to gain consent from them. Details in regards to the aims of the 
experiment were kept to a minimum. 
Depending on the experimental condition, the pairs may have been asked specific 
questions about their background prior to watching the crime footage. In the third condition 
(High IQ/No Authority), participants were asked by the experimenter to verbally state their 
highest level of education. In the fourth condition (High IQ/High Authority), participants 
were asked by the experimenter to verbally state their highest level of education and 
occupation. In these conditions, the confederates were instructed to always state that they 
were a PhD student (for education) and/or that they were a police officer (for occupation). 
The main procedure which is discussed in chapter 5.2.3 was then implemented, with the 
participants watching and discussing the criminal incident with their confederate (with the 
exception of the control group), before being interviewed privately by the investigator.  
 
10.4. Results 
 
The focus of the present study was to determine whether the perceived level of 
authority and intelligence of an eyewitness (confederate) would have an effect on their level 
of influence over their co-witness. The main results are presented in two sections. First, 
evidence for the relationship between the confederate’s characteristics and co-witness 
suggestibility is given through an analysis of eyewitness blame attribution (first dependent 
variable). The second section of the results investigates the relationship between the 
confederate’s characteristics and co-witness suggestibility through analyses of eyewitness 
confidence (second dependent variable). Means and standard deviations for the distribution 
of blame attribution are presented in Table 10.1 and Figure 10.1; and the mean confidence 
scores across all conditions and responses are presented in Table 10.2. The base error rate 
in blame attribution was relatively high with 39.5% of the participants within the control 
group blaming the wrong suspect for starting the altercation (see Table 10.1). The 
researcher purposely used a difficult task for the simulation in order to elicit some level of 
uncertainty amongst the participants. As Table 10.1 indicates, the error rate increased when 
participants were exposed to co-witness misinformation. Within the control condition, the 
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confidence scores in eyewitness statements were relatively similar between correct and 
incorrect judgements (see Table 10.2).  
 
Table 10.1. Distribution of eyewitness responses between conditions (N=193). 
Condition (N) Answer 
 Incorrect Correct  Unsure 
Control (N=86) 39.5% 43% 17.4% 
No IQ/ No Authority (N=38)  44.7% 34.2% 21.1% 
High IQ/ No Authority (N=32) 71.9% 21.9% 6.3% 
High IQ/ High Authority (N=37) 73% 16.2% 10.8% 
 
 
Table 10.2. Mean confidence scores in blame attributions (N=164). 
Condition (N) Incorrect Correct 
 M SD M SD 
Control (N=71) 2.94 .92 2.89 1.21 
No IQ/ No Credibility (N=30) 3.35 1.06 3.38 .96 
High IQ/ No credibility (N=30) 3.43 1.31 2.71 .95 
High IQ/ High Credibility (N=33) 3.19 1.04 3.33 1.37 
Note. Confidence scores for ‘Unsure’ answers were excluded due to not being 
applicable 
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Figure 10.1. Distribution of eyewitness responses between the conditions. 
 
10.4.1. Blame conformity 
 
False blame attribution rates were first analysed to determine whether there was a 
significant difference in co-witness influence between the experimental conditions. A 
Multinomial Logistic Regression was used to analyse predictors for an unordered group 
classification of eyewitness statements, such as participants who produced a correct 
response (dark top), participants who produced an incorrect response (yellow top), and 
participants who stated that they were uncertain about who had started the fight (unsure). 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, 
linearity, and homoscedasticity. Due to the dependent variable consisting of three 
outcomes, two regressions were conducted: one with the incorrect response as the 
reference category (yellow top; misinformation), and one with the correct response (dark 
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top) as the reference category. The main interest of current analysis was focused on the 
relationship between an eyewitness’s characteristics and their influence on co-witness 
statements (3 categories) while controlling the participant’s age and gender. The analysis 
found that the model fit was significant, [χ² (10, N=190) = 27.96, p < .01], indicating that 
both full models predicted significantly better, or more accurately, than the null model. 
 The first column in Table 10.3 has the outcome of ‘correct response’ compared to 
‘incorrect response’ (reference category). The results suggested that the age and gender of 
the participants had no significant effect on their responses. In relation to the experimental 
conditions, the results suggested that participants who were exposed to misinformation 
from a confederate who was either presented as having high intelligence (OR=.23) or high 
intelligence and high authority (OR=.21), compared to participants from the control 
condition, were significantly more likely to report the misinformation (incorrect response). 
The measures of association were large, in accordance to Cohen (1988). The effect sizes, 
calculated using Cohen’s d, were -.81 and -.86, respectively. The results suggested that 
there were no significant differences in blame attribution responses between participants 
from the control condition and participants who were exposed to the misinformation from a 
confederate with no indication of intelligence or authority. 
The second column in Table 10.3 has the outcome of ‘unsure’ compared to ‘incorrect 
response’ (reference category). Statistical analysis indicated that the age and gender of the 
participants had no significant effect on their responses. In relation to the experimental 
conditions, the results suggested that participants who were exposed to misinformation 
from a confederate who was presented as having high intelligence (OR=.19), compared to 
participants from the control condition, were significantly more likely to report the 
misinformation (incorrect response). The measure of association was large, in accordance to 
Cohen (1988). The effect size, calculated using Cohen’s d, was -.92. The results suggested 
that there were no significant differences in blame attribution responses between 
participants from the control condition and participants from the remaining conditions. 
The third column in Table 10.3 has the outcome ‘unsure’ compared to ‘correct 
response’ (reference category). The results suggested that the age and gender of the 
participants had no significant effect on their responses. Similarly, the results also indicated 
that the group condition was not a significant predictor for the direction of the participants’ 
responses. 
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Table 10.3. Multinomial logistic regression predicting eyewitness blame attribution 
 Correct responsea (N=63)                                                                                Unsurea (N=29) Unsureb (N=29)
Variable OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE OR (95% CI) SE 
Age .99 (.87/1.13) .07 1.16 (.99/1.35) .08 1.17(.99/1.38) .08 
Gender           
    Male 1.07 (.55/2.08) .34 1.91 (.79/4.6) .45  1.79 (.72/4.45) .47  
    Female 1   1  1  
Confederate’s characteristics 
 
          
    Control 1  1  1  
    No IQ/No credibility  .8 (.34/1.84) .44 1.27 (.44/3.7) .55 1.59 (.54/4.69) .55 
    High IQ/High credibility .21 (.08/.56)** .51 .3 (.09/1.05) .64 1.49 (.36/6.17) .73 
    High IQ/no credibility .23 (.08/.64)** .52  .19 (.04/.94)*  .81 .83 (.15/4.65) .88  
Note. a= Reference group: ‘incorrect response’ (N=101); b= Reference group: ‘correct response’ 
(N=63). OR= Odds Ratio.  SE = Standard Error. 95% CI = Confidence Interval. * p<.05. ** p<0.01. 
 
The distribution of correct, incorrect, and unsure responses was then compared 
between participants who were exposed to misinformation from a confederate with high 
intelligence and high credibility and participants who were exposed to misinformation from a 
confederate with high intelligence only, to determine whether there was a significant 
difference in co-witness influence between the two conditions. The analysis was subjected to 
a 2 X 3 chi-square test of independence. The analysis found no significant differences in 
blame attribution between the two conditions, [χ2 (2, N = 69) = .48, p >.05]. 
 
10.4.2. Confidence 
 
For the second part of the results, the confidence judgements of participants who 
answered correctly and incorrectly were analysed to determine whether exposure to co-
witness misinformation influenced the level of confidence that participants placed in their 
responses. Moreover, the researchers wanted to determine whether the relationship 
between co-witness misinformation and eyewitness confidence could be predicted by the 
perceived intelligence and authority of the confederate.  
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10.4.2.1. Eyewitness confidence in correct responses 
 
Hierarchical multiple regression was performed to investigate the ability of a co-
witness’s perceived level of intelligence and authority (group condition) to predict the 
confidence ratings of participants who gave correct statements (rejected misinformation), 
after controlling for participant age and gender. Preliminary analyses were conducted to 
ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. 
In the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, two predictors were entered: age 
and gender. This model was not statistically significant [F (2, 60) = 1.51; p > .05] and 
explained 4.8% of variance in eyewitness confidence (see Table 10.4). After entry of the 
confederate’s characteristics (group condition) at Step 2, the total variance explained by the 
model as a whole was 7.2% [F (3, 59) = 1.54; p > .05]. The introduction of confederate’s 
characteristics explained an additional 2.4% of variance in eyewitness confidence, after 
controlling for participant age and gender [R2 Change = .02; F (1, 59) = 1.56; p > .05]. In 
the final adjusted model, none of the predictor variables were statistically significant. 
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Table 10.4. Hierarchical Regression Model of confidence in correct statements. 
 R R2 R2 
Change 
B SE β t 
Step 1 .22  .05      
Age      -.06  .05 -.15 -1.14 
Gender     -.4 .27 -.18 -1.45 
         
Step 2 .27  .07 .02     
Age     -.06 .05 -.15 -1.18 
Gender     -.47 .28 -.22 -1.68 
Confederate’s 
characteristics 
    -.16 .13 -.16 -1.25 
Note. No statistical significance measured between variables. 
 
10.4.2.2. Eyewitness confidence in incorrect responses 
 
Hierarchical multiple regression was performed to investigate the ability of a co-
witness’s perceived level of intelligence and authority (group condition) to predict the 
confidence ratings of participants who gave incorrect statements (as suggested by the 
confederate), after controlling for participant age and gender. Preliminary analyses were 
conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity. 
 In the first step of hierarchical multiple regression, two predictors were entered: age 
and gender. This model was not statistically significant [F (2, 98) = 1.64; p > .05] and 
explained 3.2% of variance in eyewitness overconfidence (see Table 10.5). After entry of 
the confederate’s characteristics (group condition) at Step 2, the total variance explained by 
the model as a whole was 5.7% [F (3, 97) = 1.95; p > .05]. The introduction of 
confederate’s characteristics explained an additional 2.4% of variance in eyewitness 
overconfidence, after controlling for participant age and gender [R2 Change = .02; F (1, 97) 
= 2.52; p > .05]. In the final adjusted model, none of the predictor variables were 
statistically significant. 
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Table 10.5. Hierarchical Regression Model of eyewitness confidence in incorrect 
statements. 
 R R2 R2 
Change 
B SE β t 
 
Step 1 
 
.18 
  
.03 
 
 
    
Age      -.04  .05 -.1 -.95 
Gender     -.3 .22 -.14 -1.36 
         
Step 2 .24  .06 .02     
Age     -.05 .05 -.11 -1.13 
Gender     -.26 .22 -.12 -1.19 
Confederate’s 
characteristics 
    -.15 .09 -.16 -1.59 
Note. No statistical significance measured between variables. 
 
10.5. Discussion 
 
Much of the existing literature has argued that exposure to post-event 
misinformation can influence the recollections and consequent statements of eyewitnesses 
(Gabbert et al., 2004; Garry et al., 2008; Granhag, Memon, Gabbert, & Allwood, 2004; 
Carlucci et al., 2010; Paterson & Kemp, 2006; Wright et al., 2005). The present findings 
lend further support to this notion, participants who were exposed to misinformation from a 
co-witness were more likely to make the same erroneous judgement when recalling the 
event and giving their statements about who had thrown the first hit.  
An immediate inference that can be made from such an observation is that the 
occurrence of blame conformity is possible, where post-event discussions occur. More 
specifically, the results suggest that some participants may choose to adopt the 
recollections of others over the information retrieved from their own recall memory, if they 
deem the individual to be competent enough. Further implications of the findings would 
suggest that false convictions could therefore occur if investigators are unable to 
differentiate information that eyewitnesses observed, from information that they were 
exposed to post-event. As a result, it is common practice within most policing organizations 
for officers to separate eyewitnesses prior to recording their statements (Paterson & Kemp, 
2006), however such interventions cannot always be successfully implicated.   
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10.5.1. Intelligence and co-witness influence 
 
The current study aimed to determine whether the perceived level of authority and 
intelligence of an eyewitness (confederate) had an effect on their level of influence over 
their co-witness. The first hypothesis predicted that there would be a significant relationship 
between the perceived intelligence of the misinformation source and co-witness influence 
(H1). For this observation, the researcher compared the responses of the participants from 
the control condition (no group discussion), with the responses of the participants from the 
other three experimental conditions. The findings suggested that participants were 
significantly more likely to conform to the misinformation, if their co-witness was identified 
as a PhD student; however, exposure to co-witness misinformation from a confederate with 
no indication of intelligence did not seem to have any effect on the participants’ responses. 
The findings supported the first hypothesis. The findings suggest that eyewitnesses are 
more likely to conform to the recollections of co-witnesses who they perceive as being more 
intelligent. The findings also suggest that eyewitnesses would make stereotypical judgments 
about the accuracy of their co-witnesses based on any knowledge they have on them. More 
importantly, the results suggest that eyewitnesses will act on these judgements and 
conform to the co-witnesses, if they perceive them as having a greater level of intelligence. 
With previous research indicating that eyewitnesses are more likely to conform to co-
witnesses that they deem to have accurate memory (Williamson et al., 2013), it is 
suggested that the present study’s participants will have used the intelligence of their co-
witnesses as a predictor of their ability to interpret and recall the witnessed event 
accurately. These findings are supported by numerous past studies which have also yielded 
results suggesting that eyewitnesses will make stereotypical assessments about the 
accuracy of their co-witnesses and, in turn, act on these judgments by conforming to them 
(see Kwong See et al., 2001; Thorley, 2015). Thorley (2015) found that eyewitnesses were 
significantly less likely to conform to misinformation from an elderly co-witness than 
compared to a younger adult co-witness. The researcher attributed the difference to 
participants making negative assessments about the elderly co-witness’s recall memory 
based on their age. The present study argues that as well as negative assessments, 
eyewitnesses can also make positive stereotypical judgements about their co-witness’s 
abilities. Although general intelligence, or - more specifically - an individual’s level of 
education, is not a direct measure of memory recall accuracy, the present findings suggest 
that eyewitnesses can use any schema-guided information about their co-witness’s 
intelligence as a means for gauging their ability to attribute blame correctly. 
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Social-psychological theories on eyewitness behaviour indicate that for an eyewitness 
to conform to the informational influence of co-witness, they must perceive their co-witness 
as being more likely to be correct than themselves (French et al., 2011; Williamson et al., 
2013). Therefore, the present chapter argues that the effects of the information source’s 
perceived intelligence on their level of influence is relative to the perceived self-intelligence 
of the target eyewitness. Subsequently, the relativity of such assessments offers an 
explanation as to why many individuals will choose to refrain from conforming to 
misinformation, even when presented by someone with a high level of intelligence.  
 
10.5.2. Authority versus intelligence 
 
Previous research had demonstrated that participants were more likely to conform to 
the memory reports of police officers, in comparison to co-witnesses with non-authoritative 
occupations (Skagerberg & Wright, 2009; Williamson et al., 2013). Some theories attributed 
this effect to a police officer’s heightened level of authority and credibility, inducing greater 
levels of normative and informational influence (respectively) (Echterhoff et al., 2005; 
Hoffman et al., 2001; Kwong See et al., 1987). However, more recently, Williamson et al., 
(2013) produced evidence suggesting that it was the heightened level of perceived 
competence that increased a police officer’s informational influence on co-witnesses. The 
present study argued and demonstrated that perceived competence (demonstrated through 
perceived intelligence) did, in fact, have an effect on co-witness influence. 
Based on the assertions made by Willimason et al. (2013), the second hypothesis of 
the study predicted that an increase in the perceived authority of a misinformation source 
would not have a significant effect on co-witness influence, after controlling for perceived 
intelligence (H2). To investigate for this effect, the researchers compared the prevalence 
rates of false eyewitness statements between participants who were exposed to 
misinformation from a co-witness with high intelligence and authority, and participants who 
were exposed to misinformation from a co-witness with high intelligence but no indication of 
authority. The results indicated that there were no significant differences in false eyewitness 
statements between co-witnesses who were only presented as having high intelligence and 
co-witnesses who were presented as having high intelligence and credibility, supporting the 
second hypothesis. The findings also suggested that the authority of a co-witness had no 
additional effect on influencing the participants’ statements. 
As discussed earlier; the authority of the police officer may not have had an 
increased their influence due to the participants being interviewed privately. It was 
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suggested that individuals would be more likely to conform to police officers through their 
compliance and obedience to someone of higher authority. However; with the police officer 
confederate not being aware of the participant’s final response, the participants may have 
felt less pressure to conform to the confederate’s erroneous blame attribution. 
With regards to the credibility of the police officer; one suggestion that can be drawn 
from this observation is that eyewitnesses may only be concerned with the intelligence of 
their co-witness when assessing their judgement. The findings do not necessarily imply that 
the perceived competence of an information source does not have any effect on their level 
of influence. Instead, the results suggest that - to an eyewitness - the intelligence of a co-
witness acts as a greater predictor for the validity of their statements than their credibility. 
Such implications are supported by previous research; Williamson et al. (2013) found that 
participants were significantly more likely to conform to co-witnesses who they perceived as 
having a more accurate memory relative to themselves, yet the heightened credibility of the 
police co-witness had no effect on influencing the participants. Through these studies it can 
be inferred that eyewitnesses are more likely to agree with competent co-witnesses than 
reliable co-witnesses. This inference is further supported by Thorley (2015), who found that 
despite perceiving elderly eyewitnesses as being more reliable, participants were more likely 
to conform to younger co-witnesses, due to perceiving them as having more accurate 
memory.  
The insignificance of source credibility on co-witness influence can be a result of pre-
existing truth biases held by the participants in laboratory experiments. Research on the 
detection of deception suggests that when assessing the credibility of an individual’s 
statement, people will be biased towards believing that the individual is telling the truth 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Van Swol & Braun, 2015; Vrij, 2008). Additionally, Bond and 
DePaulo (2006) argued that misinformation given in laboratory experiments have little 
consequences. As a result, the individuals stating these fabrications will show very little 
indications of deception and will subsequently be less likely to have their integrity 
questioned. Therefore, in such settings, an increased level of credibility would not have any 
additional effect on influencing participants when they have no reason to doubt the honesty 
of their co-witnesses in the first place. It can be argued that in a more realistic eyewitness 
setting where some witnesses may have a plausible reason for exposing their co-witnesses 
to misinformation (such as to defend the suspect, whom they may be acquainted with), 
eyewitnesses will have more reason to question the credibility of their co-witnesses. In such 
circumstances, the credibility of an information source may have a significant effect on their 
level of influence on co-witnesses. Emulating this form of eyewitness deception in an 
experiment would be difficult; however, Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) found that individuals 
 207 
 
were more likely to question the truthfulness of an eyewitness if they believed that witness 
had a motive to lie. The findings therefore suggest that despite the present study indicating 
that intelligence is a stronger predictor for co-witness influence than credibility, the 
credibility of a co-witness may still have a significant effect in circumstances where 
eyewitnesses have a legitimate reason to doubt the integrity of their co-witnesses. It must 
be acknowledged that although the present study considers and discusses the potential 
relationship between source credibility and co-witness influence, the present study was not 
able to reliably determine whether source credibility had any effect on the confederate’s 
level of influence. This is because the variable was not directly measured. Moreover, 
although a police officer can be considered by most as having a high level of credibility, one 
can argue that a PhD student could also be perceived as being highly credible by most 
individuals. 
 
10.5.3. Co-witness influence on confidence 
 
Despite the results suggesting that misinformation from a co-witness was able to 
influence participants into changing their statements, further tests on confidence judgments 
indicated that the same exposure of misinformation did not have any effects on the 
confidence of participants who gave correct statements. Additionally, participants who gave 
incorrect statements did not seem to gain confidence after receiving confirmation from their 
confederate. These findings differ from existing research that indicates that eyewitness 
confidence can be influenced through co-witness discussions (Foster et al., 2012; Gabbert 
et al., 2003; Mudd & Govern, 2004). A key difference between the present study and the 
majority of previous research within the general literature of co-witness influence was that 
the current study purposely used a far more ambiguous task, with only 43% of the control 
group identifying the correct offender for starting the offence (see Table 10.1). The results 
from the control condition also indicate that only 17.4% of the participants were unable to 
blame one of the suspects for committing the crime. The researchers suggest that the 
ambiguity of the task will have distorted the participant’s ability to assess how confident 
they were in their judgement. Further, it was suggested that the use of a five-point Likert 
scale will have allowed the majority of participants to give a confidence score of three as a 
safer answer to indicate their uncertainty towards how confident they felt. This can be seen 
in Table 10.2, where the mean confidence scores within all conditions ranges from 2.71 to 
3.43. Therefore, the confidence scores given by participants within the present study may 
not have been accurate representations of their true beliefs in their judgments. A direction 
 208 
 
for future research will be to use an evenly distributed Likert scale (i.e. one to six) in order 
to influence participants into giving a clearer indication of their confidence. 
 
 
 
10.5.4. Limitations and directions for future research 
 
While the study represents a step forward towards understanding the cognitive 
thought processes behind co-witness conformity, it still bears several limitations that should 
be addressed by future research. The present study found that participants were more likely 
to conform to co-witnesses who were perceived as having a high level of intelligence. This 
was attributed to the participants believing that the co-witness was more likely to be correct 
than themselves. However, the participants’ perceptions of their own intelligence were 
ignored in the analysis. A fruitful direction for future research would be to measure the 
perceived intelligence of the information source relative to that of the participants; by doing 
so, subsequent analysis will allow researchers to gain a more accurate indication of the 
effects co-witness intelligence has on co-witness influence.  
A second limitation of the study was the way in which co-witness intelligence and 
authority was represented. Although existing research suggests that the indicators 
(education and occupation) used to manipulate these variables will have been moderately 
accurate (Garrido et al., 2004; Williamson et al., 2013), individual differences in the 
participants’ attitudes towards these characteristics may have influenced their perceptions 
of the co-witness’s level of intelligence and credibility. It could be argued that many 
participants may have perceived a PhD student as also having a high level of authority. 
Future research can measure the accuracy of these indicators by asking participants to rate 
the intelligence and authority of their co-witnesses after the experiment. However, a 
counter-argument for this intervention is that the participants’ perceptions of their co-
witnesses might consequently be affected after being exposed to false information by them. 
Finally, the study did not include a condition where the confederate was ostensibly 
just a police officer. This condition would have allowed the researchers to determine 
whether the effects of high authority would have a greater impact on co-witness influence 
than high intelligence. Although the findings suggest that increased authority had no 
additional impact on co-witness influence, it cannot be definitively concluded that this 
suggests that intelligence was more influential than authority. In addition, it could be 
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argued that the participants may have deemed the PhD confederate as having a higher level 
of authority due to having a higher status on the academic hierarchy. This would have 
meant that the both factors (authority and intelligence) will not have been compared in a 
fair and controlled design. 
 
 
 
10.5.5. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this study aimed to determine whether eyewitnesses would use available 
information about their co-witnesses to gauge the validity of their statements. The findings 
indicated that participants' own recollection were more easily influenced by co-witnesses 
who were perceived as being highly intelligent due to higher pressures of informational 
influence. The credibility or authority of the information source, however, did not have any 
additional influence on eyewitnesses’ judgements. This may be due to the laboratory-based 
design of the experiment, as participants did not have any reason to question the integrity 
of their co-witnesses and, thus, an increased level of credibility would not be likely to have a 
significant effect on participants. However, in circumstances where a co-witness would have 
a reason to confabulate information, the credibility of an information source may have a 
greater influence on others.  
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Chapter 11:  
General Discussion 
11.1. Introduction 
 
The present thesis developed a novel experimental paradigm that would allow the 
effects of co-witness discussions on blame attributions of individual eyewitnesses to be 
observed. This was done through using an ecologically-valid procedure that simulated the 
process of witnessing a crime and the subsequent act of engaging in a post-event discussion 
with other co-witnesses (participants). Across all four studies, participants were placed into 
different sized groups ranging from one (control) to six individuals, depending on the 
experimental condition. The groups of participants were then presented with a video footage 
of a fight breaking out between two customers within a bar, the video showed a man in a 
dark green t-shirt initiate the fight by attacking another man in a yellow t-shirt. Through the 
use of confederates, disguised as participants, the studies were able to present the true 
participants with misinformation about the incident. To be specific, the confederates were 
instructed to suggest that the man in the yellow t-shirt had initiated the fight by attacking 
the man in the dark green t-shirt first. Afterwards, the participants were individually 
interviewed in a private room and were asked to determine and recall who they believed 
had started the fight and were also asked to provide a confidence rating (with the exception 
of study 3, where no confidence rating was recorded). By comparing the rates of false 
blame attribution between the experimental conditions and the control group (acting as the 
base rate of blame attribution accuracy), the studies could determine whether the post-
event discussions with the misleading co-witnesses (confederates) had influenced the 
participants’ blame attributions; allowing the research to establish a measure of blame 
conformity. The paradigm enabled the creation of an artificial environment that resembled 
two real-life situations that could occur after a criminal incident. Firstly, the procedure 
simulated the process of a post-event discussion occurring between co-witnesses. Secondly, 
the procedure simulated a scenario where eyewitnesses could encounter false information 
from one (or more) of their co-witnesses. 
 
The procedure had similarities with the experimental ‘social contagion of memory’ 
paradigm of Roediger et al. (2001), in that both studies used confederates disguised as 
participants to present the true participants with misleading information during a post-event 
discussion. However, the present procedure differed from the latter in three ways. Firstly, 
the social contagion of memory paradigm used still pictures of household scenes (e.g. a 
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kitchen or a bathroom) as the visual stimuli. Roediger and colleagues (2001) were 
concerned with observing the process of general memory conformity and were not 
interested in its applied applications to crime eyewitnesses; therefore, their choices of visual 
stimuli were justifiably suitable for the nature of their study. However, the present study 
wanted to emulate the process of witnessing a crime in the most ecologically-valid manner. 
Therefore, the choice of stimulus was changed from still images of household scenes to a 
footage of a real crime. Secondly, Roediger and colleagues observed the effects of group 
discussions on participant pairs only, whereas the present work observed the effects of co-
witness discussion on various group sizes, to allow for more generalizable data to be 
produced. Finally, Roediger and colleagues observed the effects of group discussions on 
general memory conformity using tasks that involved recalling items from a scene, whereas 
the present study looked more specifically at whether a co-witness discussion could evoke 
blame conformity. Blame conformity is a sub-form of memory conformity, where an 
individual conforms to the blame attribution of another individual (Thorley, 2015). This task 
would test the participants abilities in both memory recall as well as their ability to attribute 
blame based on the information recalled. The present thesis argued that this form of 
memory conformity could be more specifically linked to false convictions and, thus, it should 
be studied directly. Although both processes deal with an individual’s tendency to conform 
to the memory report of someone else, it was the contention of the present thesis that 
blame conformity would be a far more cognitively facilitated process than general memory 
conformity. Overall, the experiments conducted throughout the present work were used as 
an improvement and development from the previous paradigms incorporated by previous 
studies on co-witness influence (reviewed in Chapter 3). Moreover, the procedures used 
within the present study enabled the salient factors that could influence an eyewitness’s 
susceptibility to co-witness influence when attempting to attribute blame to be determined. 
The main findings of the empirical studies from the present thesis will be summarised 
below, and subsequently discussed in regard to their theoretical and practical implications. 
 
11.2. Summary of main findings 
 
All four studies were able to consistently demonstrate that a proportion of the 
participants who engaged in a post-event discussion with their co-witnesses were 
susceptible to blame conformity. More specifically, the studies demonstrated that the 
erroneous judgement of one co-witness could influence the judgement of another, and this 
would subsequently lead to many participants blaming the wrong person for the incident. 
However, one thing that was apparent was that the co-witness discussions only had a 
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significant effect on co-witness influence under certain conditions. In addition, it was 
demonstrated that some participants would be more susceptible to co-witness influence 
than others. The findings of the present study with regards to these internal and external 
factors are discussed below. 
The results indicated that both male and female participants were equally as likely to 
be influenced by misleading co-witnesses. Despite some research suggesting that females 
would possess greater abilities in memory recall (e.g. Megreya et al., 2011; Rehnman & 
Herlitz, 2007; Seidlitz & Diener, 1998; Smith, 1966; Washlin et al., 1993), the present 
findings suggest that these superiorities did not transfer onto reducing their susceptibility 
co-witness influence. Similarly, despite the vast majority of literature on age and memory 
suggesting that elderly individuals would possess poorer memory recall abilities, relative to 
younger individuals (Adam-Prince, 1989; Dodson et al., 2007; Memon et al., 2003; 
O’Rourke, et al., 1989; Searcy et al., 1999), the present thesis found no significant 
differences in susceptibility to blame conformity and age. As previously contended by 
Gabbert et al. (2003) and Gabbert (2004), the results indicate that an individual’s 
susceptibility to blame conformity does not seem to bear a simple relationship to memory 
recall accuracy (i.e. individuals with poorer memory being more susceptible to having their 
memory reports influenced). Instead, the absence of such a relationship would suggest that 
co-witness influence would therefore, be influenced by factors other than the quality the 
eyewitness’s memory recall pathway. Therefore it could be suggested that blame conformity 
is a process that is more likely to be a product of social and behavioural processes rather 
than processes relating to memory recall pathways. Interestingly, when looking at the 
participants who had produced a false blame attribution after encountering misleading co-
witness information, the results found a weak, but nonetheless, significant relationship 
between the eyewitness’s gender and their level of confidence. The findings suggested that 
male eyewitnesses were significantly more likely to gain a false sense of confidence in their 
erroneous judgement, after encountering confirmatory information from a co-witness. There 
were no observed age or gender related differences in the confidence of participants who 
refrained from conforming to their co-witness’s misleading information. 
Despite the results suggesting that the age and gender of the participants had no 
effect on their susceptibility to blame conformity, the second study was able to identify a 
different internal factor that did seem to accurately predict the suggestibility of an individual 
to co-witness misinformation: their personality traits. More specifically; using the FIRO-B 
assessment, the second study identified a significant relationship between wanted control 
and susceptibility to co-witness influence. Individuals who scored higher on the wanted 
control score were significantly more likely to blame the innocent suspect, after 
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encountering similar misinformation from the confederates. Although the observed effect 
size was relatively small (d=-.06), the results still indicated that a distinct significant 
relationship existed between an individual’s level of wanted control and their susceptibility 
to blame conformity (N.B. wanted control refers to an individual’s need to have their actions 
controlled by others, rather than control the actions of others). The results also identified a 
significant a negative relationship between wanted control scores and eyewitness confidence 
in both participants who made incorrect (r=-.24) and correct (r=-.36) responses, after a 
post-event discussion. The results suggested that eyewitnesses with high levels of wanted 
control were more likely to lose confidence in their blame attribution after discussing the 
event with their co-witnesses. Due to the results indicating that both incorrect and correct 
participants were likely to lose confidence, it is suggested that the individuals with high 
levels of wanted control will have been likely to be influenced more by disconfirmatory 
feedback rather than confirmatory feedback. Potential explanations for this behaviour is 
discussed below in the general discussion of the results (chapter 11.3). None of the other 
FIRO-B scales were able to accurately predict co-witness suggestibility. Although a small 
relationship was observed between expressed inclusion scores and correct blame 
attributions (relative to unsure responses), this is suggested to have been a statistical 
artefact, due to the relationship not being consistently observed as well as a very weak 
effect size (d=-.09). 
As well as internal predictors of co-witness suggestibility, multiple external factors 
that could reliably predict a targeted individual’s susceptibility to co-witness influence were 
also identified. The fourth empirical study compared the group similarity scores in blame 
attribution between participant groups (of five) who either discussed the event with 
participants that they shared a pre-existing relationship with; participants who they were 
unfamiliar with; or they were grouped with unfamiliar participants and were prohibited from 
discussing the event (control condition). The findings indicated that the participants within 
each group were more likely to produce similar statements (with regards to blame 
attribution) if they shared a pre-existing relationship with one another. Conversely, the 
study found no significant differences in the level of similarity in blame attributions between 
groups of unfamiliar co-witnesses who engaged in a post-event discussion and participants 
from the control condition. The findings suggest that the groups of co-witnesses who would 
initially hold contradicting views to one another would only be likely to come to a unanimous 
consensus, if the co-witnesses shared pre-existing relationships with each other. The third 
study also inspected the accuracy of the individual participant’s blame attributions within 
the three conditions to determine whether a co-witness discussion would have a negative or 
positive impact (if any at all) on the accuracy of the participant’s blame attributions, when 
no misinformation was deliberately planted in the group. The findings indicated that there 
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were no proportionate changes in incorrect or correct responses between the experimental 
conditions, suggesting that a co-witness discussion with strangers or familiar individuals did 
not seem to have any effects on the accuracy of their blame attributions. The study did, 
however, find that the number of uncertain responses was significantly lower when the 
participants discussed the event with familiar co-witnesses, with higher rates of correct and 
incorrect responses. This suggested that uncertain individuals would be the most 
susceptible to co-witness influence, an observation that lies in agreement with previous 
research on co-witness influence (e.g. Zajac and Henderson, 2009), and with the general 
theoretical construct of informational influence (Suls and Wheeler, 2000). 
Although the findings from the third study indicated that familiar eyewitness groups 
were more likely to produce similar answers in comparison to unfamiliar co-witness groups, 
this was not to say that eyewitnesses could not be influenced by unfamiliar co-witnesses. 
Conversely, there was evidence suggesting that eyewitnesses could still be influenced by an 
unfamiliar co-witness if they perceived them as being likely to be accurate (Kwong See, 
Hohhman and Wood, 2001; Thorley, 2015). To demonstrate this, the fourth study observed 
the effects of co-witness discussions on eyewitness pairs. Depending on the experimental 
condition (4 independent conditions) participants were either paired with a confederate who 
was presented as being highly intelligent (PhD student), a confederate who was presented 
as being highly intelligent and authoritative (PhD student and police officer), a confederate 
with no indication of intelligence or authority level, or the participants completed the study 
individually (control). After discussing the witnessed incident with their assigned 
confederate, the results indicated that participants who were either introduced as being 
intelligent or intelligent and authoritative were significantly more likely to influence the 
participant’s blame attribution when compared to the confederates with no indication of 
education or authority level. The results found that there were no significant differences in 
blame conformity rates between the participants who were exposed to a confederate with 
high intelligence and authority and participants who were exposed to a confederate with 
only high intelligence. The results suggested that the perceived intelligence of the 
participant had a greater mediating effect on co-witness influence than their perceived 
authority or credibility. The study failed to find any significant relationships between the 
perceived intelligence or authority of the confederate and their impact on the participant’s 
confidence. 
The majority of research studies on co-witness influence had observed the behaviour 
on eyewitness pairs (e.g. Gabbert et al., 2003; French et al., 2008; Hope et al., 2008; 
Kieckhaefer and Wright, 2014). It was suggested that observations on co-witness influence 
through traditional two-person paradigms would provide an unrealistic estimation of the 
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true risks of co-witness influence within real criminal investigations. This was due to the 
literature indicating that there would often be more than two eyewitnesses present during a 
criminal event (Paterson and Kemp, 2006a). Therefore, study 1b (Chapter 7) investigated 
the effects of both misinformation size and unanimity of misinformation, in order to 
determine whether the effects of co-witness influence were applicable to different real-life 
scenarios involving various group sizes. The results indicated that misinformation from an 
individual confederate did not seem to influence the blame attributions of the participants. 
This partly lay in agreement with the findings from study 4 (mentioned above), where the 
results indicated that a single confederate would not have a significant influence over the 
participant, unless presented as being highly intelligent or authoritative. The findings 
suggest that an individual misinformation source would not have a significant effect on the 
co-witnesses, due to the participants having no reason to believe that the confederate was 
accurate. However, the study did find that blame conformity was prevalent when 
participants were presented with misinformation from a group of unanimous confederates. 
With regards to misinformation size; the results suggested that there was a significant 
increase in false blame attribution rates when the confederate size was increased from two 
to five (see Tables 8.3 and 8.5). However, the effect size of this increase was weak (φc = 
.19), suggesting that the unanimity of misinformation was a greater mediator of blame 
conformity than the misinformation size. As Figure 9.1 illustrates, the greatest increase in 
false blame attribution rate was evoked with the addition of the second confederate, 
suggesting that creation of a majority group would have the biggest impact on co-witness 
influence. In regard to eyewitness confidence (after a post-event discussion), the results 
found no significant relationships between either of the independent variables 
(misinformation size and unanimity of misinformation) and eyewitness confidence. 
 
11.3. Discussion of main findings 
 
Blame conformity is a form of memory conformity which refers to a psychological 
process where an eyewitness is influenced by another co-witness when attempting to 
determine which person from the incident is to blame (Thorley & Rushton-Woods, 2013). Up 
until recently, the majority of memory conformity studies had only observed the effects of 
co-witness influence on an eyewitness’s ability to report items that they remembered seeing 
(e.g. Carlucci et al., 2010; Davis & Meade, 2013; Roediger et al., 2001; Wright et al., 
2000). Although some studies on memory conformity may have included a question 
regarding blame attribution, the majority of the questions asked regarded the 
characteristics of insignificant items from an event. Such studies were able to demonstrate 
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how eyewitnesses could be influenced into erroneously reporting seeing unseen items which 
could consequently lead to investigators receiving misleading details such as the number of 
accomplices - as found in the Oklahoma bombing incident (Wright et al., 2000), or the 
characteristics of a witnessed suspect -  as evident in Anna Lindh’s murder investigation 
(Granhag et al., 2005). However, in relation to miscarriages of justice; such occurrences 
would not be directly linked with the false conviction of an innocent bystander. It can be 
argued that false information provided by witnesses about a suspect’s characteristics could 
consequently contribute to the false imprisonment of an individual; however, this inference 
does not explain how a group of eyewitnesses could misinterpret how an incident unfolded 
and mistakenly blame a bystander who was present during an incident for committing the 
crime.  
Thorley (2015) studied the effects of co-witness influence on an individual’s blame 
attribution, directly. Although the study did not observe the effects of co-witness influence 
through a co-witness discussion (participants were presented with a previous a participant’s 
statement, instead), the study was able to demonstrate that participants could be 
influenced by a co-witness into blaming an innocent bystander who had been present during 
the incident, but had not committed the crime. Although research had observed the effects 
of co-witness on an eyewitness’s blame attribution, very little research had attempted to 
investigate the moderating factors that could increase or decrease an individual’s 
susceptibility to blame conformity. A large body of previous research had identified 
numerous moderating factors in relation to general memory conformity. However, there 
were many discrepancies between previous research studies. Furthermore, it was argued 
that, unlike a standard memory recall task, the process of attributing blame is significantly 
more cognitively demanding. Moreover, it is a decision-making process that not only 
requires the witness to recall the event, but also requires them to interpret the information 
correctly in order to deliberate which potential suspect is at guilt.  Due to the heuristic 
nature of blame attribution, it was suggested that the internal and external predictors of 
general memory conformity may not share the same relationship with blame conformity. 
For that reason, a central focus of the thesis was to determine whether the same 
relationship between co-witness discussions and general memory conformity would be 
present with blame conformity. 
Comparisons between the present findings and the previous research on memory 
conformity indicated that blame conformity and memory conformity shared similarities in 
the way that they were moderated by internal and external factors. Both forms of co-
witness influence could be predicted through the personality traits of the targeted 
eyewitnesses, both seemed to be more effective when the misinformation was presented 
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unanimously, and the present findings seemed to lie in agreement with the pre-existing 
literature in demonstrating that similar characteristics of the misleading co-witness would 
impact how influential they were. 
 
11.3.1. Are the effects of co-witness discussions necessarily 
negative? 
 
Despite the results indicating that eyewitnesses were susceptible to incorporating 
their co-witness’s false information, these observations were only observed when 
participants were deliberately presented with erroneous co-witness information. Roediger et 
al. (2001) described such observations as being ‘one-sided’, due to only emphasizing on the 
negative effects of social influence. In reality, misinformation is not always presented during 
a co-witness discussion. Therefore, the effects of co-witness discussions on the blame 
attributions of participants when no confederates were present were also observed. The 
results indicated that participants were still susceptible to blame conformity; however, there 
was no evidence suggesting that this lead to a significant increase in false blame 
attributions. The results indicated that among the participants who had engaged in post-
event discussions (when no confederates were present) there were more cases of both false 
and correct blame attributions and fewer cases of uncertain responses, in comparison to the 
control groups (no group discussion). However, the ratio between correct and incorrect 
blame attributions remained relatively constant between the control and experimental 
conditions. This suggested that many of the uncertain co-witnesses will have conformed to 
both correct and incorrect co-witnesses. The findings indicate that although blame 
conformity can occur, it does not necessarily mean that it will have a negative impact on the 
accuracy of the eyewitnesses' recollections. However, it can still be argued that many of the 
uncertain individuals who conform to a co-witness will still be reporting unwitnessed 
information to investigators, be it accurate or inaccurate. Moreover, eyewitness testimonies 
are required to be independent and only based on the witness’s experiences during the 
incident (Forbes, 2003; Heaton-Armstrong, 1987). Therefore, any reports that have been 
made with the help of co-witness information (be it correct or incorrect) should be classed 
as unreliable evidence and omitted from the court case. 
The British Psychological Society (2007) set out a series of guidelines for the UK 
Home Office which advised police forces to ensure that their officers would separate multiple 
eyewitnesses apart from each other. The guidelines also recommended that the officers 
should attempt to determine whether or not the co-witnesses had discussed the event with 
each other, in order to establish whether their reports were independent or influenced. The 
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present thesis supports the aforementioned guidelines, due to the present findings 
demonstrating how easily the originality of an eyewitness’s account can be compromised 
after a co-witness discussion. However; despite such regulations being put in place, reports 
have suggested that many police officers will refrain from separating eyewitnesses, due to 
not believing in the risks associated with co-witness discussions (Paterson and Kemp, 
2005). Additionally, eyewitness surveys have found that many officers will encourage 
witnesses to discuss the event with their co-witnesses and even give their statements 
collectively (Paterson and Kemp, 2006a). It is argued that policing organisations should 
make more effort in ensuring that their officers adhere to these regulations. Police officers 
should be educated on the risks of co-witness influence and interventions should be put in 
place to prevent officers from avoiding such practises. Additionally, it is proposed that police 
investigators and legal professionals should encourage eyewitnesses to not report 
information that they may have been previously uncertain about. However, although 
inferred, there is no evidence indicating that such an intervention technique would be 
effective in helping eyewitnesses improve their blame attribution abilities. Moreover, this 
could result in valuable evidence being omitted. 
 
11.3.2. Gender and age-related differences 
 
The absence of any gender or age-related differences being observed in co-witness 
suggestibility suggests that an eyewitness’s susceptibility to blame conformity would not be 
related to the quality of their memory for the incident. Similar inferences were made for 
memory conformity by Gabbert (2004). This inference is made under the presumption that 
age and gender differences existed in memory recall, as suggested by a large body of 
existing research (see Dodson et al., 2007; Memon et al., 2003; Megreya et al., 2011; 
Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007; Seidlitz & Diener, 1998; Smith, 1966). The present study failed 
to control for memory recall quality directly; therefore, the assumption that gender and age 
related-differences in memory recall exist rest completely on the findings of previous 
empirical research. One possible explanation for why blame conformity would not bear a 
relationship with memory recall quality is that the act of blame attribution may not be 
heavily reliant on an individual’s memory retrieval skills. When faced with the task of 
attributing blame to the correct suspect, participants will be more reliant on their cognitive 
and moral reasoning abilities (Devine, 2012; Devine et al., 2001). Research has shown that, 
on average, men and women perform similarly on such cognitive reasoning tasks 
(Blumenthal, 2005). As a result, it could be suggested that an individual’s cognitive 
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reasoning skills may be able to predict their susceptibility blame conformity during an 
eyewitness investigation far more accurately than their memory retrieval skills could. 
Further, despite research suggesting that gender and age-related difference in 
memory recall quality existed, for this to have an impact on an eyewitness’s susceptibility to 
co-witness influence, the individual would have to be aware of their inaccuracies for them to 
become dependent on the reports of their co-witnesses. The results from the control groups 
indicated that there were no gender or age-related differences in the participant’s 
confidence when attributing blame. Therefore, even if age or gender-related differences in 
memory accuracy did exist, the participants will not have been aware of this and, thus, 
would have been equally susceptible to informational influence. A common misconception to 
make would be to assume that eyewitnesses who are less competent in producing an 
accurate memory report would be most susceptible to being influenced. However, the 
present work was able to identify additional factors unrelated to the individual’s competence 
that could render them more vulnerable to co-witness influence. 
 
11.3.3. Personality correlates of co-witness suggestibility 
 
Using the FIRO-B assessment, wanted control was identified as an accurate predictor 
of co-witness suggestibility. Individuals who scored high on the wanted control scale were 
significantly more susceptible to blame conformity and were also more likely to lose 
confidence in their own blame attributions after a co-witness discussion. Some interesting 
inferences were drawn from these findings. Firstly, the results indicated that individuals with 
a high level of wanted control were more likely to present investigators with misleading 
information, if it was suggested to them by a co-witness. Additionally, the results suggested 
these individuals would be more likely to lose confidence in their statements, after engaging 
in a post-event discussion with their co-witnesses. On one hand, this could suggest that the 
conforming witnesses would be less confident in their judgements which could deter them 
from giving false evidence in court. However, the findings also suggest that eyewitnesses 
with high levels of wanted control may also be less confident when giving correct 
statements, which could not only deter them from giving evidence in court, but could also 
influence the jurors in perceiving the witness to be unreliable (Brewer & Burke, 2009). 
The relationship between high wanted control scores and co-witness suggestibility 
was attributed to the submissive nature of these individuals and their reduced levels of self-
esteem (Gilbert and Allan, 1994; Schutz, 1958). Research suggest that individuals with 
submissive tendencies would be more likely to exhibit perceptions of inferior social rank and 
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are therefore, more likely to conform to those that they perceive as being more powerful 
(Gilbert, 1993). This would suggest that even if an eyewitness had a very accurate memory 
recollection of the event, exposure to misleading information from other co-witnesses would 
be likely to reduce their confidence and potentially motivate them to conform to the 
misinformation. 
Owing to these findings; it is suggested that practitioners within the criminal justice 
system should consider such personality traits when assessing an eyewitness’s testimony. If 
jurors and police investigators were to use an appropriate assessment to measure the 
witness’s level of wanted control and other indicators of submissiveness, they would have 
access to more resources for gauging the reliability of the individual’s statement. However, 
owing to the weak effect size between wanted control and co-witness suggestibility, such 
interventions may not prove to be effective. It is also important to acknowledge that such 
an assessment would have to be used in conjunction with other evidence when assessing 
the reliability of a witness. Otherwise, the investigators would run the risk of making false 
inferences. As mentioned previously, an eyewitness’s level of confidence can influence how 
the jurors will perceive their testimonies. This is worrying because the present study 
demonstrated that many eyewitnesses who engage in post-event discussions will lose 
confidence in their reports, even when giving a correct testimony. As a result, it is 
suggested that jurors should be instructed not to use the confidence of eyewitness’s as an 
indicator of accuracy or reliability, especially considering the large body of additional 
research which suggests that confidence is not a reliable predictor of eyewitness accuracy. 
 
11.3.4. Co-witness familiarity  
 
Despite evidence suggesting that the majority of co-witnesses would have pre-
existing relationships (Paterson et al., 2007), the majority of previous research had 
investigated the effects of co-witness influence on pairs of participants who were strangers 
to each other (e.g. Gabbert et al., 2003; Gabbert et al., 2004; Meade & Roediger, 2002). 
The present work produced evidence to suggest that such observations would produce an 
inaccurate representation of real co-witness discussions. The third study (Chapter 9) found 
that statement similarity between larger groups was significantly more likely when the co-
witnesses had pre-existing relationships with each other, but was unlikely if they were 
strangers. This was mainly attributed to the habitual tendency of individuals to spend less 
time questioning the credibility of those that they are familiar with (Hope et al., 2008). 
Additionally, it was suggested that the development of transactive memory systems 
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between groups of friends would allow them to concordantly dictate who they would be 
conforming to. In the Oklahoma bombing incident where one witness (Tom Kessinger) had 
influenced the statements of two others, all three co-witnesses were colleagues with pre-
existing relationships. The question therefore arises; had the co-witnesses been strangers 
to each other, would the co-witnesses have still conformed to the misleading suggestions of 
Kessinger? 
Through these observations, it is proposed that both investigators and jurors should 
consider the relationship between the co-witnesses when evaluating their statements. If 
there were to be discrepancies within the statements of a group of co-witnesses, 
investigators could consider which co-witnesses shared a pre-existing relationship with each 
other in order to determine whether any of the statements were more likely to have been 
influenced through post-event information.  
 
11.3.5. Perceptions of the information source 
 
The literature on memory conformity suggests that individuals could incorporate 
misinformation through both intentional processes (i.e. informational influence; Hope et al., 
2012) and also unintentional processes (source monitoring errors; Greene et al., 1982; 
Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; Morgan et al., 2013). With regards to the present work; due to 
latent nature of suggestibility, it was hard to accurately determine which process would be 
the predominant facilitator of blame conformity during a post-event discussion. However, 
within the final empirical study (Chapter 10), it was demonstrated that the act of blame 
conformity was, in fact, a very conscious process in which the eyewitnesses would choose 
whether or not to conform to a co-witness. The study did not eliminate the possibility of 
blame conformity being driven by source monitoring errors and it can be agreed that some 
participants may have incorporated the confederate’s misinformation unintentionally 
through such processes. However, there were multiple reasons suggesting that the main 
cause of blame conformity will have been social influence. Firstly, the experiments used 
within the thesis did not issue the participants with filler tasks between witnessing the event 
and reporting who was at fault. Therefore, participants will have been likely to have had a 
good memory of the event and would have been significantly less vulnerable to 
misattributing the post event information as witnessed information. Secondly, blame 
conformity was only observed when the confederate was presented as being highly 
intelligent or authoritative. When the confederate did not indicate their level of intelligence 
or authority (condition 2), the results found no significant differences in blame attribution 
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rates in comparison to the control condition. Source monitoring errors should not be 
affected by the characteristics of the information source. Therefore, if source monitoring 
errors had facilitated blame conformity, condition 2 would have had a significantly higher 
rate of false blame attributions in comparison to the control group, however, this was not 
evident. 
 
The final study also indicated that eyewitnesses would be more likely to conform to a 
co-witness if they perceived them as being highly intelligent. This relationship was 
attributed to the individuals believing that the co-witness would be more likely to be correct 
and, thus, becoming more susceptible to informational influence. Additionally, it was found 
that after controlling for perceived intelligence, the perceived authority and credibility of an 
information source seemed to have no additional impact on their level of influence over their 
co-witness. It was suggested that heightened authority would not have much of an 
influence on the eyewitnesses, due to their statements being made privately. Moreover. The 
findings suggest that eyewitnesses would be more concerned with the competence of a co-
witness rather than their credibility, when deciding on whether to conform. This inference 
was also supported by the observations of Thorley (2015). However, as discussed in 
Chapter 10, source credibility may have had little impact due to the participants having very 
little reason to doubt the truthfulness of another participant. It can be argued that after a 
real criminal incident, some witnesses may have a plausible reason for exposing their co-
witnesses to misinformation (such as to defend the suspect, whom they may be acquainted 
with). Resultantly, eyewitnesses will have more reason to question the credibility of their 
co-witnesses. In such circumstances, the credibility of an information source may have a 
significant effect on their level of influence on co-witnesses.  
 
11.3.6. Misinformation size and unanimity 
 
The results from study 1b found that a post-event discussion with one confederate 
had no effect on the blame attribution accuracy of the participants, in comparison to the 
control condition (no discussion permitted). The findings suggest that blame conformity 
would require multiple co-witnesses to be presenting the targeted individual with misleading 
information. Study four demonstrated that a singular source could influence the blame 
attribution of an eyewitness; however, this effect was only observed when the information 
source was presented as being exceptionally intelligent or credible. Collectively, the studies 
suggest the risk of blame conformity to one co-witness would be relatively low, an inference 
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that contradicts with a large body of previous research on memory conformity (c.f. Foster et 
al., 2012; Hope et al., 2012; Roediger et al., 2001). More specific research on blame 
conformity has also suggested that eyewitness’s can conform to the misleading statement 
of one co-witness. This difference was attributed to the ambiguity of the experimental task 
that was used within the present studies. The task of identifying which individual had 
thrown the first hit was difficult and ambiguous, due to the physical confrontation erupting 
unexpectedly and very quickly. Therefore, the participants would have been likely to believe 
that their co-witness would have faced similar levels of difficulty as them. Because of this, 
the participants may have been more likely to believe that their co-witnesses were 
vulnerable to making errors and, thus, will have been more inclined to reject the 
misinformation of a singular co-witness, perceiving it as an idiosyncratic error.  
The results from multiple studies within the thesis (studies 1 and 2) indicated that 
the rate of blame conformity significantly increased when additional confederates were 
present. The findings indicated that eyewitnesses would be significantly more vulnerable to 
blame conformity when exposed to misinformation by a group of co-witnesses. The findings 
lay in agreement with previous research on memory conformity (e.g. Walther et al., 2002). 
Moreover, the results indicated that after the addition of the second confederate, additional 
confederates had a smaller impact on the group’s level of influence over the targeted 
participants. The findings suggested that the unanimity of misinformation was more 
influential on blame conformity than the actual size of the misinformation source. However, 
it was concluded that further research was needed to determine whether a majority group 
would still have similar impact on co-witness influence if the misinformation was not 
unanimously held by all co-witnesses (i.e. multiple dissenters against a misleading 
majority). 
Two main implications were drawn from study 1b. A theoretical implication from the 
study suggested that previous research which had typically observed the effects of co-
witness influence on participant pairs will have produced inaccurate estimations of the true 
prevalence of co-witness influence during real co-witness discussions. This was because 
eyewitness surveys indicated that on average there would be over six co-witnesses present 
during an incident and as the study demonstrated, the level of co-witness influence between 
a group size two and six would significantly different. As a result, it is argued that the 
effects of co-witness discussions should be measured in different sized groups so that the 
findings could possess greater external-validity. A more practical implication of the findings 
suggested that the risks of one individual contaminating the blame attributions of a group of 
co-witnesses during a post-event discussion would be relatively low. This is because the 
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results indicated that for blame conformity to be effective, the misinformation would have to 
be presented unanimously or at the very least, by the majority of the group.  
 
11.3.7. Confidence as a measure of co-witness influence 
 
The present study used the self-reported confidence scores of participants as an 
additional measure of co-witness influence. This measure was implemented after previous 
research had indicated that many eyewitnesses who did not conform to a co-witness could 
still be influenced by losing confidence in their own reports (Luus & Wells, 1994). 
Additionally, research had also indicated that individuals who would already hold an 
erroneous report of an incident could gain more confidence in their false judgement if 
confirmatory information was presented to them by a co-witness (Allwood et al., 2006; 
Semmler et al., 2004). However, results indicated that the participants’ self-reported 
confidence scores did not seem to bear a clear relationship with co-witness influence. The 
only significant findings that were found using the confidence scores were that male 
eyewitnesses would be more likely to be overconfident in their false reports after exposure 
to misinformation and that eyewitnesses with high levels of wanted control would be likely 
to lose confidence in their reports, after a post-event discussion with co-witnesses. Although 
the observed relationships were significant and valid, they were also weak in effect size. 
Other than these observations there were no other links between confidence levels and co-
witness influence. The insignificant observations could be attributed to a methodological 
flaw in the way that the confidence scores were analysed. Due to the theoretical design of 
the studies, participants who had produced their responses through conformity (were 
confidence may not have been affected) and participants who had produced their responses 
through their own choice or through source monitoring errors (where confidence would not 
be affected) could not be differentiated. 
Thus, a direction for future research would be to incorporate a more appropriate 
design with greater internal validity, which would allow the confidence scores of participants 
to represent co-witness influence more reliably. One way such a design could be 
implemented is by recording the responses of participants before and after they had 
engaged in a post-event discussion. However, such a design would run the risk making the 
participants become more aware of the post-event information, which could affect their final 
responses.  
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11.4. Real life applicability of findings 
 
Although implications and practical applications can be drawn from the empirical 
studies presented here, there are numerous factors from real criminal incidents that cannot 
be emulated within a laboratory simulation. Consequently, these caveats question the 
external validity of implications drawn from the present observations. The caveats relating 
to the real-life applicability of the findings are discussed below. 
Perhaps the hardest element of a real criminal incident recreate within an 
experiment is the induced levels of shock and fear that can be inflicted onto an eyewitness 
during criminal incidents that involve violence or danger. Researchers have argued that 
higher levels of stress during an incident can have a negative impact on an eyewitness’s 
focus during the incident and consequently distort their memory of the event (Deffenbacher 
et al., 2004; Dysart et al., 2002; Roebers & Schneider, 2000; Tuckey and Brewer, 2003; 
Wells et al., 2000). This could potentially cause the eyewitness to become more reliant on 
external sources to make sense of the incident and reconstruct the event. Participants form 
the present experiments viewed the incidents through a monitor screen. They were fully 
aware that there was no danger to their safety and as a result, they would not have been 
affected by the same kind of emotional stress. An attempt to create and match a false 
sense of shock or fear would not only be highly impractical and difficult, but would also 
break multiple ethical codes of practise (as set out by the BPS Code of Human Research 
Ethics, 2011). 
It is also impossible to replicate the real-life implications associated with eyewitness 
statements. After a real criminal incident, eyewitnesses will be fully aware of the 
implications that their statements will have to the investigation, in helping convict the 
correct offender (Williamson et al., 2013). Additionally, police officers are perceived as 
authoritative individuals (Garrido et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2012; Williamson et al., 
2013). As a result, witnesses who are interviewed by an officer may be more likely to 
exhibit compliant tendencies towards them and, thus, may exhibit a greater pressure to 
perform (Bushman, 1984). Within an eyewitness experiment, participants will be likely to 
assume that there is a correct answer of which the interviewer would be aware of and, as a 
result, participants may be more inclined to conform if they think that the interviewer will 
be able to determine whether they are correct or not. During a real incident, the police 
officers understanding of the event may be incomplete and, as a result, participants may be 
less likely to conform if they think that the officer would not know whether they are correct 
or not. This suggestion is supported by previous research; Insko et al. (1985) found that 
the misinformation was more influential when the respondents believed that there was a 
 226 
 
correct answer to the task, as compared to subjective tasks where there was no verifiable 
correct answer. 
The consequences of providing false information to an interviewer are also 
significantly greater during a real police interview than during an experimental interview. 
During a real criminal investigation, eyewitnesses will be fully aware that a false blame 
attribution could consequently lead to the conviction and imprisonment of an innocent 
individual. As a result, eyewitnesses would be more cautious in accepting unwitnessed 
information from others. However, during the experiments from the present thesis, there 
were no serious consequences to providing a false blame attribution (other than the 
interviewer knowing that you were incorrect). As a result, the participants may have been 
more careless in their decisions to incorporate unwitnessed information into their final 
report. 
Ultimately, the aforementioned implications from real-life investigations would be 
extremely difficult to replicate. One way of recreating a study with higher levels of 
ecological validity would be to adopt the methodological design of Areh (2011). Areh 
conducted a laboratory study on eyewitness accuracy. Participants were told that their 
answers would be used in a real investigation to identify the offender, inducing similar 
investigator effects that would be present during a real eyewitness interview. Overall, the 
study found similar results to other research which, like the present work, failed to recreate 
this real-life implication effect. However, such a design would involve a strong level of 
deception on the participants, which could generate ethical complications. 
As discussed previously; participants who took part in the present study will have 
been very unlikely to believe that their co-witnesses would be purposefully deceiving. This is 
because, as far as the participants were aware, their co-witnesses would have no motivation 
to purposely lie to them during the discussion (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). As a result, they will 
have exhibited a truth bias when encountering the confederates’ misinformation (Van Swol 
& Braun, 2015; Vrij, 2008). After a real criminal incident, an eyewitness could have a 
plausible reason for exposing their co-witnesses to misinformation (such as to defend the 
suspect, of whom they may be acquainted with). As a result, eyewitnesses may be more 
aware of potential dishonesty during a post-event discussion with other co-witnesses. 
Consequently, eyewitnesses from real incidents may, therefore, be more likely to question 
the credibility of their co-witness’s statement and, thus, be more likely to reject their 
information. A fruitful direction for future research would be to incorporate a way to give 
some participants a motive to be dishonest. By making the rest of the participants aware of 
these potential motives, the participants may be less reluctant to assume that their co-
witnesses are being truthful. 
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During all of the experimental trials (with the exception of the control condition), all 
participants were instructed to discuss the event with co-witnesses prior to giving their 
statements. Therefore, the subsequent results from these trials would be based on the 
assumption that every eyewitness from an incident would engage in a post-event 
discussion. In reality, there is no guarantee that all eyewitnesses will wish to discuss the 
event with co-witnesses. According to Paterson and Kemp (2006a), 14% of eyewitnesses 
will refrain from engaging in a co-witness discussion when there are additional co-witnesses 
present. A question that arises is whether the non-engaging co-witnesses possess distinct 
individual differences from the engaging co-witnesses. The FIRO-B indicates that individuals 
with high levels of wanted and expressed inclusion would be significantly more likely to 
interact with others (Rubin et al., 1988; Schutz, 1958). This could suggest that after a real 
criminal incident, eyewitnesses with higher needs for expressed and wanted inclusion may 
be more susceptible to co-witness influence due to being at a higher risk of encountering 
co-witness misinformation. Furthermore, the third empirical study of this thesis suggested 
that individuals with higher levels of wanted control would be more vulnerable to co-witness 
influence due to their submissive tendencies making them more susceptible to informational 
influence during a discussion. However, this was only observed when the participants were 
deliberately instructed to engage in a post-event discussion. Studies indicate that high 
levels of wanted control and submissive personalities are comorbid with an introverted 
personality (Gilbert & Allan, 1994; Schutz, 1958). Therefore, it is likely that after a real 
criminal investigation, individuals with high levels of wanted control may be less likely to 
engage in co-witness discussion due to their introverted tendencies and, as a result, may be 
less likely to encounter and incorporate the misinformation of their co-witnesses. If an 
eyewitness’s tendency to engage in co-witness discussions is moderated by internal factors, 
this could suggest that the relationship between individual differences and memory/blame 
conformity may be different to what has been observed through traditional laboratory based 
observations (including the present studies). A suggestion for future research, to allow the 
participants to have control over their decision to engage in a discussion, is to present no 
instructions for a discussion. Instead, the experimenter can leave the room and let the 
participants dictate their own behaviour. However, multiple issues could arise from such a 
design. Many participants may assume that they are not permitted to discuss the event due 
to being in a laboratory. Conversely, they may assume that the allocated time after the 
footage has elapsed would be for them to discuss the event. Secondly, even if some 
participants choose not to discuss the event with others, they would still have to be present 
whilst the other participants discuss the event. Consequently, they will still be exposed to 
the information of those who do chose to discuss the event. 
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Despite some significant issues with regards to the real-life applicability of 
eyewitness research, it can still be confidently contended that eyewitnesses from real 
criminal incidents will be susceptible to co-witness influence. This has been demonstrated 
within numerous notable real-life cases of false witness testimonies, such as the misleading 
statements provided during the Oklahoma Bombing incident (discussed in Chapter 1-3). 
Furthermore; co-witness influence has been commonly observed after traffic accidents. 
Through the use of mathematical and physics–based calculations, traffic police have 
commonly disproven the collective statements of eyewitness groups. Traffic officers have 
stated that within real cases of motor-vehicle incidents, eyewitnesses will often agree on 
certain information about a witnessed event, which will often be incorrect (Gabbert, 2004). 
However; based on the existing differences between the experimental paradigms used by 
studies within the current literature and real-life incidents, it is proposed that - in the future 
- more realistic research may identify additional mediating factors that are associated with 
co-witness influence. 
 
11.5. Limitations and directions for future research 
 
As well as some general differences between the majority of eyewitness 
experimental designs (including those utilised in the present studies) and real-life crime 
incidents, the experiments presented here have several limitations that could be amended 
by future research. In addition, numerous implications have arisen from the present findings 
which could be built upon by future studies. Many of these limitations and suggestions are 
discussed within their respective empirical chapters (Chapters 6-10); however, some of the 
more general issues are discussed below. 
 
11.5.1. No filler tasks administrated 
 
The present studies did not provide the participants with any form of filler tasks to 
complete during the interval between viewing the incident and providing a statement 
(blame attribution). Filler tasks have been commonly used by researchers when observing 
the accuracy of eyewitness memory (e.g. Echterhoff et al., 2005; Shaw, Bjork, & Handal, 
1995; Smith, Kassin, & Ellsworth, 1989). The tasks often take the form of an unrelated 
cognitive reasoning task such as mathematical questions, and are used to divert the 
participant’s attention away from the incident for a brief moment before they are 
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interviewed about the incident. Such tasks are used because during a real investigation, 
eyewitnesses are very rarely interviewed instantly after witnessing the event; interviewing 
can commence after several hours or even days (Horry, Memon, Milne, & Wright, 2012). 
Therefore, if an experiment allows participants to give a report instantly after viewing the 
incident, the participants would possess an unrealistic memory advantage in comparison to 
real eyewitnesses. Within the present studies, participants viewed the incident, discussed 
the event with their co-witnesses (excluding the control groups) and were then interviewed 
privately. Although this design meant that the participants will have possessed an 
unrealistically accurate memory for the incident, the absence of a filler task can be justified 
due to the nature of the present studies’ observations. The present studies observed the 
blame attribution of participants to determine whether they had been influenced by their co-
witnesses (blame conformity). As discussed previously; eyewitness conformity does not 
seem to bear a direct relationship with memory accuracy (Gabbert 2004; Gabbert et al., 
2003). Instead, an individual’s susceptibility to co-witness conformity seems to be 
predominantly driven by their individual differences in personality (Mojtahedi et al., 2017) 
as well as external factors such as the perceived characteristics of the co-witnesses (Betz et 
al., 1996; Forgas & Williams, 2001; Throley, 2015). Therefore, the quality of the 
participant’s memory should not have an effect on their susceptibility to blame conformity. 
By ensuring that the participants had a good memory of the incident, any significant 
differences in false blame attribution rates within the experimental conditions could be more 
confidently attributed to co-witness conformity rather than memory errors. 
 
11.5.2. Singular measure for blame conformity 
 
The present study incorporated a single blame attribution task to measure blame 
conformity. Although the task was able to accurately simulate the process of eyewitness 
blame attribution, by relying on an independent response to measure the dependent 
variable of blame conformity, the internal validity of the findings could be questionable. This 
is because the blame attribution task only consisted of three potential responses (blaming 
the man in the yellow t-shirt, man in the green t-shirt, or responding as ‘unsure’). As a 
result, many participants may have produced a response through guessing, due to there 
being a 50% chance of being correct. To avoid such potential risks, future research should 
present participants with multiple blame attribution paradigms, allowing the research to 
record a more reliable overall measure of co-witness suggestibility. 
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11.5.3. The time interval between witnessing an incident and giving 
evidence 
 
As discussed above, many eyewitnesses may not be asked to provide a statement 
until several days after the incident (Horry et al., 2012); therefore, it would be interesting 
to observe the effects of co-witness discussion on participants several days after witnessing 
an incident. Although some evidence has suggested that memory conformity may not carry 
a direct relationship with memory accuracy (Gabbert 2004; Gabbert et al., 2003), Paterson 
et al. (2009) found that participants were more susceptible to memory conformity when 
being asked to give a statement two weeks after viewing the incident, in comparison to 
those who gave statements 20 minutes after viewing the incident. This could be due to the 
participants losing confidence in their own memory reports after the longer duration. Thus, 
a fruitful direction for future research would be to observe the effects of blame conformity 
after different time intervals, to gain an accurate indication of the relationship between time 
delay and susceptibility to blame conformity. Additionally, Paterson and Kemp (2006a) 
suggested that only 67% of participants who discussed the event with others, did so 
immediately after the incident. A large proportion of eyewitnesses reported discussing the 
event several hours-days after the incident. An interesting direction for future research 
would be to investigate whether the time interval between witnessing an incident and 
discussing it with others could have a moderating effect on an individual’s susceptibility to 
co-witness influence. 
 
11.5.4. Controlling for speaking order during the group discussion 
 
During the present experiments, all confederates had received specific instructions 
on their role and were instructed to interact with the participants under a rigid set of 
guidelines (see Chapter 5). They were not, however, presented with any specific 
instructions regarding when to speak during the post-event discussion (i.e. whether to 
speak before or after the other group members). Instead, confederates were allowed to 
present their misinformation at any time during the discussion. This was done to create a 
more naturalistic environment, in order to prevent the participants from questioning the 
validity of the confederates as true participants. Secondly, with many of the experimental 
conditions incorporating multiple confederates, it would have been more difficult to provide 
each confederate with a specific order for speaking, whilst maintaining the false illusion of a 
natural discussion amongst true participants. However, failure to control for the order of 
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discussion could have had an extraneous effect on the results. Gabbert, Memon, and Wright 
(2006) demonstrated that the first speaker will have the greatest influence on the rest of 
the group. Therefore, if a true participant was first to speak, this could produce a 
significantly different outcome than if a confederate was first to speak. To control for this 
variable, future interviewers might provide the participants with instructions for a structured 
co-witness discussion. The instructions could then provide a specific order for the 
participants to state their judgements before engaging in a group discussion (i.e. ‘please 
state who you believe threw the first hit in an orderly fashion, starting from the participant 
on the far right and ending on the participant on the far left’).  
 
11.5.5. Skewed sample size 
 
For many of the studies, the experiments were conducted over the duration of a 
year, and were sequentially carried out in order of condition. However, this turned out to be 
an unreliable approach as the differences in experiment dates had a mediating effect on the 
availability of participants for each experimental condition. Many subjects who were 
allocated a later date dropped out of the study and did not turn up to the experiments. 
Resultantly, there were some disparities in sample size between the experimental conditions 
within studies one to three. This is acknowledged as a limiting factor to the study; however, 
despite this level of variance, all experimental conditions were still of sufficient size for 
statistical comparisons to be made (in accordance with Stevens, 2009). 
 
11.5.6. Interviewing techniques 
 
It was demonstrated that eyewitnesses could be influenced by their co-witnesses 
when attempting to attribute blame. Moreover, it was shown that this form of influence 
could result in innocent individuals being blamed for committing a crime. In regard to the 
progression of blame conformity research, proceeding studies should aim to identify and 
empirically test appropriate intervention techniques to reduce the risks of blame conformity 
during eyewitness interviews. Research has indicated that positive rapport building could 
help reduce an eyewitness’s risk of reporting misleading post-event information 
(Kieckhaefer & Wright, 2014; Kieckhaefer, Vallano & Schreiber Compo, 2013; Vallano & 
Schreiber Compo, 2011). The findings suggest that certain interview guidelines such as the 
Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) may be able to allow investigators to reduce 
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the risks of recording such influenced reports. Therefore, future research should aim to build 
upon the key findings from the current thesis by observing the effects of different 
intervention techniques in reducing the risks of blame conformity. 
 
11.5.7. Recording the initial responses of participants before the 
group discussion 
 
The present study only recorded the blame attribution and confidence of each 
participant once (after the group discussion had taken place for participants in the 
experimental conditions). The experiments did not record participants' responses both 
before and after the group discussions for multiple reasons. Firstly, it could be argued that 
the process of giving a statement of an event twice in a short space of time would lack 
ecological validity. This is because it would be unusual for a participant to give a statement 
both before and after discussing the incident with eyewitnesses at the scene, typically, 
investigators will only record the statements of eyewitnesses at the crime scene once — 
although eyewitnesses could be asked to give additional testimonies later on during the 
court proceedings. Secondly, a risk of making participants give responses both before and 
after a group discussion could be that participants would be more likely to suspect that that 
the experimenter is attempting to observe their suggestibility to a co-witness discussion. 
Consequently, this could have an effect on a participant's second response, disrupting the 
internal validity of the experiment. However, the present project acknowledged that without 
recording the responses of participants both before and after exposure to co-witness 
misinformation, it is impossible to determine the exact number of participants who provided 
a false blame attribution through blame conformity and the number of participants who 
provided a false blame attribution through independent errors. Future research could 
potentially counteract these issues by collecting the responses of participants both before 
and after exposure to co-witness misinformation and use a post-manipulation check (where 
participants are asked afterwards if they suspected the experiment's true aims) to 
determine whether the participants' answers were affected by an expectancy bias. 
 
11.5.8. Controlling for the participants' ethnicity and education 
 
To date, there has been no evidence produced to suggest that the ethnicity of an 
eyewitness could have an effect on their suggestibility to co-witnesses or any other sources 
of post-event information. For this reason, the present study did not record or control for 
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the participants' ethnicity. However, the project acknowledges that there still could be some 
ethnical or cultural differences in an eyewitness’s susceptibility to co-witness influence. This 
is because earlier cross-cultural studies on social conformity demonstrated that participants 
from collectivist cultures (such as China) were more likely to conform to a majority group 
due to the cultural norms within their communities favouring group compliance, in 
comparison to individualist cultures (such as the UK) (Bond and Smith, 1996). Although, the 
present experiments were carried out on individuals living in the UK, if the study had 
recruited participants who were originally from collectivist cultures, their cultural norms may 
have consequently influenced their responses. Secondly, research has demonstrated that 
during identification tasks, eyewitnesses can exhibit own-race biases, in that participants 
are more likely to recognise the faces of individuals of similar ethnicities (Johnson & 
Fredrickson, 2005; Meissner & Bingham, 2001; Wright, Boyd, and Tredoux, 2003). Due to 
the present studies' stimulus only involving suspects of African descent, it could be argued 
that participants of a similar ethnicity may have had an advantage in recalling the event and 
thus, may have been less reliant on their co-witnesses’ information. However, it should be 
acknowledged that research has only demonstrated the existence of own-race biases during 
eyewitness line-up identification and not during eyewitness memory recall, thus there is no 
direct evidence that participants in the present study will have exhibited such biases.  
Another demographic variable that was not measured during the experiments was 
the participants’ levels of education. Furthermore, despite recruiting from both student and 
non-student samples, the present studies did not attempt to investigate the differences 
between these samples with regard to co-witness suggestibility. This was due to previous 
research suggesting that student and non-student eyewitnesses perform similarly on 
memory recall tasks (see Desmarais & Read, 2011, for review). However, future research 
should still seek to investigate whether such variables could have moderating effects on an 
eyewitness’s susceptibility to co-witness influence. 
 
11.5.9. Peripheral errors during the blame attribution task 
 
The present studies attempted to observe the process of blame attribution through a 
task that required participants to identify which person from a CCTV footage had initiated 
the physical assault – a process that required the participants to report central details about 
the incident. Participants were not informed of either of the involved individuals' names and 
due to the angle of the CCTV camera, it would have been difficult for participants to clearly 
recognize and differentiate between each person's face. In lieu of this, participants identified 
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which person they thought was at blame by referring to the colour of the individual's 
clothing (yellow top or green top). However, the use of peripheral details from the event 
could have meant that if participants were unable to recall the correct colour of clothing 
each person had, they could have misattributed the wrong colour clothing to each person 
(i.e. thinking that the man in the yellow top was wearing a green top and/or the man in the 
green top was wearing a yellow top). Such errors could decrease the internal validity of the 
present studies' dependent variable, due to the chances of the responses being indicative of 
peripheral memory errors rather than blame attribution accuracy. 
 
11.6. Conclusion 
 
It is a common tendency for humans to discuss their memories of events with one-
another and the more unusual and emotionally significant a memory is, the more the 
individual will want to discuss the event with another person (Gabbert, 2004). It is therefore 
no surprise that the majority of eyewitnesses seem to choose to discuss their witnessed 
incidents with others around them (Paterson & Kemp, 2006a). Within the past two decades, 
a wealth of research has attempted to observe the effects of co-witness discussions and the 
majority seem to have indicated that eyewitnesses can be influenced by the information 
they encounter during post-event discussions. Researchers have been able to demonstrate 
how misleading information from co-witnesses could influence an individual to falsely report 
seeing items that were not present, get the characteristics of certain details incorrect (e.g. 
suspect’s hair colour), and even misidentify the wrong suspect from an identification 
parade. Rather than concerning one’s self with false reports of inconsequential peripheral 
items that were not significantly relevant to a forensic investigation (such as the presence 
of certain items from a scene), the focus the present research was on observing the effects 
of co-witness influence on the false reporting of forensically relevant details, such as who 
they believed was to blame for committing the crime. The studies demonstrated that 
individuals could be influenced by their co-witnesses when attempting to attribute blame 
and, more importantly, it was observed that individuals could be influenced by their co-
witnesses into blaming the wrong person for committing a crime. The empirical studies went 
further and built on the existing literature by identifying various internal and external 
factors that were proven to mediate co-witness influence. A key assertion made through the 
present findings was that the risks of co-witness influence are context-dependent, and will 
vary significantly depending on the characteristics of the targeted witness, the 
characteristics of the co-witnesses who are presenting the information, and the 
environmental characteristics of the incident. The present study successfully achieved its 
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main aims in investigating the effects of co-witness influence on eyewitness blame 
attribution and identifying the external and internal predictors of co-witness suggestibility, 
in relation to blame conformity and eyewitness confidence.  
With regards to the practical implications of the findings, practitioners within the 
criminal justice system — both legal and investigative— could benefit from the discussed 
observations by enhancing their knowledge on not only the dangers of co-witness influence, 
but also the predictors of co-witness suggestibility. Of course, as discussed earlier (see 
11.4.), there are boundaries to the applicability of the present study’s findings to real 
criminal investigations. Moreover, the ecological validity of the laboratory-based 
observations are not completely exemplary, therefore, caution must still be taken when 
interpreting the findings and using them to assess the reliability of an eyewitness’s 
statement. Practitioners can however, use the present findings to identify additional factors 
relating to both eyewitnesses and their environments that require consideration when 
evaluating the reliability of such investigative information. A key issue investigators are 
sometimes faced with is a surplus of investigative information — of which, most will be 
unreliable or inaccurate (Canter & Youngs, 2009). As a result, investigators have to be 
cautious in assessing the reliability of each source to prevent the investigations from 
following an incorrect lead and such a process could slow the investigation down severely. 
Therefore, by presenting investigators with more information for gauging the reliability of 
eyewitness evidence, the process of evaluating investigative information could be improved 
with regards to both accuracy and time efficiency. Furthermore, the findings may be able to 
help determine future interventions for preventing co-witness misinformation from guiding 
an investigation. It is proposed that future research will build on the present findings by 
investigating the most efficient approach for helping investigators filter out unwitnessed 
information from eyewitness reports. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Pre-experiment instruction sheets. 
A. True participant sheet 
Instruction Sheet 
 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate within the present study. Before starting the 
experiment, it is worth familiarising yourself with some background information relating to 
the research you are involved in. 
 
The researcher: 
 
The key researcher for this study is Dara Mojtahedi, a PhD student at the University 
of Huddersfield. 
 
The PhD project, of which you are participating in, has also been supervised by Dr 
Maria Ioannou and Dr Laura Hammond- members of staff at the University of Huddersfield. 
 
The current study: 
 
The current research is interested in identifying how individuals react when 
encountering violent behaviour.  This means that the footage you will be viewing will 
contain some scenes of fighting that many would consider to be violent. You are asked to 
watch the footage and later, partake in some discussion activities in relation to you views on 
the event. Please refrain from talking to any other participants, unless instructed to do so 
by the experimenter. 
 
 
Thank you, 
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Dara Mojtahedi 
PhD Researcher 
 
 
B. Confederate sheet 
Instruction Sheet 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate within the present study.  
 
You have been randomly selected to play the role of a confederate within this study. 
 
This means that you will be asked to purposely produce specific responses during the 
experiment. The aim of the study is to determine whether eyewitnesses can be influenced 
by their co-witnesses, when attempting to attribute blame. 
 
Shortly, you will be asked to watch a footage of a bar fight breaking out. The footage 
will show a man in a dark green t-shirt starting a fight with a man in a yellow t-shirt by 
attacking him first.  
 
Once you have watched the video footage I will be asking your group to discuss 
amongst each other what happened. Your job is to purposely suggest that the man in the 
yellow top had started the fight by confronting the other man and throwing the first hit. You 
must not let on to the others that you are a confederate. 
 
You can provide your misleading suggestion at any time during the discussion 
(present the misinformation when you deem most appropriate). 
You can either present it before the other participants have spoken by saying the 
following sentence: ‘I remember seeing the man in the yellow top throw the first hit.’ 
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You can present your misinformation after a participant has given the correct 
response by saying ‘No, I remember the man in the yellow top throwing the first hit.’ 
You can also present the misinformation after another participant has provided a 
similarly misleading response by saying ‘Yes, I agree. I also remember seeing the man in 
the yellow top throwing the first hit.’ 
 
Please do not add any additional arguments or information to the discussion. If 
another participant questions your input, you can respond by saying ‘well, that’s what I 
remember seeing from the video’. There may other confederates within the same group as 
you. You are permitted to slightly alter the wording of the responses provided above, to 
prevent your response from sounding to similar to another participant/confederate’s. You 
are instructed to provide all of your statements in a confident manner, but you are advised 
not to be assertive or to try to be purposefully persuasive. 
 
Before starting the experiment, it is worth familiarising yourself with some 
background information relating to the research you are involved in. 
 
Thank you, 
Dara Mojtahedi 
PhD Researcher. 
 
Appendix 2. Information sheet, consent form and debrief sheet. 
A. Information sheet. 
  
INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTS OF CO-WITNESS INFLUENCE ON BLAME 
ATTRIBUTION 
 
INFORMATION SHEET  
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You are being invited to take part in this experiment.  Before you decide to take part 
it is important that you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with the 
experimenter if you wish.  Please do not hesitate to ask if there is anything that is not clear 
or if you would like more information. 
 
What is the study about? 
The purpose of this study is to produce an accurate simulation of witnessing a crime 
and to observe to identify the attitudes of individuals on watching violence. 
 
Why I have been approached? 
You have been asked to participate because the study requires a copious amount of 
well minded individuals to watch the footage to allow us to understand how individuals react 
to witnessing a crime. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, participation is completely voluntary, you can refuse to participate at any time. If 
you do choose to take part, you will be asked to fill in a consent form after being informed 
of what the study consists of. You can withdraw from the study at anytime without any 
reason and it will not affect you. 
 
What will I need to do? 
If you were to take part in the experiment this is what the study would consist of : 
 1)You will be asked to watch a short video. 
2A) After viewing the video, you will be given the opportunity to discuss the footage 
with the other participants. 
2B) After watching the footage, you are not allowed to discuss the footage with the 
other participants. 
3) You will then be asked a series of questions about your views of the footage. 
4) You will then be debriefed and any questions you have will be answered. 
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(NB: the use of A/B indicates alternative instructions participants will be given 
depending on which condition they will be in.)  
 
Will my identity be disclosed? 
All information will be highly confidential and not disclosed to anyone outside the 
research team, unless you disclose any information that puts yourself or others at risk. 
Through out the research you will be refered to by your allocated number and not your 
name, making your data untraceable to you. 
 
What will happen to the information? 
All information will be stored electronically onto one computer and also on one pen 
drive, both of which will be password protected. As mentioned before, the data will not 
include your name or any other details that can make you identifiable, granting total 
annonymity. 
 
Who can I contact for further information? 
If you require any further information about the research, please contact me on:  
 
Researcher: Dara Mojtahedi  
Email: dara.mojtahedi@hud.ac.uk 
Mobile: +44 (0) 7932475715 
 
Supervisor: Dr Maria Ioannou 
Email: m.ioannou@hud.ac.uk 
Mobile: +44 (0) 779 612 3044 
 
Supervisor: Dr Laura Hammond 
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Email: l.hammond@hud.ac.uk 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1484 471460 
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B. Consent form 
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C. Debrief sheet 
Debrief Sheet 
 
Thank you for your participation in the study, please be aware if you choose to want 
to withdraw your data from the study at any time please email us on one of the addresses 
listed below to do so. 
The following sheet will explain the whole study to you thoroughly. 
Aims of the experiment: 
The study is aiming to identify if eyewitnesses are at risk of conforming to each 
other’s statements if they are allowed to discuss the footage amongst each other before 
giving statements. 
The study was made up of 2 main groups. The control group was the group which 
showed participants the footage and then asked them to carry out the identification parade 
without discussing the footage. 
The control group involved the participants discussing the footage before carrying 
out the identification parade. However if you were in this group, the other four group 
members were not actual participants but confederates that were planted in your group to 
purposely claim that a different individual committed the crime. The study proposed that if 
the participants in this group gave a false answer as well it would have been due to 
conforming to the confederates. 
The footage: 
The footage that you will have watched was a mock scenario that was recorded in a 
Vox Bar, Huddersfield. All the individuals in the footage were volunteers and nobody was 
hurt in the making of the footage. 
The Questionnaire: 
The Questionnaire that you filled out before watching the footage is called the 
Fundamental interpersonal relations orientation (FIRO) questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was used so that the participant’s scores on it could be compared with their answers on the 
identifications parade to establish if the questionnaire could predict whether certain 
individuals were more likely to conform to confederates than others.  
Further Questions: 
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Should you have any further questions or if any aspect of the experiment has 
effected you in anyway, please contact me through my details below for more information. 
Dara.mojtahedi@hud.ac.uk 
+44 (0) 7932475715 
 
Thank you for your time, 
 
Dara Mojtahedi 
 
 
Appendix 3. Evidence of SREP approval  
 
 
Appendix 4. Interview script  
 
Experimenter Questions 
 
During the event that you just witnessed, where you able to identify which person 
had thrown the first hit? If so, could you please identify which person it was based on a 
description of their clothing? If you are unsure as to who had started the fight, you can 
state that you are ‘unsure’. Please try to refrain from guessing and only provide a response 
based on what you remember seeing yourself. 
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Answer: __________________ 
 
Could you also please state how confident you are in your response on a scale of one 
to five, with one meaning very little confidence and five meaning a very high level of 
confidence. (do not ask for confidence rating from those who answer ‘unsure’). 
 
 
Confidence rating:                             1        
                                                              2 
                                                              3 
                                                              4 
                                                              5 
 
Appendix 5. Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation-
Behaviour (FIRO-B) Scale 
 
Below is a list of some different ways of behaving towards others that you may have. 
Read each statement put a X in one of the 6 boxes to show how much you agree 
that the statement is true.  
The more you agree it is true, the nearer your X should be to the AGREE side. 
 
 
 
 
1. I seek out people to be with. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
2. People decide what to do when we are 
together. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
3. I am totally honest with my close friends. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
4. People invite me to do things. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
5. I am the dominant person when I am with 
people. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
6. My close friends tell me their real feelings. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
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7. I join social groups. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
8. People strongly influence my actions. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
9. I confide in my close friends. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
10. People invite me to join their activities. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
11. I get other people to do things I want 
done. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
12. My close friends tell me about private 
matters. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
13. I join social organisations. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
14. People control my actions. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
15. I am more comfortable when people do 
not get too close. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
16. People include me in their activities. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
17. I strongly influence other people's actions. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
18. My close friends do not tell me about 
themselves. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
19. I am included in informal social activities. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
20. I am easily led by people. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
21. People should keep their private feelings 
to themselves. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
22. People invite me to participate in their 
activities. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
23. I take charge when I am with people 
socially. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
24. My close friends let me know their real 
feelings. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
25. I include other people in my plans. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
26. People decide things for me. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
27. There are some things I do not tell 
anyone. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
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28. People include me in their social affairs. DISAGREE       AGREE 
 
29. I get people to do things the way I want 
them done. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
30. My closest friends keep secrets from me. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
31. I have people around me. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
32. People strongly influence my ideas. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
33. There are some things I would not tell 
anyone. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
34. People ask me to participate in their 
discussions. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
35. I take charge when I am with people. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
36. My friends confide in me. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
37. When people are doing things together I 
join them. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
38. I am strongly influenced by what people 
say. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
39. I have at least one friend to whom I can 
tell anything. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
40. People invite me to parties. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
41. I strongly influence other people`s ideas. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
42. My close friends keep their feelings a 
secret from me. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
43. I look for people to be with. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
44. Other people take charge when we work 
together. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
45. There is a part of myself I keep private. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
46. People invite me to join them when we 
have free time. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
47. I take charge when I work with people. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
48. At least two of my friends tell me their 
true feelings. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
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49. I participate in group activities. DISAGREE       AGREE 
 
50. People often cause me to change my 
mind. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
51. I have close relationships with a few 
people. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
52. People invite me to do things with them. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
53. I see to it that people do things the way I 
want them to. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
 
54. My friends tell me about their private 
lives. 
 
DISAGREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AGREE 
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